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Since its founding, NASA has been dedicated 
to the advancement of aeronautics and space 
science. The NASA scientific and technical 
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helping NASA maintain this important role. 
The NASA STI program operates under the 
auspices of the Agency Chief Information 
Officer. It collects, organizes, provides for 
archiving, and disseminates NASA’s STI. The 
NASA STI program provides access to the 
NASA Aeronautics and Space Database and 
its public interface, the NASA Technical 
Report Server, thus providing one of the 
largest collections of aeronautical and space 
science STI in the world. Results are published 
in both non-NASA channels and by NASA in 
the NASA STI Report Series, which includes 
the following report types: 
TECHNICAL PUBLICATION. Reports of 
completed research or a major significant 
phase of research that present the results of 
NASA Programs and include extensive data or 
theoretical analysis. Includes compilations of 
significant scientific and technical data and 
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reference value. NASA counterpart of peer-
reviewed formal professional papers but has 
less stringent limitations on manuscript length 
and extent of graphic presentations. 
TECHNICAL MEMORANDUM. Scientific 
and technical findings that are preliminary or 
of specialized interest, e.g., quick release 
reports, working papers, and bibliographies 
that contain minimal annotation. Does not 
contain extensive analysis. 
CONTRACTOR REPORT. Scientific and 
technical findings by NASA-sponsored 
contractors and grantees. 
CONFERENCE PUBLICATION. Collected 
papers from scientific and technical 
conferences, symposia, seminars, or other 
meetings sponsored or co-sponsored  
by NASA. 
SPECIAL PUBLICATION. Scientific, 
technical, or historical information from 
NASA programs, projects, and missions, 
often concerned with subjects having 
substantial public interest. 
TECHNICAL TRANSLATION. English-
language translations of foreign scientific 
and technical material pertinent to  
NASA’s mission. 
Specialized services also include creating 
custom thesauri, building customized 
databases, and organizing and publishing 
research results. 
For more information about the NASA STI 
program, see the following: 
Access the NASA STI program home page at 
http://www.sti.nasa.gov 
E-mail your question via the Internet to 
help@sti.nasa.gov 
Fax your question to the NASA STI Help 
Desk at 443-757-5803 
Phone the NASA STI Help Desk at  
443-757-5802 
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NASA STI Help Desk 
NASA Center for Aerospace Information 
7115 Standard Drive 
Hanover, MD 21076-1320 
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Preface 
In order to appreciate this report as the latest development in the evolution of risk management 
(RM) at NASA, it is important for the reader to have some knowledge of the milestones that 
preceded it.  Formal RM first began on an agency-wide basis in 1995 when the Office of Safety 
and Mission Assurance (OSMA) introduced it in the form of Continuous Risk Management 
(CRM), developed in the early 1990s for the Department of Defense by the Software Engineering 
Institute (SEI).  (SEI is a Federally Funded Research and Development Center and part of 
Carnegie-Mellon University).  It was at this time that OSMA became the NASA office of prime 
responsibility (OPR) for RM.  In 2002, as the OPR for RM, OSMA published NASA Procedures 
and Guidelines (NPG) 8000.4, Risk Management Procedures and Guidelines, the first Agency 
directive on RM.  The NPG continued to rely on CRM as the paradigm for NASA’s RM process.  
At that time CRM focused mainly on NASA’s programs and projects and on the identification 
and management of individual risks. In 2008, OSMA revised NPG 8000.4 and published it as 
NASA Procedural Requirements (NPR) 8000.4A, Agency Risk Management Procedural 
Requirements.  NPR 8000.4A continued to use CRM but added an Analysis-of-Alternatives (AoA) 
type front-end to the process, calling it Risk-Informed Decision Making (RIDM).  This revision 
of the NPR continued to address RM for programs and projects but added consideration of 
institutional risk.  And while it still dealt with individual risks, it also recognized the overriding 
importance of aggregate or cumulative risk.  The NPR was supplemented in 2011 by OSMA’s 
publication of NASA/SP-2011-3422, NASA Risk Management Handbook, focusing on programs 
and projects.  In 2016, OSMA published NASA Interim Directive (NID) 8000-108, an expedited 
partial update of NPR 8000.4A in response to a recommendation of the Aerospace Safety Advisory 
Board calling for improved accountability in risk acceptance decision making. 
To sum up the evolution of RM since 1995 at NASA, it began with CRM and a focus on individual 
risks to programs and projects and has slowly expanded to include institutional risk, the concept 
of aggregate risk, and improved risk decision making.  RM is now ready for the next logical steps 
in its evolution: 1) to consider “opportunity,” as well as risk, and 2) to apply “risk and opportunity 
management” both horizontally across the agency or “agency-wide,” as well as vertically to all 
levels of the agency from its lowest levels up to the executive level.  It is the purpose of this report 
to provide material on “organizational risk and opportunity management” to begin a wider 
discussion of the future of RM where we envision a broader and more unified approach.  
Incorporation of risk and opportunity management into an organization’s operations requires 
integration of RM with the organization’s strategic mission. According to the 2014 Strategic Plan, 
NASA’s overriding mission is to “drive advances in science, technology, aeronautics, and space 
exploration to enhance knowledge, education, innovation, economic vitality, and stewardship of 
Earth.”  This mission is at once lofty, challenging, and creative.  But in addition to lofty goals, the 
planning and implementation of strategies for achieving NASA’s mission involves practical, hard 
choices about how to formulate a meaningful and achievable set of objectives, develop a relevant 
and effective portfolio of programs and projects, allocate human and physical assets among the 
programs and projects, evaluate whether the goals and objectives are being met, formulate 
controls, make adjustments when needed, and still meet externally imposed constraints.  A 
principal intent of organizational risk management is to support these strategic planning and plan 
implementation activities. 
xxii 
 
As mentioned above, NASA has published several documents on the subject of risk management, 
including procedural requirements and general guidance.  Since these requirements and guidelines 
apply to all activities at NASA, they extend beyond programs and projects to NASA’s mission as 
a whole, including the strategic performance functions of the agency and the performance planning 
functions of the various centers and directorates within the agency.     
This concepts and processes report is offered to stimulate thought about how to put organizational 
risk management into effect both at the executive level of NASA and at organizational levels that 
are responsible for the technical work (i.e., NASA centers).  While directed especially toward 
NASA, the report is relevant as well for other agencies of the Government and nonprofit research 
institutions whose mission involves the development of science and technology in the national 
interest.  For this reason, the development of principles and approaches often takes a broader 
viewpoint before focusing in on their applicability to NASA.   
Attainment of a formal Organizational Risk and Opportunity Management (OROM) approach 
within the agency is a goal that will require some time to realize.  Implementation plans will be 
developed with the broad participation of agency personnel and will be thoughtfully applied to 
assure a gradual but steady evolution of OROM from today’s baseline to the optimum 
configuration.  An earlier draft of this document was presented at the October 2014 enterprise risk 
and opportunity management workshop organized by the Office of Safety and Mission Assurance. 
The workshop was a catalyst for bringing key stakeholders together and airing diverse concerns 
and expectations regarding the management of organizational risks and opportunities at NASA. 
As a result, the 2014 version of this report has undergone considerable revision.  The report has 
been reorganized and expanded to include the following topics: 
 How various management units within the agency can separately apply OROM; 
 The challenges of conducting OROM across extended partnerships; 
 How OROM complies with agency, mission directorate, and center roles and 
responsibilities as outlined in the NASA Project Management Handbook; 
 How the roll-up of risks and opportunities proceeds from center and mission directorate 
levels to executive level; 
 How OROM can account for factors that produce unknown and underappreciated (UU) 
risks and include them in the roll-up process; 
 How risk and opportunity drivers can be derived from the rationale developed during the 
roll-up process; 
 How risk mitigations, opportunity actions, and controls can be derived from the risk and 
opportunity drivers, paying special attention to key assumptions that need to be protected; 
 How OROM templates can be developed and used for strategic planning and for agency-
wide organizational performance evaluation; 
 How OROM can be used to inform risk acceptance decisions in harmony with competing 
objectives; 
 The OROM organizational structure for organizations that involve multiple partners; 
xxiii 
 
 How OROM can help inform acquisition, allocation, and retirement of resources across a 
center’s extended organization; 
 How OROM may interface with other strategic and agency-wide assessment activities at 
NASA such as the Technical Capability Assessment Team (TCAT), Capability Leadership 
Model (CLM), Baseline Performance Review (BPR), and strategic reviews.  
Finally, it is important to note that: 
 This concept paper does not describe an approach that has been adopted by 
NASA.  Rather, it provides ideas for possible consideration in the Agency’s 
implementation of an evolved risk management framework.   
 Because this document was drafted over a period of time from within the Office of Safety and 
Mission Assurance, some of our assumptions on management processes might not be fully 
consistent with current practice.   
 
Homayoon Dezfuli, Ph.D. 
NASA Headquarters 
November 2016 
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1. Introduction 
Organizational risk and opportunity management (OROM) concerns the means by which 
organizations apply risk and opportunity considerations in developing their strategic goals and 
objectives, in implementing them through a portfolio of programs, projects, institutional assets, 
and activities, and in managing them through controls. The use of the word “organizational” in the 
risk management context is consistent with the following definition provided in [1]: 
“Organizational risk management is risk management at the strategic level.”  The overall purpose 
of OROM is to help reach an optimal balance between minimizing the potential for loss (risk) 
while maximizing the potential for gain (opportunity).1   
OROM is sometimes thought of as being identical to institutional risk management (IRM) but is 
in fact larger than it.  IRM is the part of OROM that, according to NASA NPR 8000.4A [2], 
concerns “risks to infrastructure, information technology, resources, personnel, assets, processes, 
occupational safety, environmental management, or security.”  Additionally, according to [2], 
institutional risks “affect capabilities and resources necessary for mission success, including 
institutional flexibility to respond to changing mission needs and compliance with external 
requirements (e.g., Environmental Protection Agency or Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration regulations).”  OROM concerns itself with institutional risks, portfolio risks, 
program/project risks, operational risks, and various other types of risk and opportunity that are 
commonly categorized in the risk management literature. 
The focus of this report is on the development of a framework and overall approach that serves the 
interests of nonprofit and Government organizations like NASA that focus on developing and/or 
applying new technology (henceforth referred to as “organizations like NASA”).  These interests 
tend to place emphasis on performing services and achieving scientific and technical gains more 
than on achieving financial investment goals, which is the province of commercial enterprises.  In 
addition, the objectives of organizations like NASA extend to institutional development and 
maintenance, financial health, legal and reputational protection, education and partnerships, and 
mandated milestone achievements. 
This report discusses the philosophical underpinnings of OROM for organizations like NASA, the 
integration of OROM with existing management processes, and the nature of the activities that are 
performed to implement OROM within this context.  The proposed framework includes a set of 
core principles that would be essential to any successful OROM approach, along with some 
features that are currently under development and are continuing to evolve.  The report is intended 
to foster discussion of OROM at NASA in order to reach a consensus on the optimum approach 
for the agency. 
Sections 2 and 3 are intended mainly for high-level managers and their administrative staffs who 
wish to understand the organizational aspects of OROM and the broad concepts of how it could 
be applied at organizations like NASA.  Section 2 is presented in the form of a primer on OROM, 
                                                          
1 The purpose of OROM is similar to that of enterprise risk management (ERM), but the term “enterprise” is 
sometimes construed as emphasizing financial objectives, whereas the focus in this report is on achieving scientific 
and technical objectives as well as financial objectives.   
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answering fundamental questions about how OROM works at a high level, how OROM is 
particularly relevant to pioneering technical organizations like NASA, how it works in tandem 
with existing management structures, how it facilitates interactions with external agencies, and 
how it can be applied both across the organization as a whole and within individual management 
units of the organization.  Section 3 discusses how OROM coordinates with the major management 
functions within most technically oriented organizations, how it helps to shape and corroborate the 
information that flows within, between, and out of these management functions, and how it may 
be practiced in technological organizations like NASA that interact with many partners, both 
domestic and international. 
Sections 4 and 5 are directed more toward technical managers and practitioners who wish to gain 
an understanding of some of the more important technical aspects and the fine points of 
implementing OROM at organizations like NASA.  Section 4 provides guidance on the activities 
that are conducted within an OROM analysis for organizations like NASA, including advice on 
how risk tolerances and opportunity appetites can be established, how risk and opportunity 
scenarios can be formulated and categorized, how indicators of the potential importance of risks 
and opportunities can be identified, tracked, and evaluated, how the overall degree of achievement 
for each objective can be inferred from the indicators, how the potential for unknown and/or 
underappreciated (UU) risks can be evaluated, and how responses to risks and opportunities and 
control options can be identified and evaluated.  Section 5 provides helpful templates for 
conducting OROM within organizations like NASA, and using an example of interest to NASA, 
shows how the templates may be populated and exploited for purposes of evaluating overall 
performance and planning strategy.   
Section 6 focuses on how OROM may be applied at a regional or center level, such as at NASA’s 
centers.  Sections 6.1 and 6.2 speak about the managerial aspects of OROM at the center level, 
emphasizing the various roles that each center plays in executing its programmatic and institutional 
responsibilities, the nature of the strategic objectives that require centers to manage multiple 
partnerships, the ways in which a center can use an OROM approach to facilitate its management 
responsibilities, and the organizational aspects of OROM that permit effective communication 
between centers and their various partnering organizations.  Section 6.3 discusses the technical 
activities that may be conducted within an OROM analysis for centers, emphasizing the types of 
risks and opportunities and associated indicators that pertain to its core competencies and the 
development, allocation, and retirement of its resources and assets.  Section 6.3 also provides 
additional templates which, together with those in Section 5, can be of significant use for planning 
its strategies and evaluating its overall performance. 
Section 7 provides a brief discussion of how OROM in general and the templates in particular can 
potentially interact with important strategic initiatives and other agency-wide activities currently 
practiced within NASA, including the Technical Capability Assessment Team (TCAT) process, 
the Capability Leadership Model (CLM) process, and the Baseline Performance Review (BPR) 
process. 
Finally, Section 8 deals with the application of OROM results to assist decision makers in making 
risk acceptance decisions at key decision points when there are competing objectives at the top 
level of the organization with correspondingly different levels of risk tolerance.  It uses an example 
applicable to a sister Federal agency (the Department of Defense) to illustrate the processes 
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involved, and discusses how these processes can be applied to NASA programs such as the 
Commercial Crew Transportation (CCT) program. 
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2. A Primer on OROM for NASA and Pioneering Technical 
Organizations like NASA 
2.1 OROM Scope and Objectives 
2.1.1 What is OROM? 
Organizational risk and opportunity management (OROM) is a means by which organizations 
account for risks and opportunities in identifying and implementing their strategic goals, 
objectives, and priorities, subject to imposed constraints, through a process of strategic planning, 
execution, and performance evaluation. 
• According to [3], the principal concerns of organizational risk management are as follows: 
Aligning risk tolerance, opportunity appetite2 and strategy – Management considers the 
entity’s risk tolerance and opportunity appetite in evaluating strategic alternatives, setting 
related objectives, and developing mechanisms to manage related risks. 
• Enhancing risk response decisions – Organizational risk management provides the rigor to 
identify and select among alternative risk responses – risk avoidance, reduction, sharing, 
and acceptance. 
• Reducing operational surprises and losses – Entities gain enhanced capability to identify 
potential incidents and establish responses, reducing surprises and associated costs or 
losses. 
• Identifying and managing multiple and cross-organizational risks – Every organization 
faces a myriad of risks affecting different parts of the organization, and organizational risk 
management facilitates effective response to the interrelated impacts, and integrated 
responses to multiple risks. 
• Seizing opportunities – By considering a full range of potential incidents, management is 
positioned to identify and proactively realize opportunities. 
• Improving deployment of capital – Obtaining robust risk and opportunity information 
allows management to effectively assess overall capital needs and enhance capital 
allocation. 
The overall objectives of OROM are to facilitate the successful development of the strategic plan, 
to promote an overall best approach for implementing the plan, and to evaluate performance with 
respect to the plan.  The means for doing this is to seek an optimal balance between minimizing 
the potential for loss (risk) while maximizing the potential for gain (opportunity) with respect to 
the organization’s overall mission.  OROM is an integration of risk and opportunity management 
over all programs, projects, initiatives, and activities in the organization’s portfolio.  Achievement 
of an optimal balance implies the involvement of the decision maker(s) in setting maximum 
tolerable levels for risk, minimum desirable levels for opportunity, and the tradeoffs between them. 
2.1.2 Why is OROM important to organizations like NASA? 
                                                          
2 In [3], the term “risk appetite” has the same meaning as the term “risk tolerance and opportunity appetite” in 
this document.  Contrarily, the term “risk tolerance” in [3] has a different meaning and connotation. 
6 
 
Organizations that perform pioneering technical work in the public interest must continually assess 
whether their strategic objectives continue to be achievable as conditions evolve, whether the 
balance between the risks and the opportunities has changed with time so as to require a 
recalibration of the strategic plan or a reassessment of how it is being implemented, and whether 
the funding agencies have introduced new requirements or constraints that need to be addressed.  
For example, NASA, in response to new directions advocated by the executive branch of the US 
Government, announced its intentions in 2013 to embark on new space exploration missions that 
necessitated a change in philosophy from strict risk minimization to a balanced combination of 
risk control and opportunity exploitation.  This direction was enunciated in the following 
statements made by the NASA Administrator in a letter addressed to all NASA employees dated 
April 19, 20133. 
“…throughout our history NASA’s explorer spirit has led us deeper into the unknown where 
we continue to learn as much from our failures as our successes. One of the things that 
impress me most about our workforce is the willingness of so many to dream big, think 
outside the box, and take risks. …We have to be willing to do daring things. Put another way, 
risk intolerance is a guarantee of failure to accomplish anything of significance 
[emphasis is the Administrator’s].  
“… As long as we ensure that our people are protected we can manage and tolerate failures 
as part of the price of progress. … As we prepare to undertake the many challenges offered 
in the President’s 2014 budget for our agency, I ask you to continue to think about how we 
can identify and seize opportunities to make progress quickly and affordably, identify and 
manage risks, learn fast and adapt our plans to take the next steps. While we do this, we must 
constantly balance our risks and rewards and always, always put the lives and safety of our 
people first.” 
This change in philosophy indicates a need to expand the approach to organizational risk 
management from one that is centered on reducing risks to one that includes recognizing, 
cultivating, and exploiting opportunities.  OROM is a rational, structured approach to reaching an 
optimal balance between minimizing the potential for loss (risk) while maximizing the potential for gain 
(opportunity). 
2.1.3 How does OROM for organizations like NASA differ from OROM for 
commercial organizations? 
The last ten to fifteen years has seen a steadily expanding development of processes and standards 
for conducting OROM within commercial organizations [3, 4].  While these developments have 
undoubtedly provided impetus for the acceptance and practice of OROM, they have tended to 
emphasize monetary risks and opportunities as would be paramount for profit-making companies.  
OROM to this point has been used less widely for non-profit Government agencies and research 
institutions.  For OROM to be effective at organizations like NASA, it must focus on the 
multidimensional objectives and constraints that NASA is required to satisfy, including: 
• Achievement of scientific and technical gains in the public interest, over both short-term 
and long-term horizons 
                                                          
3 The full letter is reprinted in Appendix A. 
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• Exploration of new frontiers and knowledge development 
• Partnerships with other nations, commercial organizations, and academia 
• Public education and outreach 
• Objectives common to both commercial and nonprofit organizations, including 
institutional development and maintenance, legal and reputational protection, and financial 
health 
• Specific annual outcomes mandated by the Government including Congress and the White 
House 
• Outcomes specified by oversight bodies such as independent advisory groups and 
inspectors general 
• Satisfaction of Government requirements and policies 
In addition, these objectives must be met within financial, schedule, and political constraints that 
are subject to periodic change due to changing Administrations and changing public priorities. 
Thus, the OROM framework for organizations like NASA may utilize ideas from previous 
frameworks developed for private enterprises and from standardized quality management systems 
such as the SAE Standard AS9100 [5], where applicable, but also must include the capability of 
addressing strategic objectives that are fundamental to the mission of the organization and should 
build upon its culture and history of performance management and risk management.  Furthermore, 
it should adhere to the basic principles in its directives, requirements, and standards, which for 
NASA includes NPR 8000.4A and the NASA Risk Management Handbook.  These documents 
address roles and responsibilities pertaining to risk management and, for NASA, the functions to 
be addressed by risk-informed decision-making (RIDM) and continuous risk management (CRM). 
2.1.4 To what extent does OROM work within the existing management 
structure of an organization like NASA? 
For any well-established organization, the OROM approach is framed and structured to 
synchronize with and facilitate the philosophy and management processes that already exist within 
that organization.  OROM does not fundamentally alter the existing management approach for 
setting strategic direction, goals, architectures, requirements, and policies; establishing metrics, 
setting mission and budget priorities, or approving major new initiatives, although it may result in 
adjustments to some of the processes.  Rather, it generally supports the existing approach for 
overseeing and approving risk plans and mitigation strategies, reviewing progress, overseeing 
controls, identifying deficiencies, and reviewing corrective actions. 
Over the years, NASA has evolved a set of processes for establishing agency-level strategic 
objectives and desired outcomes while developing its core institutional and technical capabilities 
and tailoring its programmatic initiatives to support these objectives. In facilitating these processes 
and helping make them more effective, the OROM framework for NASA should support decisions 
made within the strategic management, mission support management, and program management 
functions of the agency.  Simultaneously, it should support existing high-level reviews and 
decision forums conducted within NASA, such as meetings of the management councils, 
acquisition planning and procurement meetings, and performance review meetings. 
The OROM process facilitates management activities by providing some of the key data and 
insights needed to make informed decisions.  These processes are guided by information obtained 
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from both external and internal sources.  The needed information includes knowledge and 
understanding of the constraints that are imposed by Government and other sources, as well as 
recognition of the problems that occur during the execution of the strategic plan, the opportunities 
that present themselves, the risks from potential adverse events that have not yet occurred, and the 
leading indicators that portend emerging problems, opportunities, and risks.  (Note: leading 
indicators are traceable measures that are quantifiable, correlatable with the likelihood of success 
of one or more of the agency’s objectives, and actionable.4) 
2.1.5 How does OROM facilitate negotiations between an organization like 
NASA and the entities that govern it? 
Although strategic planning is performed within the organization that is responsible for executing 
the strategic plan, external stakeholders often mandate many of the strategic objectives that the 
executing organization must achieve.   OROM has a role to play in informing external stakeholders 
and funding entities about the achievability of various strategic objective alternatives so that these 
stakeholders can make informed decisions about which objectives to mandate.  OROM does this 
by determining the overall risk of not being able to meet each strategic objective, taking into 
account all the individual risks and opportunities that accompany the objective.  While 
stakeholders like Congress and the White House may have different views from an organization 
like NASA about what constitutes gain and what level of opportunity is significant, a majority can 
agree on whether the risk of not being able to achieve an objective is intolerably high so long as 
the case is laid out plainly and accurately.  The justification of the case is the role that OROM 
plays.  When an organization like NASA determines through OROM analysis that the aggregate 
risk of not being able to achieve an objective is steep and there are few opportunities for reducing 
it, it makes these findings known to all stakeholders to help discourage them from mandating 
unachievable objectives and from having unrealistic expectations.  
2.1.6 Can various management units within the organization separately apply 
OROM? 
OROM can be applied to autonomous, self-contained organizations such as agencies, institutions, 
and companies, or it can be applied separately to management units within an organization so long 
as the objectives of each management unit are consistent with the objectives of the organization as 
a whole, and the cross-cutting risks and opportunities are handled consistently.  For example, 
NASA’s management structure can be considered to consist of its administration and supporting 
offices providing its executive management, a set of mission directorates providing its 
programmatic management, and a set of centers and independent facilities providing its 
institutional and technical management as well as program/project support.  Each of the mission 
directorates, centers, and independent facilities has its own top objectives and lower-level 
performance objectives, each with its own set of risks, opportunities, and associated indicators.  
Therefore, the OROM framework can be applied to each unit separately.  However, the OROM 
processes applied for management units will not be successful unless there are both formal and 
informal communication channels to ensure that the top objectives of each mission directorate, 
center, and independent facility support the strategic objectives developed at the executive level, 
                                                          
4 Leading indicators will be discussed in considerable detail in Sections 4.4, 4.5, 5.4, 5.5, and 6.3. 
9 
 
and that the technical performance objectives of the centers and independent facilities support the 
program/project performance objectives of the mission directorates.  Such communication 
channels must also ensure that risks, opportunities, and associated indicators that cut across 
management units are identified and accounted for by all affected parties in a consistent manner. 
2.1.7 In what areas does OROM facilitate strategic planning, implementation, 
and evaluation of performance for organizations like NASA? 
Following are examples of the planning, implementation, and evaluation processes that benefit 
from an OROM approach:5 
 Developing the organization’s strategic plans and performance management plans by 
selecting options that maximize the likelihood of successfully advancing the organization’s 
fundamental mission.  In the case of Federal agencies like NASA, OROM provides 
traceable and documented evidence for justifying the selections of objectives in a manner 
that is consistent with the constraints placed by the Government. 
 Developing a portfolio of programs, projects, research initiatives, institutional assets, and 
other activities and resources by selecting alternatives that maximize the likelihood of 
successfully achieving the strategic objectives.  OROM uses a risk-and-opportunity-
informed decision making process to help the decision makers within the organization 
select the most viable portfolio.  
 Promoting creative technologies and new processes and/or leveraging legacy systems for 
advancing the organization’s mission in a manner that promotes a more optimal tradeoff 
between risk and opportunity while working within the reality of a limited and sometimes 
shrinking budget. 
 Allocating the organization’s facilities, infrastructure, and human resources in a manner 
that promotes a more optimal balance between the probability of success and the cost of 
implementation.  In concert with the organization’s ongoing technology capabilities 
assessment processes, OROM identifies organization-wide risks and opportunities that 
pertain to staffing requirements, the qualifications of the staff, test facility requirements, 
information technology needs, and other program/project support needs, thereby providing 
focus for institutional and mission support functions and initiatives. 
 Tracking and controlling risks, opportunities, and leading indicators so as to facilitate 
evaluation of performance relative to the strategic and performance management plans.  
OROM provides traceable and documented evidence of how well the programs, projects, 
and other portfolio items are being implemented and the degree to which that 
implementation is satisfying the strategic and nearer-term objectives. 
 Updating and amending the strategic and performance management plans at selected 
(usually different) intervals to reflect status changes and the emergence of new risks and 
opportunities.   
                                                          
5 Further elaboration on these points will be provided throughout the report. 
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 Complying with Federal and other regulations on risk and controls. 
 Informing baseline performance reviews (BPRs) and periodic reviews of progress on 
objectives.  OROM interacts with BPR and objectives-based reviews by helping to identify 
risk and opportunity indicators that each program needs to track and controls that each 
program needs to manage; by informing these reviews about how the indicators and 
controls cross programmatic boundaries; by helping to provide a logical basis for self-
assessing performance relative to the strategic plan; and by helping to generate results that 
are required by external entities, including self-assessment results and rankings. 
 Enabling an agile response to pervasive new conditions, either positive or negative, that 
demand immediate action.  By treating risks and opportunities that cut across programs, 
projects, entities, and organizational units in a consistent and integrated fashion, OROM 
helps ensure that the means are in place to develop timely responses to newly developing 
cross-cutting issues that require an integrated response.  
 Facilitating risk acceptance decisions at key decision points.  Results obtained from OROM 
include an aggregation of risk and opportunity information from lower to higher levels, 
allowing decision makers to obtain insight into the overall level of concern or confidence 
attributable to the organization’s chances of satisfying each of its top objectives. 
The benefits that derive from using an OROM approach are particularly significant for complex 
missions that involve difficult choices between alternative pathways.  Since NASA’s mission and 
the programs that support it are by their nature complex (e.g., the proposed flexible path to Mars), 
the agency should benefit significantly by implementing an integrated OROM approach into its 
current management practices. 
2.2 OROM Definitions and Technical Attributes 
2.2.1 What is meant by “risk” and “opportunity” within the context of OROM? 
Within the context of OROM, we define risk and opportunity as follows: 
• Risk is the possibility of future performance shortfalls with respect to achieving explicitly 
established and stated objectives at all organizational levels, including the agency’s 
strategic objectives. 
• Opportunity is the possibility of future performance improvements with respect to 
achieving the explicitly established objectives and accomplishing the mission of the 
agency. 
Risks and opportunities are always possible occurrences that may take place in the future.  Once a 
risk is realized it becomes a problem and is no longer a risk.  Once an opportunity is realized it 
becomes a gain and is no longer an opportunity. 
Although the realization of a risk is viewed as negative and the realization of an opportunity is 
viewed as positive, risk and opportunity are two sides of the same coin.  We speak of “the risk of 
missing an opportunity” to emphasize that missing an opportunity is a form of risk.  In the same 
way, we speak of “the opportunity of mitigating a risk” to emphasize the fact that mitigating a risk 
is a form of seizing an opportunity.  Both risk and opportunity require an action to achieve the best 
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possible outcome (i.e., mitigate a risk or seize an opportunity).  The actions must occur within an 
acceptable timeframe to be effective. 
That said, the fundamental difference between a risk and an opportunity is that the action is 
intrinsic to the definition of an opportunity but extrinsic to the definition of a risk.  The potential 
negative outcomes that are the basis for identifying a risk exist as concerns prior to any 
intervention, whereas the potential benefits of an opportunity that are the basis for identifying a 
circumstance as an opportunity, only exist in the context of some action(s) that could be taken to 
realize those benefits. 
In the present context, opportunity has two dimensions.  The first applies to the potential to reduce 
the risk of not meeting one or more already-stated strategic goals or desired outcomes.  For 
example, an emerging opportunity for an organization that has begun execution on a project to 
share a research and development task with a partner organization that has specialized expertise in 
that area, might result in a reduction of the risk of the originating organization failing in that task.  
The event that leads to the possibility of a partnership (e.g., the partnering organization expressing 
a willingness to participate) is an opportunity because it offers the promise of leading to a positive 
outcome.  (In contrast, a risk leads to the possibility of a negative, or unwanted, outcome.) 
The second dimension applies to an opening for changing strategic objectives or desired outcomes 
to align them better with the agency’s vision and mission.  For example, the emergence of a new 
technology might open up possibilities for the originating organization to achieve strategic benefits 
that were not previously considered possible.  The latter type of opportunity pertains to promoting 
accomplishment of the agency’s mission through strategic re-planning, rather than reducing the 
risk of not meeting its existing strategic objectives.6 
Risks and opportunities may both have a timeframe associated with them, a “window of 
opportunity,” after which response to the risk or seizure of the opportunity is no longer possible. 
This is one reason that an organization must be agile. 
Significant gains in advancement or progress may involve proactively searching for opportunities, 
such as putting resources into basic or applied research, with the expectation that on the whole 
these efforts will bear fruit and speed the rate of progress toward long-term goals.  In the words of 
Francis Bacon in 1612 [6]: “A wise man will make more opportunities than he finds.” 
2.2.2 How do we differentiate between risks and opportunities during strategic 
planning versus during plan implementation and performance evaluation? 
OROM is concerned with agency-wide risks and opportunities during strategic planning, during 
development of the agency’s portfolio of programs, projects, initiatives, and other activities, and 
during evaluation of performance.  Strategic planning often occurs when the functions to be 
performed have been conceived but the specifics of the system design, and even the system 
architecture, have not yet been decided upon.  In that case, the identification of risks and 
opportunities derives from historical experience, tempered with expert judgment, gained from 
                                                          
6 In Webster’s online dictionary, “opportunity” is defined as: (1) a favorable juncture of circumstances, and (2) a 
good chance for advancement or progress.  The two-dimensional definition in this paper is related to Webster’s 
definitions, in the sense that an opportunity to reduce risk may emanate from “a favorable juncture of 
circumstances” and an opportunity to expand the strategic objectives may constitute “a good chance for 
advancement or progress.”  The relationship is, of course, not exact. 
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missions that have preceded the present one but are in some ways similar to it.  (For example, the 
identification of risks for a low-earth-orbit mission using some future, as-yet undefined system 
may, for preliminary purposes, be considered to be informed by the risks that were identified for 
the Space Shuttle.  These are risks that may or may not remain applicable as the system design 
matures, but that the organization needs to be aware of in making strategic decisions.) 
Obviously, the state of definition of risks and opportunities for future missions without a specific 
system design will be less mature than for missions that have well-defined system designs.  
Correspondingly, the state of risk and opportunity definition during strategic planning will 
generally be less mature than during implementation and performance evaluation. 
2.2.3 How does OROM achieve an optimal balance between risk and 
opportunity? 
The concept of balancing risk against opportunity is illustrated schematically in Figure 2-1.  As 
shown in the figure, the balance is a reflection of the decision maker’s sense of the risk relative to 
his/her sense of the opportunity.  In this context, "sense of the risk" is equivalent to one’s tolerance 
for the risk as presently perceived, and "sense of the opportunity" is equivalent to one’s appetite 
for the opportunity as presently perceived.  Factors such as the availability of resources or assets, 
together with other fixed constraints, enter into the decision maker’s sense of risk or opportunity. 
 
Figure 2-1.  Decision making is a balance between risk and opportunity. 
The balance between tolerating risks and seizing opportunities for organizations like NASA is 
informed by the NASA Administrator’s comments cited earlier, which imply that the organization 
must manage risks and opportunities in a graded manner across its portfolio of activities. As shown 
in Figure 2-2, the organization has stricter standards (low tolerance for risk) relative to preserving 
its core capabilities and human lives and safety, while at the same time having more lenient 
standards (tolerating higher risk) relative to accepting the possibility of losing hardware in the 
pursuit of pioneering or capability-expanding activities that create new opportunities to more 
effectively advance the organization’s mission. This considered grading of risk tolerance during 
strategic planning and during execution of the plan sets the ground-rules for strategic risk taking 
that is essential for progress and success over the long term. It creates areas where the organization 
learns rapidly, in part through constructive failures and setbacks, as well as promoting areas where 
Decision Maker’s 
Sense of Risk
Decision Maker’s 
Sense of Opportunity
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the gains made through high-risk activities are consolidated and institutionalized into a more 
capable agency.7 
 
 
Figure 2-2.  Risk tolerance relative to diverse goals and objectives. 
There is a well-known tendency for such balances to be made based on psychological factors that 
are not always in the interest of making the optimum decision. A variety of treatises on risk 
aversion point out that when people are confronted with two choices where the balance between 
opportunity for success and risk of loss is neutral or even moderately favorable to the opportunity, 
they will tend to choose the path with lower risk. This aversion is related to the so-called Ellsberg 
paradox [7], which concerns people's choice between situations that exhibit different levels of 
certainty (they have "ambiguity aversion").  Use of OROM in a structured approach helps to 
counter risk aversion and ambiguity aversion by ensuring that strategic decisions are made more 
objectively. 
The decision to pursue an opportunity in one area invariably involves exposure to risk in another 
area.  For example, a major revision to a design may provide an opportunity to increase technical 
performance but simultaneously introduce risks to cost and schedule.  OROM provides an 
structured means for determining the break-even point between the opportunity and the risk.  It 
does this by examining the degree to which the opportunity meets or exceeds the decision maker’s 
minimum expectation for an opportunity to be worthwhile, and comparing it to the degree to which 
the concomitant risk meets or exceeds the decision maker’s tolerance for risk.  In other words, 
OROM assesses the likelihood and magnitude of benefit and the likelihood and magnitude of loss 
relative to each of the agency’s strategic objectives, and the decision maker’s stated risk tolerance 
and opportunity appetite determine whether or not the former justifies the latter. 
In the case of NASA, this point is strongly supported by the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel 
(ASAP), who in their 2013 Annual Report stated:  “We fundamentally believe that NASA should 
be plain-speaking and transparent with regard to risk acceptance and that risk and reward must be 
pursued in harmony and balance.”  Ultimately, the decision maker has the responsibility to define 
risk tolerance levels rather than simply accept a risk-averse stance. 
                                                          
7 The subjects of risk tolerance, opportunity appetite, and the break-even point between them will be discussed 
further in Sections 4.3, 5.5, and 8.4. 
14 
 
2.2.4 What is meant by the terms “risk scenario,” “opportunity scenario,” 
“cumulative risk,” and “cumulative opportunity”? 
The OROM process identifies specific concerns that are perceived as presenting a risk to the ability 
to achieve one or more strategic objectives.  Each concern implies a scenario of events that must 
happen in order for the risk to “come true.”  Collectively, these individual scenarios comprise the 
cumulative, or aggregate, risk of not being able to achieve the objective. 
It is common practice to use the term “risk” to denote both the individual concern, or scenario, and 
the cumulative likelihood of not meeting the objective.  The differentiation between the two is 
provided by the context, but sometimes, this dual usage leads to confusion when the context is not 
clear.  In such cases, we refer to the specific concerns as being “risk scenarios” and the effect on 
the strategic objective as being “cumulative risk” or “aggregate risk.”  For example, the possibility 
of staffing shortages in a crucial technical area due to higher than expected retirements is a risk 
scenario, and the likelihood of not being able to launch a mission that is critical to a strategic 
objective or goal as a result of this and other risk scenarios is a cumulative risk. 
Likewise, the OROM process identifies specific scenarios that, if they should occur, would lead to 
an opportunity to either increase the likelihood of achieving a strategic objective or open the 
possibility of defining a new objective that coincides with the agency’s mission.  Therefore, we 
sometimes use the term “opportunity scenario” to differentiate the individual context for 
opportunity from the cumulative context.  For example, the possibility of a breakthrough in the 
development of a new technology, opening the possibility of taking a positive action to reap the 
benefit, is an opportunity scenario. The prospect of translating that development, along with other 
opportunistic developments and directed actions, into higher performance for a strategically 
critical mission is a cumulative opportunity.8 
2.2.5 How does OROM incorporate RIDM and CRM within the organization as 
a whole and within different management units? 
OROM is operationalized within an organization through the introduction of risk- and opportunity-
informed decision making and continuous risk and opportunity management into the 
organization’s management processes.  In both the program/project domain and the institutional/ 
technical domain, they are denoted as risk-informed decision making (RIDM) and continuous risk 
management (CRM).  For NASA, definitions and guidance for RIDM and CRM may be found in 
NPR 8000.4A [2] and in the NASA Risk Management (RM) Handbook [8].  As shown in Figure 
2-3, they are executed at each of the management levels of the organization. 
                                                          
8 The concept of cumulative risks and cumulative opportunities will be discussed in considerably more detail in 
Sections 4.5 and 5.5. 
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Figure 2-3. The elements of RIDM and CRM applied to the agency’s management activities at 
various levels. 
For the organization as a whole, risk- and opportunity-informed decision making is applicable to 
strategic planning activities and the selection of the agency’s portfolio of programs, projects, etc.  
It is similar to its counterpart for programs/projects, RIDM, but it is expanded to make opportunity 
a major component of the decision making process.  It is used first to help executive management 
select from among various alternative sets of long-term strategic objectives and nearer-term 
programmatic objectives in formulating a strategic plan, subject to external constraints, that 
supports the agency’s mission.  It is then used to help executive management select from among 
various alternative portfolios of programs, projects, institutional initiatives, and other major 
initiatives, and/or between different overall implementation approaches, to support the 
achievement of the strategic objectives.  Like the RIDM process that it is derived from, it is 
composed of the following three steps: 1) identification of alternatives, 2) analysis of alternatives, 
and 3) the selection of an alternative. 
Continuous risk and opportunity management, for the agency as a whole, is applicable to 
implementation of the portfolio approved at the executive level and to evaluation of the agency’s 
performance relative to the strategic objectives.  The process of managing risks and opportunities 
on a continuing basis is similar to the CRM process exercised for programs/projects as described 
in the NASA RM Handbook, except again for the expansion to make opportunity a major 
component in the management process.  Like its CRM counterpart, it consists of the following five 
basic actions: 1) identify, 2) analyze, 3) plan, 4) track, and 5) control. This five-step process is 
supported by robust communication and documentation. 
In incorporating RIDM and CRM into OROM for different management units, the areas of 
emphasis tend to differ according to the responsibilities assigned to each unit. At the executive 
level, emphasis is on strategic objectives and meeting the overall goals of the agency.  For 
management units within the programmatic level (e.g., NASA mission directorates), the emphasis 
shifts to programmatic objectives and meeting project milestones within established schedules and 
costs.  For management units within the institutional/technical level (e.g., NASA centers), there is 
an increased emphasis on the development and maintenance of the workforce, facilities, and 
support systems.  While the areas of emphasis may differ, however, the general approach for 
incorporating RIDM and CRM into OROM is basically the same whether applied at the executive 
level, the programmatic level, or the institutional/technical level. 
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2.2.6 Is the analysis in OROM principally qualitative or quantitative? 
OROM uses a mixture of qualitative and quantitative methods.  On the one hand, quantitative 
models are used for assessing and predicting specific outcomes that are amenable to quantitative 
analysis (e.g., matters of budget and schedule).  On the other hand, there is a greater reliance on 
qualitative methods for OROM than there is for program/project risk management.  That is because 
OROM involves assessments of strategic goals and objectives that are largely subjective in their 
interpretation and for which there are no easily formed quantitative models (e.g., increase human 
knowledge of the solar system; promote the development of groundbreaking new technology; etc.).  
To assess the status or potential for achieving such goals and objectives, OROM relies on risk and 
opportunity leading indicators9, which serve as surrogates for the identified risks and opportunities.  
Although the leading indicators are in themselves quantifiable, their relationship to the actual risks 
and opportunities is qualitative, and hence the OROM analysis itself is more qualitative than 
quantitative. 
2.2.7 Can OROM account for unknown and underappreciated (UU) risks? 
Unknown and underappreciated (UU) risks are risk scenarios that either have not been identified 
and are therefore unknown at the time of analysis, or have been correctly identified but for which 
the likelihood of occurrence and/or potential severity of harm or loss are underestimated.  By 
definition, it is not possible to identify unknown scenarios before they are revealed, or to be aware 
that a known scenario is underappreciated before it is better understood.  It is possible, however, 
to be aware of various types of indicators that can be correlated with the likelihood of unknown 
and underappreciated risks, based on experiences that have been reported in the literature.  These 
indicators tend to be associated with organizational shortcomings, questionable managerial 
practices, and certain design approaches.  As will be discussed shortly, OROM analyses are able 
to include these indicators in the assessment of whether UU risks are likely to be a large contributor 
to the overall risk of not achieving the organization’s objectives.   
Recent work reported in Volume 2 of the NASA System Safety Handbook [9] and in the Journal 
of Reliability Engineering and System Safety [10] has demonstrated that for complex systems that 
are breaking new ground, the probability of loss from UU risks early in a program or during the 
initial stages of operation can be several times greater than the probability of loss from known 
risks.  This has been found to be true not only for safety risks but also for technical, cost, and 
schedule risks, and not only for space systems but also for other systems such as commercial 
nuclear and military.  The presence of UU risks can therefore significantly affect the ability of an 
organization to achieve its strategic objectives. 
An understanding of the potential magnitude of UU risks in each area of concern, and the factors 
that are causing them to be of concern, is important for at least the following two reasons: 
                                                          
9 We use the term “risk leading indicator” to refer to a possible future development that is indicated by a present 
condition which is evolving with time.  We include the word “leading” to emphasize that these indicators may be 
changing with time, and that one needs to track not only their present values but also their trends to infer 
potential future values. 
17 
 
• It helps inform external stakeholders about the achievability of various strategic 
objectives and portfolio alternatives so that these stakeholders can make informed 
decisions about how to allocate funding. 
• It helps identify ways for mitigating the design-related, organizational and programmatic 
causes of UU risks, thereby increasing the potential for achieving the agreed-upon 
strategic objectives. 
It has not been common practice for UU risks to be considered as a part of an OROM analysis, but 
the approach recommended in this report goes beyond present practice by considering the 
organizational, programmatic, and design factors that can lead to UU risks.  These factors, obtained 
largely from [9] and [10], are treated as leading indicators of UU risk, and are included in the roll-
up of leading indicators that is performed to estimate the aggregate risk of not being able to meet 
each strategic objective.  The treatment of UU risks is itself qualitative, in keeping with the 
epistemic nature of UU risks and the overall qualitative nature of OROM.  The potential effects of 
UU risks are included both in the strategic planning, RIDM-based aspect of OROM, and in the 
performance evaluation, CRM-based aspect of OROM. The treatment of UU risks within the 
OROM framework will be discussed further in Sections 4.4.4, 5.4.3, and 5.6.5. 
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3. Coordination of OROM with Management Activities 
Although the need for OROM in nonprofit technical organizations may be driven by a need to 
provide innovative technical solutions to complex problems, it is also desirable, and often 
necessary, to implement OROM within the current management framework of the organization. 
3.1 The Executive, Programmatic, and Institutional/Technical Management 
Functions and their Interfaces 
While the detailed organizational and management structure of individual organizations differs, 
most share common top-level organizational entities, management processes, and management 
activities. Generally, as illustrated in Figure 3-1, an organization like NASA may be described as 
being comprised of three management levels: 1) an executive level that sets and manages the 
direction and strategy for the organization, 2) a programmatic level that develops and manages the 
programs and projects that support the strategic plan, and 3) an institutional/technical level that 
develops and manages the institutional and technical resources that support the programs and 
projects.  Decision making involves robust communication within and among all levels.  
 
Figure 3-1.  The three levels of management within an organization like NASA. 
Each of these organizational levels performs a similar set of management activities, as shown in 
Figure 3-2.  These activities include planning, plan implementation, and performance evaluation.  
At the executive level, management sets the overall strategic objectives, goals, and desired 
outcomes for the organization; develops a plan for implementation, including the definition of 
major programs and projects and specification of institutional support requirements; evaluates 
performance in terms of the degree to which its strategic objectives are being realized; and makes 
major course correction or course resetting decisions when conditions warrant. At the 
programmatic level, program/project management provides the same goal setting and execution 
oversight with respect to the programs and projects that the executive level initiates.  At the 
institutional/technical level, management does the same for the institutional and technical 
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capabilities of the organization, including the sufficiency of the workforce, availability of facilities, 
and integrity of procurement and quality control practices.  The transfer of information between 
the organizational levels is bidirectional, with the results of the planning activities being 
communicated in general from executive to programmatic to institutional/technical level, and the 
results of the evaluation activities being communicated in general from institutional/technical to 
programmatic to executive level (although the direction of communication may vary according to 
the nature of the organization). 
 
Figure 3-2.  The principal activities and transfer of information within and between levels of 
management. 
3.2 OROM-Relevant Management Activities within Each Level 
At the executive level, the processes of strategic planning, strategic plan implementation, and 
strategic performance evaluation are guided by information obtained from both external and 
internal sources, as shown in Figure 3-3.  The information to be gleaned from external sources 
includes: 
 Mission priorities, programs/projects, schedules, and budgets that are mandated by external 
stakeholders and funding authorities, such as Congress and the President in the case of 
Federal agencies such as NASA 
 Supply constraints such as the availability of suppliers, parts, and materials 
 Marketplace constraints such as inflation rates and competition from other agencies, both 
domestic and foreign 
 Political constraints, such as the prospects for changes in the Administration or the makeup 
of Congress, or restrictions on certain foreign entities 
 Legal constraints, such as new enactments with new requirements or threats of litigation 
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 The emergence of new technology that may open opportunities for undertaking new 
objectives or achieving faster progress toward current objectives, or conversely pose new 
threats (e.g., cyber security) 
 
Figure 3-3.  Activities within the executive level at NASA and transfer of information from/to 
external and internal sources. 
In addition, information is transferred from the executive level to agencies external to or 
independent from the NASA management structure, such as the GAO, the OMB, Inspectors 
General, and Congress in the form of presentations and reports.   
Information to be received from internal sources (programmatic and institutional/technical levels) 
includes: 
 The status of risks and opportunities for programs/projects, including safety concerns, 
technical performance concerns, cost concerns, and schedule concerns 
 The status of risks and opportunities at the institutional/technical level, including 
workforce concerns, concerns with facilities and equipment, IT concerns, and security 
concerns 
 Identification and evaluation of risks and opportunities that cut across programs, projects, 
and institutional/technical entities 
 The status of concerns within the programmatic and institutional/technical levels that have 
evolved from risks to problems, and the status of corrective actions 
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Correspondingly, information is transferred from the executive level to the programmatic and 
institutional/technical levels via the strategic plan, and associated back-up material, including in 
particular, the specifications for the agency’s portfolio of programs, projects, institutional 
initiatives, research and development initiatives, resource expectations, schedules and budgets, etc. 
The activities and transfer of information at the programmatic or mission directorate level parallel 
the activities and transfer of information at the executive level, but with the following differences 
as shown in Figure 3-4: 
 
Figure 3-4.  Activities within a mission directorate (programmatic level) at NASA and transfer of 
information from/to external and internal sources. 
 The top objectives are programmatic and, for the most part, are received from the 
executive level as part of its strategic planning and plan implementation activities. 
 The results from the programmatic planning, implementation, and performance evaluation 
activities are presented to the various governing councils within NASA. 
 The results from the programmatic performance evaluation also provide input to NASA’s 
Baseline Performance Reviews (BPRs). 
 Implementation of the programmatic planning activity includes feedback to and from other 
mission directorates, particularly regarding concerns that cut across mission directorates. 
By and large, the mission directorates operate as individual organizations, so from a practical point 
of view, the principles of OROM apply to them as well as to the executive level. 
The same is true for the centers, as shown in Figure 3-5.  The activities and transfer of information 
at the center level parallel the activities at the mission directorate level, except that the top 
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objectives concern institutional and technical capability development as well as support of the 
programs/projects.  These top objectives require the centers to concentrate, in their planning 
processes, on how to achieve an efficacious balance between services provided directly by them 
versus services acquired from other entities such as commercial companies, universities, and other 
agencies. 
 
Figure 3-5.  Activities within a center (institutional/technical level) at NASA and transfer of 
information from/to external and internal sources. 
3.3 Coordination of OROM with Management Activities 
3.3.1 Organizational Planning and Plan Implementation 
The manner in which OROM assists management at all three levels in developing a responsive 
and achievable plan is illustrated in Figure 3-6.  Following is a brief summary of the activities 
depicted in this figure: 
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Management activities that provide input to the OROM process 
 Understand and comply with external constraints such as mandated missions and programs, 
mandated budgets, the availability of suppliers and parts or materials, and legal realities. 
 Identify alternative objectives hierarchies that comply with the external constraints and 
have the potential for achieving the organization’s mission in all timeframes.    
OROM activities that provide input to the management activity of selecting among alternative 
objectives and preparing the organizational plan 
 Characterize and understand all relevant historical experience pertaining to failures, 
successes, precursors, anomalies, unexpected benefits, and lessons learned. 
 Identify risks and opportunities for each alternative set of objectives based on the historical 
record and expert judgment.  
 From past experience and current risk/opportunity leading indicators, assess the state of 
risks/opportunities as they pertain to the likelihood of achieving each objective. 
 Risk-inform the selection and application of internal controls. 
 
Figure 3-6.  Interfaces between OROM activities and management activities in the development of 
an organizational plan  
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3.3.2 Evaluation of Organizational Performance and Re-Planning 
The evaluation of performance at the various management levels also involves close coordination 
between management activities and OROM activities.  From an OROM perspective, the activities 
that support performance evaluation are similar to the activities that support organizational 
planning in the sense that both involve the identification and evaluation of risks and opportunities.  
As discussed in Section 2.2.2, the key difference is in the level of maturity that exists in the 
definition of risks and opportunities. 
The manner in which OROM assists management in evaluating organizational performance is 
illustrated in Figure 3-7.  Following is a brief summary of the activities depicted in that figure: 
Management activities that provide input to the OROM process 
 Track progress on individual programs, projects, institutional initiatives, and other 
activities in the portfolio with respect to meeting the mid- and short-term objectives in the 
organizational objectives hierarchy. 
 Conduct a baseline performance review (BPR) at periodic intervals to assess overall 
adherence to the performance plan and to identify and evaluate cross-cutting issues. 
 
Figure 3-7.  Interfaces between OROM activities and management activities in the evaluation of 
performance relative to the organizational plan 
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OROM activities that provide input to the management activity of conducting the baseline 
performance reviews 
 Track leading indicators that pertain to organizational risks and opportunities.  (Note that 
risks and opportunities that enter at executive level generally emanate from external 
sources such as political, economic, or regulatory changes, whereas risks and opportunities 
that enter at lower management units and propagate upward generally emanate from 
internal sources such as the depletion of reserves and margins in any of the mission 
execution domains: safety, technical performance, schedule, and cost.) 
 From the current values of the leading indicators, assess the significance of the risks and 
opportunities at each level in the organizational objectives hierarchy. 
OROM activities that provide input to the management activity of evaluating organizational 
performance 
 Identify and track internal performance measures and internal/external leading indicators 
of risks and opportunities that pertain to the mid- and short-term organizational objectives. 
 From the current values of the performance measures and leading indicators and their 
observed trends, assess the state of risks and opportunities as they pertain to the likelihood 
of achieving the top organizational objectives. 
 When risks are of concern, or when opportunities are attractive, perform an analysis to 
suggest options that may be pursued to mitigate risks or pursue opportunities and identify 
associated controls. 
With these inputs in hand, management has a solid basis for determining whether the 
organization’s objectives are being achieved and whether there are imposing reasons (either 
positive or negative) for amending or changing some of the objectives and/or portfolio elements.  
The organization also is in a better position to prepare performance reports and presentations of 
the type required by the external stakeholders and funding agencies. 
3.4 Communication across Extended Partnerships 
3.4.1 Nature of the Strategic Objectives that Require Extended Partnerships 
Large not-for-profit organizations like NASA tend to have a diversity of strategic objectives that 
go beyond technical and scientific accomplishments related to the prime mission to geopolitical, 
macroeconomic, and societal objectives that require extensive collaboration.  Following are 
several strategic objectives (S.O.’s) from NASA’s strategic plan that fall into this category 
[emphasis added to highlight the point]: 
[S.O. 1.1] Expand human presence into the solar system and to the surface of Mars to advance 
exploration, science, innovation, benefits to humanity, and international 
collaboration 
[S.O. 1.2] Conduct research on the International Space Station (ISS) to enable future space 
exploration, facilitate a commercial space economy, and advance the fundamental 
biological and physical sciences for the benefit of humanity 
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[S.O. 1.3] Facilitate and utilize U.S. commercial capabilities to deliver cargo and crew to 
space 
[S.O. 1.7] Transform NASA missions and advance the Nation’s capabilities by maturing 
crosscutting and innovative technologies 
[S.O. 2.4] Advance the Nation’s STEM education and workforce pipeline by working 
collaboratively with other agencies to engage students, teachers, and faculty in 
NASA's missions and unique assets 
These objectives require NASA to work collaboratively with other US agencies, foreign agencies, 
commercial entities, and educational entities.  Most of the collaboration takes place within 
projects, programs, and special activities (such as new technology development) that are designed 
to satisfy the strategic objectives of the managing organization. 
3.4.2 The Challenges of Conducting OROM across Extended Partnerships 
Implementing an effective OROM process within an organization that depends on extended 
partnerships can be challenging.  For example, according to a deputy director of the US 
Department of Defense’s National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency [11], writing about the practice 
of risk management across extended partnerships:  “Culture resistance to change and unwillingness 
to share information viewed as negative prevail. There is additional complexity convincing people 
to adopt a process that is part of the bigger organization and sharing information regarding their 
ability to achieve program objectives.” 
In general, the following attitudinal and operational perspectives are needed to accomplish a 
satisfactory implementation of OROM when extended partnerships are involved [11, 12]: 
 Managers within each of the partners need to be convinced that making risk known to all 
participants in the extended partnership will be positively recognized and at times 
rewarded with an allocation of risk mitigation funds. 
 Partners whose components or systems are being integrated with those of other partners 
need to be convinced that it is to their benefit to collaboratively and cooperatively manage 
risks evolving from the integrated relationships. 
 When joining entities managed by distinctly different organizations to create an extended 
partnership, diverse leaderships, objectives, motivations, and other cultural views (and 
ways of doing risk management) need to be melded in accordance with proprietary, ITAR, 
and other considerations. 
According to various sources, the single most important factor for achieving buy-in across an 
extended partnership is for senior leaders of each partnering organization, especially at the top 
level, to repeatedly voice their support and enforce accountability for an integrated risk and 
opportunity management process across the partnership.  More discussion on this subject will 
occur in Section 6.2 within the context of the extended partnerships that are managed within NASA 
centers. 
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4. Overview of the OROM Process and Analysis Approach 
This section discusses some of the main processes and analysis activities that are involved in 
conducting OROM in coordination with organizational planning, plan implementation, and 
organizational evaluation of performance.  The topics include the basic principles for deriving 
organizational objectives hierarchies; developing risk and opportunity information for each 
objective; understanding risk tolerance and opportunity appetite; composing organizational risk 
and opportunity scenario statements; identifying corresponding risk and opportunity leading 
indicators, including leading indicators for UU risks; correlating strategic success likelihoods with 
leading indicator values; rating the likelihood of success for the various goals and objectives; 
identifying risk and opportunity drivers; and identifying/evaluating various options for mitigating 
risk, availing opportunity, and setting up internal controls. 
4.1 Organizational Objectives Hierarchies 
4.1.1 Objectives Hierarchies for Each Management Unit 
Although the particulars of the management structures of organizations like NASA tend to vary 
from one organization to another, the process of developing objectives hierarchies for each 
management unit tends to be uniform.  It consists of identifying the unit’s top objectives, which 
tend to be mandated by the entities that the management unit supports, and for each top objective, 
devising a set of underlying performance objectives whose success leads to the success of the top 
objective.  The top objectives generally have a longer-term focus, and the supporting performance 
objectives a shorter-term focus.  We can therefore illustrate the process of devising objectives 
hierarchies assuming a management structure similar to NASA’s and contend that the process 
applies equally well to organizations that have a different management structure.  
Strategic planning at the executive level generally produces a set of strategic objectives, and under 
the strategic objectives a set of top programmatic objectives and a set of top institutional and 
technical objectives (see Figure 4-1).  The strategic objectives typically cover a 10-year timeframe 
or greater.  [Example: Expand human presence into the solar system and to the surface of Mars.]  
The top programmatic objectives typically cover a 5 to 10 year timeframe, although these 
boundaries are flexible.  [Example: Develop the Space Launch System (SLS), the Orion  
 
Figure 4-1.  Types of objectives developed at the executive level  
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Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle (MPCV), and the Exploration Ground Systems (EGS).]  Similarly, 
the top institutional and technical objectives typically cover a 5 to 10 year timeframe and support 
the top programmatic objectives.  [Example: Maintain a qualified workforce and necessary 
facilities to support the SLS, MPCV, and EGS programs, and develop the needed technology base 
for human survival on Mars.]   
The managerial units at the programmatic level at NASA consist of a set of mission directorates.  
Each mission directorate is responsible for one or more of the top programmatic objectives that 
flow down from the executive level.  Underneath each top programmatic objective is a set of 
nearer-term objectives, which for convenience are divided into different timeframes (see Figure 4-
2).  At NASA, these nearer-term objectives are referred to as performance goals, which have a 1 
to 5 year timeframe, and annual performance goals, which have a 1-year or less timeframe.  Those 
with especially high priority are referred to as Agency Priority Goals (APGs).  In this report we 
refer to the NASA performance goals and annual performance goals as mid-term objectives and 
short-term objectives, respectively, to keep the nomenclature more-or-less generically applicable 
not only to NASA but also to organizations like NASA. 
. 
Figure 4-2.  Types of objectives developed at the programmatic level 
The managerial units at the institutional/technical level at NASA consist of a set of centers.  Each 
center generally serves two purposes:  (1) developing and maintaining the institutional and 
technical capabilities needed to satisfy those strategic objectives that pertain to infrastructure and 
technical capability, and (2) taking technical (often including technical management) 
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responsibility for ensuring that the programmatic objectives are successfully satisfied.10  Similar 
to the objective breakdown for the mission directorates, the objectives for the centers start from 
top objectives passed down from the executive level and continue down to mid-term and short-
term objectives (i.e., performance goals and annual performance goals in NASA’s terminology).  
This breakdown is shown in Figure 4-3. 
4.1.2 Objectives Hierarchy for the Agency as a Whole 
Once the objectives hierarchies have been determined for each management unit of the agency, it 
should be possible to combine them into a single agency-wide objectives hierarchy that consists 
of an amalgam of the various management unit hierarchies.  A conceptualization of such a 
composite agency-wide objectives hierarchy is shown in Figure 4-4.  The red arrows between units 
in this figure are intended to be representative of the interfaces that would exist between different 
management units and their respective objectives.  It is these interfaces that dictate how the status 
of objectives within the various management units affects the status of the strategic objectives at 
the top of the organization. 
The interfaces shown by red arrows in Figure 4-4 are in reality a simplification of the complex 
interactions that tend to exist between the various management units and their objectives.  These 
interactions are better displayed by other means such as tables and templates.  The use of templates 
to account for inter-unit interactions in the roll-up of risks and opportunities to strategic level will 
later be demonstrated in Section 5. 
4.2 Populating the Organizational Objectives Hierarchies with Risk and 
Opportunity Information 
A principal product that OROM provides to support both organizational planning and 
organizational performance evaluation is an assessment, including a ranking, or rating, of each 
objective in the objectives hierarchy in terms of its “cumulative risk” and “cumulative 
opportunity.”  The cumulative risk, or aggregate risk, for an objective is basically the likelihood 
of not being able to achieve the objective based on following the current plan.  The cumulative 
opportunity for an objective is the likelihood that it will be possible to improve the plan based on 
future developments so as to be able to achieve the objective.  Refer to Section 2.2.4 for a definition 
of these terms. 
This ranking evolves as a result of completing the processes that were outlined in Sections 3.3.1 
and 3.3.2 and depicted in Figures 3-6 and 3-7.  The processes involve the following steps, the 
results of which are illustrated in Figure 4-5: 
 Identifying the individual risks and opportunities that affect each objective 
 Identifying associated leading indicators that can be used to gauge the significance of the 
risk/opportunity and trend its status over time 
                                                          
10 The centers also serve in an additional role as Technical Authority, but this role does not entail an associated 
decomposition of objectives and is therefore not included in the discussion that follows. 
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Figure 4-3.  Types of objectives developed at the institutional/technical level 
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Figure 4-4.  Conceptualization of an agency-wide objectives hierarchy 
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Figure 4-5.   Associating risk and opportunity information with objectives in the organizational objectives hierarchy
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 Establishing trigger values for the leading indicators based on the risk tolerances and 
opportunity appetites that the stakeholders (which may include both external funding 
authorities and internal decision makers) have relative to the affected objective(s) 
 Determining the current status of each leading indicator, accounting for both the current 
values of the indicators and their current trends 
Two other steps are depicted in Figure 4-5, the intricacies of which may not be immediately 
obvious to the reader: 
 Rolling-up the statuses of the risk and opportunity leading indicators for each objective to 
infer aggregated risk and opportunity status rankings (or ratings) for the objective 
 Rolling-up the risk and opportunity status rankings for the all objectives in the hierarchy 
to infer risk and opportunity status rankings that include influences from other objectives.  
The processes involved in performing these roll-up steps will become more apparent as the 
explanation of the processes unfolds in later sections. 
As called out in Figure 4-5, the same steps are performed with the same form of results being 
obtained whether the processes are applied during organizational planning or during organizational 
performance evaluation.  During organizational planning, details of architecture and design are 
generally not yet available, and so the risks and opportunities are based on historical experience.  
During organizational performance evaluation, the architectures and designs are in a mature 
enough state to base the risks and opportunities on actual architectures and designs.  
In Figure 4-5, the information provided for the individual opportunities may be seen to include not 
only opportunity scenarios but also introduced risk scenarios.  Introduced risks are a by-product 
of opportunities in the sense that the fulfillment of an opportunity requires an action that is not 
currently in the plan and that may introduce one or more associated risks.  For example, availing 
an opportunity created by the emergence of a new technology may introduce risks associated with 
first-of-a-kind uncertainties and development costs.  The nature of introduced risks will be 
explored more fully in Sections 5.4 and 5.5. 
4.3 Establishing Risk Tolerances and Opportunity Appetites 
As discussed in Section 2.2.3 and depicted conceptually in Figure 2-2, a preliminary step needed 
before establishing trigger values for leading indicators or rolling up individual risks and 
opportunities to cumulative values is to establish the risk and opportunity posture for the 
stakeholders.  The risk and opportunity posture is specified through an elicitation of their risk 
tolerance and opportunity appetite for each objective on the objectives hierarchy.  
Risk tolerances and opportunity appetites for the top organizational objectives generally evolve 
from a roll-up of the tolerances and appetites specified by the stakeholders at the lower levels, 
taking into account other considerations such as the timeframe for response. 
4.3.1 Risk and Opportunity Parity Statements 
The risk tolerances and opportunity appetites elicited from the stakeholders may be expressed in 
the form of risk and opportunity parity statements.  These statements define boundaries between 
tolerable and intolerable risks, and between significant and insignificant opportunities.  Each risk 
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and opportunity parity statement reflects a common level of pain or gain from the stakeholders’ 
perspective.  This enables comparisons between risk and opportunity to be meaningful because: 
 The amount of risk perceived by the stakeholders (i.e., their level of pain) is the same for 
each parity statement. 
 The amount of opportunity perceived by the stakeholders (i.e., their level of gain) is the 
same for each opportunity parity statement. 
 For each pairing of risk and opportunity parity statements, the amount of risk (pain) is 
balanced by the amount of opportunity (gain). 
Risk tolerance and opportunity appetite statements that are elicited from the stakeholders can take 
various forms.  For example, they may involve probabilities of failure or success in satisfying a 
particular objective, or they may involve changes in the achievable values of key performance 
parameters that affect a particular objective.  To illustrate this point, consider the following 
hypothetical risk and opportunity parity statements: 
Examples of Risk and Opportunity Parity Statements 
[Example Risk Tolerance Statement 1]:   A risk scenario is considered to reach the risk tolerance 
boundary if the likelihood of failure to land humans on Mars by 2035 increases from its targeted 
value of 10% to 20%. 
[Example Risk Tolerance Statement 2]:   A risk scenario is considered to reach the risk tolerance 
boundary if the targeted date of 2035 for landing humans on Mars increases to 2045. 
[Example Risk Tolerance Statement 3]:   A risk scenario is considered to reach the risk tolerance 
boundary if the total cost of landing humans on Mars by 2035 increases by 10%. 
[Example Opportunity Appetite Statement 1]:   An opportunity scenario is considered to reach 
the opportunity appetite boundary if the total cost of landing humans on Mars by 2035 decreases 
by 20%. 
[Example Opportunity Appetite Statement 2]:   An opportunity scenario is considered to reach 
the opportunity appetite boundary if the launch system for landing humans on Mars will also be 
capable of being used for exploratory missions to the moons of Jupiter and Saturn. 
The implication of parity suggests that these five statements involve equal pain or gain.  For 
example, the stakeholders are willing to accept a doubling of the mission failure probability or a 
slippage of 10 years in the landing date in exchange for being able to use the launch system as well 
for exploratory missions to Jupiter’s and Saturn’s moons.   
In summary, strategic decisions between disparate choices can be made if the baselines for risk 
and opportunity, as defined by the boundaries, are commensurate in terms pain and gain. 
4.3.2 Response Boundaries and Watch Boundaries 
To provide greater flexibility to the stakeholders, two separate risk tolerance and opportunity 
appetite boundaries (i.e., two levels of pain and gain) are elicited to differentiate risks and 
opportunities that need to be responded to from those that need only to be watched.  The two 
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boundaries are illustrated in Figure 4-6, where they are referred to as “response boundaries” and 
“watch boundaries”: 
• Exceedance of a response boundary suggests that an action is imminently needed; e.g., 
mitigation of the risk or exploitation of the opportunity.  A risk that exceeds the risk 
response boundary is “intolerable,” and an opportunity that exceeds the opportunity 
response boundary is “significant.” 
• Exceedance of a watch boundary without exceeding a response boundary suggests that an 
action should be considered but is not imminently needed.  Risks and opportunities that 
exceed the watch boundary but do not exceed the response boundary are referred to as 
“marginal.”23  While marginal risks/opportunities fall below the threshold of needing a 
response, they should be trended and reported at formal reviews. 
• A risk that does not exceed the risk watch boundary is “tolerable,” and an opportunity that 
does not exceed the opportunity watch boundary is “insignificant.” 
 
Figure 4-6.  Risk and opportunity response and watch boundaries  
                                                          
23 The term “watch” is used advisedly in this context.  In practice, tolerable risks may be accepted but continue to 
be watched to ensure they remain tolerable. 
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4.4 Identifying Risk and Opportunity Scenarios and Leading Indicators 
Once the stakeholders’ risk and opportunity posture has been established by eliciting risk tolerance 
and opportunity appetite boundaries, the OROM analysis team proceeds to develop a set of risk 
and opportunity scenarios and associated leading indicators for each entity in the objectives 
hierarchy.  Note that some risks and opportunities and their associated leading indicators may 
appear under more than one objective. 
At lower levels of the objectives hierarchy, risk and opportunity scenarios and leading indicators 
tend to be specified by direct assignment using historical experience, expert judgment, and “What 
If” analysis.  At higher levels, scenarios and indicators that are identified by the OROM analysis 
team may also be augmented by additional scenarios and indicators that are obtained by roll-up 
from lower levels.  This process recognizes the fact that the success of strategic goals and 
objectives may be affected not only by scenarios and leading indicators that enter at that level, but 
also by scenarios and leading indicators that enter at the levels of mid-term and short-term 
objectives and propagate upward. 
An example of an opportunity scenario that is specified directly at a higher level and a risk scenario 
that is rolled-up from lower levels is provided in the yellow box below. 
Example of an Opportunity Scenario that is Specified Directly at a Higher Level and a 
Risk Scenario that is Rolled-up from Lower Levels 
Opportunity for 10-Year Strategic Objective a:  There is a possibility that new technology in the 
area of electric propulsion may become available within a ten-year time frame, making it 
possible to gain a far greater knowledge of the outer solar system over the next decade. 
Risk for 5-Year Performance Goal X:  If milestone slippages that have occurred during the past 
year in Program X are not corrected, there is a possibility that System X will not be ready for 
launch in five years. 
Risk for 5-Year Performance Goal Y:  If milestone slippages that have occurred during the past 
year in Program Y are not corrected, there is a possibility that System Y will not be ready for 
launch in five years. 
Roll-Up Risk for 10-Year Strategic Objective a:  If Systems X and Y are not successfully 
launched in five years, there is a possibility that exploration of the outer solar system will be 
severely impaired over the next decade. 
4.4.1 Risk and Opportunity Taxonomies 
A taxonomy is a tree structure of classifications that begins with a single, all-encompassing 
classification at the root of the tree, and partitions this classification into a number of sub-
classifications at the nodes below the root. This process is repeated iteratively at each node, 
proceeding from the general to the specific until a desired level of category specificity is reached. 
Taxonomies can be used to group organizational risk and opportunity scenarios into categories 
that reflect, first, the types of goals and objectives that they affect, and second, the types of events 
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that could create risk and opportunity for each goal or objective.  Risk and opportunity taxonomies 
provide the following benefits: 
 They assist in the identification of risk and opportunity scenarios that otherwise might be 
missed (e.g., by facilitating the brainstorming process), and in the identification and 
understanding of the cross-cutting nature of some of these scenarios. 
 They help identify leading indicators that can be used to rank the likelihood (at least 
qualitatively) that a postulated event that either threatens or benefits a goal or objective 
will occur. 
 They facilitate the process of identifying planning alternatives and control options to 
effectively mitigate the risks or exploit the opportunities. 
 They assist in properly allocating resources among the entities or organizational units of 
the agency (e.g., to mitigate a risk or exploit an opportunity). 
Figure 4-7 illustrates an example three-level organizational risk and opportunity taxonomy that is 
applicable to nonprofit technical organizations like NASA.  For each categorical unit in the bottom 
level of the taxonomy, it also provides an example individual risk (R) or opportunity (O) scenario 
summary description.  In addition to categories that derive from NASA’s mission and manner of 
conducting business, NASA and other Government agencies are responsible for meeting outcomes 
and milestones that are directly mandated by the Government, e.g., through Congressional 
amendments signed into law by the President. 
As noted in Figure 4-7, each bottom-level sub-category can be further decomposed into one or 
more goals or objectives that apply to that categorical unit.  For example, new technology pursuits 
pertaining to mission performance are comprised of different individual technology pursuits, each 
of which represents a goal or objective of the organization.  Thus, the taxonomy in Figure 4-7 may 
be construed as having an unseen bottom level corresponding to the goals and objectives that are 
affected. 
4.4.2 Risk and Opportunity Scenario Statements 
According to the NASA RM Handbook [8], risk scenario statements should contain three to four 
elements, as follows: 
1. A condition or set of conditions encapsulating the current key fact-based situation or 
environment that is causing concern, doubt, anxiety, or uneasiness 
2. A departure event or set of departure events describing a possible change from the baseline 
plan 
3. (Optional) An organizational entity or set of entities representing the primary resources 
that are affected by the risk scenario.  (Note: the resources most affected by the risk 
scenario may be at the top level or at a lower level in the organization.)  
4. A consequence or set of consequences describing the foreseeable, credible negative 
impacts on the organization’s ability to meet its expected performance 
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Figure 4-7.  Example taxonomy for organizational risks and opportunities 
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To facilitate strategic planning, it is useful to add the following element to the four cited in the RM 
Handbook: 
5. The objective(s) in the organizational objectives hierarchy affected by the risk scenario 
The examples in the yellow box below provide organizational risk scenarios that conform to this 
format: 
 Examples of Risk Scenario Statements 
1. Category: Mandated performance goals: 
Given that [condition] the schedule for System X is much more stringent than was the schedule for 
the development of the Space Shuttle, there is a possibility that [departure from plan] the uncrewed 
test launch will be delayed by as much as 6 months resulting in [entity] the System X program 
[consequence] being unable to reach launch capability prior to closure of the launch window, 
adversely affecting [mid-term objective] fielding of System X by 2020. 
2. Category: Financial: 
Given that [condition] economic indicators suggest the possibility of a recession, there is a 
possibility that [departure from plan] funding to NASA will be cut by Congress resulting in [entity] 
the budgeting organization [consequence] having insufficient financial resources to work with, 
adversely affecting [strategic objective] human exploration of the solar system. 
3. Category: Availability of assets / loss of assets: 
Given that [condition] the workforce is aging, there is a possibility that [departure from plan] there 
will be a larger number of retirements next year than anticipated resulting in [entity] the hiring and 
technical organizations [consequence] being unable to meet their staffing goals, adversely affecting 
[strategic objective] maintenance of a qualified workforce. 
4. Category: Legal and reputational: 
Given that  [condition] an audit of ethics training has indicated shortcomings in the contents and 
attendance of the training, there is a possibility that [departure from plan] there will be a serious 
ethical infraction resulting in [entity] the agency [consequence] losing public confidence, adversely 
affecting [long-term objective] the long-term viability of the agency. 
Opportunity scenario statements should contain analogous information: 
1. A condition or set of conditions encapsulating the current key fact-based situation or 
environment that is promoting the possibility of an opportunity 
2. An enabling event or potential advance, or a set of enabling events or potential advances, 
that could happen to promote the possibility to a reality 
3. (Optional) An organizational entity or set of entities representing the primary resources 
that are affected by the opportunity scenario  
4. An action that must be taken to realize the opportunity 
5. A benefit or set of benefits describing the foreseeable, credible possible impacts on the 
organization’s ability to perform its mission 
6. The objective(s) in the organizational objectives hierarchy affected by the opportunity 
scenario 
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As discussed in Section 2.2.1, the inclusion of an action, which is not needed for the definition of 
a risk scenario, is intrinsic to the definition of an opportunity scenario.  Example opportunity 
scenario statements following this format are presented in the yellow box below. 
Examples of Opportunity Scenario Statements 
1. Category: New technology development and application: 
Given that [condition] new technology in the area of electric propulsion shows promise, there is a 
possibility that [enabling event or potential advance] the technology will become available for use 
within 5 years so that if [entity] the propulsion organization [action] implements the new 
technology for Mission X, it may be able to [benefit] achieve its thrust requirements with a 50% 
weight savings, thereby contributing to [strategic objective] development and realization of 
creative new technologies and more distant exploration of the solar system. 
2. Category: Education and partnerships: 
Given that [condition] enrollment in NASA’s public education STEM programs has been higher 
than expected, there is a possibility that [enabling event or potential advance] enrollment will 
double in the next two years, so that if [entity] the public education organization [action] 
correspondingly doubles the number of STEM courses offered, it may be able to [benefit] meet the 
Administration’s STEM requirements sooner than expected, thereby contributing to [strategic 
objective] the advancement of the Nation’s STEM education. 
The RM Handbook [11] also provides guidance about narrative descriptions that should 
accompany risk scenario statements.  That guidance is applicable as well to OROM. 
4.4.3 Risk and Opportunity Leading Indicators 
Risk and opportunity leading indicators are used to infer the likelihood that each objective in the 
organizational objectives hierarchy will be successfully achieved within the assigned timeframe.  
During the organizational planning process, they are used to help decide from among various 
candidate objectives on the basis of their projected likelihood of success.  During the performance 
evaluation process, they are used to assess how the likelihoods of success based on current 
conditions stand with respect to the initial projections. 
Most organizations monitor numerous key performance indicators (KPIs) that shed insights about 
risk events that have already affected the organization [13].  Leading indicators, on the other hand, 
help to monitor potential future shifts in risk conditions or new emerging risks so that management 
can more proactively identify potential impacts on the organization’s portfolio of risks.  
It should be noted, however, that indicators of past performance (i.e., lagging indicators) can also 
be indicators of possible future performance.  For example, the occurrence of missed milestones 
in the past may indicate a potential for missed milestones in the future.  Therefore, the set of leading 
indicators normally includes past performance as well as present conditions that are not related to 
past performance. 
Risk and opportunity leading indicators should possess the following characteristics: 
 Quantifiability:  There should be one or more quantifiable measures by which to assess the 
status of the leading indicator. 
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 Correlatability:  There should be a direct correlation between the value of a leading 
indicator and the likelihood of success of one or more of the objectives in the organizational 
objective hierarchy. 
 Actionability:  In the event that the value of a leading indicator leads to concern about a 
risk or optimism about an opportunity, there should be means for reducing the risk or 
exploiting the opportunity.  It is not necessary for all leading indicators to be actionable (as 
some are caused by external forces that are beyond the control of the organization).  Rather, 
it is only necessary that for each nontrivial risk or opportunity, there are some leading 
indicators that can be controlled to help contain the risk or grow the opportunity, 
Risk and opportunity leading indicators may have different levels of complexity.  For example, a 
simple indicator might be a ratio that management tracks to infer the status of an evolving risk or 
opportunity.  A more elaborate indicator might involve the aggregation of several individual 
indicators into a multi-dimensional score about emerging events that may lead to new risks or 
opportunities.  In addition, leading indicators might emerge from internal sources (such as missed 
project milestones) or from external sources (such as the state of the national economy). 
Leading indicators may also be grouped according to the type of risk or opportunity to which they 
relate.  Table 4-1 provides examples showing how various leading indicators may be grouped into 
categories of risk and opportunity. 
4.4.4 Leading Indicators of Unknown and Underappreciated (UU) Risks 
As mentioned in Section 2.2.7, the factors that contribute to UU risks can be considered to be 
leading indicators, and they, too, should be included in the roll-up of risks and opportunities from 
lower to higher levels in the objectives hierarchy.  Based on work reported in [9] and [10], the 
following design, organizational, and programmatic factors are among the principal leading 
indicators of UU risks: 
• Amount of complexity, particularly involving the interfaces between different elements of 
the system.  Technical systems more prone to UU failure are complex, tightly coupled 
systems that make the chain of events leading to a disaster incomprehensible to operators. 
• Amount of scaling beyond the domain of knowledge.  UU risks may occur either from 
incrementally scaling up a design to achieve higher performance or incrementally scaling 
down a design to save on cost or time, without providing adequate validation. 
• Use of fundamentally new technology or fundamentally new application of an existing 
technology.  The use of new technology in place of heritage technology may lead to an 
increase in UU risks when other factors within this list are not well handled. 
• Degree to which organizational priorities are focused toward safety and reliability.  UU 
risks occur more frequently when top management is not committed to safety as an 
organizational goal, when there is no or little margin in the availability of qualified 
personnel, and when organizational learning is not sufficiently valued. 
• Degree to which the management style is hierarchical.  Two-way flows of information are 
essential in technological systems to maximize the sharing of information among all 
personnel regardless of position in the organizational hierarchy. 
44 
 
Table 4-1.  Typical risk and opportunity scenario types and associated leading indicators 
Category  Example Risks  Example 
Opportunities  
Example Internal (INT) and External (EXT) Leading 
Indicators 
New 
technology 
development 
and 
application 
Degradation 
of mission 
performance 
or of 
institutional 
capability or 
cost increases 
due to 
unknowns  
Enhancement 
of mission 
performance or 
of institutional 
capability or 
cost reductions 
because of 
technology 
improvements 
INT:  Initiation of and results from internal state-of-the-
art assessments 
INT:  Technology Readiness Level (TRL) rate of progress 
INT:  Number of patents applied for 
EXT: Technology trends in areas pertinent to NASA 
missions (propulsion, diagnostics, materials, 
Information Technology, etc.) 
Mandated 
performance 
goals 
Failure to 
meet 
mandated or 
targeted 
milestone 
dates 
Exceedance of 
expectations in 
meeting 
mandated or 
targeted 
milestone dates 
INT:  Schedule compared to other programs / projects * 
INT:  Number of missed intermediate milestones & 
slippage amount * 
INT:  Unresolved action items & uncorrected  problems * 
EXT:  Changes in prioritization of agency outcomes 
Financial  Funding cut Funding 
increase 
EXT:  Economic indicators 
EXT:  Congressional makeup 
EXT:  Changes in national priorities 
Insufficient 
contingency  
More-than-
sufficient 
contingency  
INT:  Contingency relative to other programs/projects * 
INT:  Rate of spending compared to other 
programs/projects * 
INT:  Unresolved assignment of roles and responsibilities 
Increased cost 
of materials / 
purchased 
services 
Decreased cost 
of materials / 
purchased 
services 
EXT:  Price trends 
EXT:  Threats of foreign conflicts or political changes (e.g., 
affecting rare material costs) 
EXT:  Supplier financial problems 
Increased cost 
of operations 
Decreased cost 
of operations 
INT:  Monthly cost reports * 
INT:  Low scores on self-assessments and audits * 
Milestone 
slippage costs 
Milestone 
acceleration 
savings  
INT:  Earned value reports * 
EXT:  Government shutdown 
Accident costs 
 
INT:  Precursors, anomalies, mishap reports * 
Availability 
of assets / 
loss of assets 
Loss of key 
personnel  
Gain of Key 
Personnel 
INT:  Age of workforce 
INT:  Workplace morale (e.g., from surveys) 
EXT:  Changes in competitive labor market 
EXT:  Demographic changes 
Loss or 
unavailability 
of facilities or 
equipment 
Increased 
availability of 
facilities or 
equipment 
INT:  Number of unplanned maintenance actions * 
INT:  Age of equipment 
EXT:  Terrorism trends 
EXT:  Changes in OSHA regulations 
* Asterisked leading indicators are measured at program/project level or center level and are 
aggregated to obtain leading indicators that apply to the agency as a whole.  
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Table 4-1 (Continued)   
Category  Example Risk 
Event 
Example 
Opportunity 
Event 
Example Internal (INT) and External (EXT) Leading 
Indicators 
Availability 
of assets / 
loss of assets 
(cont.) 
Loss or 
unavailability 
of suppliers 
Increased 
availability of 
suppliers 
EXT:  Market factors (demand versus supply) 
EXT:  Supplier financial or legal problems 
Loss or 
unavailability 
of IT capability 
Increased 
availability of IT 
assets 
INT:  Number of unaddressed vulnerabilities 
EXT:  Hacking trends 
EXT:  New viruses 
Legal and 
reputational 
Failure to 
meet Federal 
or local 
requirements 
Exceedance of 
Federal or local 
requirements 
INT:  Quality of ethics program 
INT:  Quality of record keeping (e.g., for OSHA 
requirements) * 
EXT:  New regulations 
Increase in 
financial 
liability given 
an accident 
Decrease in 
financial 
liability given an 
accident 
INT:  Increased use of hazardous or toxic materials * 
INT:  Accident precursors (ground and flight operations)* 
EXT:  Trends in Court decisions regarding liability 
Reputational 
damage due 
to mgmt. 
failures 
Reputational 
enhancement 
due to mgmt. 
successes 
INT:  Findings of independent reviews (e.g., CAIB and 
ASAP reports) 
INT:  Seeking and resolution of internal dissenting 
opinions * 
Degradation 
of scientific 
reputation 
Enhancement 
or maintenance 
of scientific 
reputation 
INT:  Number of technical papers published 
INT:  Number of patents granted 
EXT:  Number of citations in technical papers 
EXT:  Number of nominations or awards received 
Education 
and 
partnerships 
Failure to 
meet public 
educ. goals 
Exceedance of 
public educ. 
goals 
INT:  Missed or made milestones 
INT:  Low or high enrollment in educational programs 
Failure to 
meet 
technology 
transfer goals 
Exceedance of 
technology 
transfer goals 
INT:  Missed or made milestones 
INT:  Number of technology transfer agreements  
EXT:  Lack or surplus of interest or progress from potential 
commercial partners 
EXT:  Trends regarding  the sharing of sensitive 
information and materials 
Failure to 
meet 
international 
partnership 
goals 
Exceedance of 
international 
partnership 
goals 
INT:  Missed or made milestones that NASA is responsible 
for* 
EXT:  Lack or surplus of interest or progress from potential 
international partners 
EXT:  New regulations regarding sensitive information 
EXT:  Competition from a foreign country 
* Asterisked leading indicators are measured at program/project level or center level and are 
aggregated to obtain leading indicators that apply to the agency as a whole.  
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• Degree of oversight when responsibilities are distributed among various entities.  Interfaces 
between different elements of the system provided by different suppliers require stringent 
oversight by the managing agency. 
• Amount of pressure to meet schedule and budget constraints.  In particular, time pressure 
beyond the level of comfort is a fundamental reason for high human error rates. 
• Likelihood of major or game-changing external events that affect the agency’s direction, 
such as changes in the Administration or geopolitical upheavals.  Such events impact the 
stability of long-term strategic planning and of constraints such as ITAR, etc. 
References [9] and [10] provide useful guidelines on how various combinations of the above 
leading indicators affect the relative magnitude of UU risks compared to the magnitude of known 
risks. 
4.5 Specifying Leading Indicator Trigger Values and Evaluating Cumulative 
Risks and Opportunities 
Leading indicator trigger values are used to signal when a risk is reaching a risk tolerance boundary 
or when an opportunity is reaching an opportunity appetite boundary.  Reaching the trigger values 
for risk leading indicators implies that the likelihood of not being able to satisfy an objective in 
the organizational objectives hierarchy is becoming a concern.  Reaching the trigger values for 
opportunity leading indicators implies either that there is a potential for significantly increasing 
the likelihood of being able to satisfy an objective, or that there is an emerging opportunity to 
achieve new goals and objectives that were formerly considered unreachable or inconceivable. 
Leading indicator trigger values are specified for each risk and opportunity scenario for each 
objective in the organizational objectives hierarchy.  Once specified, it is possible to compare the 
actual values of the leading indicators to their trigger values to provide a measure of the overall 
risk and opportunity for each objective in the hierarchy. 
4.5.1 Leading Indicator Trigger Values 
Similar to the way that risk tolerance and opportunity appetite were characterized by two 
boundaries, a response boundary and a watch boundary, it is useful to define two triggers for risk 
and opportunity leading indicators, a response trigger and a watch trigger.  The values of the 
leading indicator triggers are elicited by the OROM analysis team from appropriate technical 
authorities and subject matter experts. 
Leading indicator triggers may be positively or negatively correlated with risk or opportunity, 
depending on whether the leading indicator is defined in the positive or negative sense.  For 
example, remaining cost reserve is defined in the opposite direction from expenditure to date.  As 
cost expenditure increases, the risk of overrun increases (a positive correlation), but as remaining 
cost reserve increases, the risk of overrun decreases (a negative correlation).  This opposite duality 
is captured by the mirror-image effects of positive and negative correlations shown in Figure 4-8. 
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Figure 4-8.  Risk and opportunity leading indicator triggers.  
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Leading indicator triggers are intended to be quantitative surrogates for the often qualitative risk 
tolerance and opportunity appetite boundaries.  Their accuracy as surrogates depends upon the 
skill of the technical authorities, subject matter experts, and OROM analysis team in defining 
leading indicators and specifying their trigger values.  
4.5.2 Cumulative Risks and Opportunities 
The cumulative risk and cumulative opportunity for each objective in the organizational objectives 
hierarchy is derived from the current status of the associated leading indicators relative to their 
trigger values, where “current status” refers to both the current value and the current trend.  The 
term “cumulative” in this context refers to the accumulation of the various leading indicators that 
apply to the objective being evaluated. 
Figure 4-5, presented earlier, conceptually illustrates the general process for determining the 
cumulative risks and opportunities for a set of objectives in an organizational objectives hierarchy.  
A more detailed illustration of the roll-up process will be provided in Sections 5.6.2 and 5.6.3 in 
connection with a particular example. 
4.6 Identifying and Evaluating Risk Mitigation, Opportunity Exploitation, and 
Control Options 
If a cumulative risk is intolerable (or marginal) and/or a cumulative opportunity is significant (or 
marginal), it may become desirable to consider means for mitigating the risk and/or exploiting the 
opportunity, along with the associated setting of controls.  This section discusses processes for 
identifying and evaluating such options. 
4.6.1 Deducing Risk and Opportunity Drivers 
Risk drivers are defined in the NASA RM Handbook [8] as: “those elements found within the 
aggregate performance risk models that contribute most to the performance risks because of 
uncertainties in their characterization. … When varied over their range of uncertainty, [they] cause 
the performance risk to change from tolerable to intolerable (or marginal).” 
In the context of OROM, a risk driver can be thought of as a significant source of risk contributing 
to the overall, cumulative risk of not satisfying a top organizational objective.  A risk driver can 
be a departure event in a risk scenario statement, an underlying cause of a departure event, a 
leading indicator, a particular assumption used in evaluating the significance of an individual risk, 
an assumption made in evaluating a cumulative risk, an essential internal control, or any 
combination of such elements that cause the cumulative risk to change its color from green 
(tolerable) to yellow (marginal) or red (intolerable) or from yellow to red.  For example, the 
following elements in the analysis of risk and implementation of controls are potential risk drivers: 
 Congress may cut funding for the Space Program next year (a departure event). 
 Human error may cause a catastrophic accident to occur during a mission (an underlying 
cause of the departure event “catastrophic accident”). 
 The schedule reserve for a key task in a key program is uncomfortably low and trending 
lower (a leading indicator of the risk of not completing the key task on time). 
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 If needed, personnel can be diverted from Task A to Task B (an assumption used to 
evaluate the significance of the risk of not completing Task B on time). 
 All pertinent information needed to evaluate the organization’s strategic performance is 
being transmitted in an unbiased fashion to the technical authorities (an assumption used 
to justify assurance that the organization is meeting its strategic objectives). 
 There is a process and document trail to ensure that all significant risks and opportunities 
are elevated to responsible individuals with management authority to act upon them (an 
internal control).  
If no one element individually is sufficient to change the color of the cumulative risk, a 
combination of them may constitute a risk driver. 
Risk drivers focus risk management attention on those potentially controllable situations that 
present the greatest opportunity for risk reduction. Often, risk drivers affect more than one 
individual risk and cut across more than one organizational unit. 
Similarly, opportunity drivers are generally departure events in an opportunity scenario statement 
or leading indicators of opportunity.  For example, the following elements in the analysis of 
opportunity are potential opportunity drivers: 
 Congress may increase funding for the Space Program next year (a departure event). 
 The schedule reserve for a key task in a key program is higher than expected and trending 
higher (a leading indicator of an opportunity to reduce program cost by reallocating 
personnel so as to finish the program ahead of schedule). 
Risk and opportunity drivers can be identified by applying the risk and opportunity roll-up process 
(illustrated schematically in Figure 4-5) to determine whether the color of the cumulative risks and 
opportunities for the top organizational objectives change as various sources of risk and 
opportunity are eliminated.  For example, Figure 4-9 shows schematically how the removal of Risk 
Driver 1 propagates up through the objectives hierarchy to change the ranking of the cumulative 
risk for the top objective from marginal to tolerable, and how the removal of Opportunity Driver 
1 changes the ranking of the cumulative opportunity for the top objective from significant to 
marginal. 
4.6.2 Deducing Risk and Opportunity Scenario Drivers 
Organizations like NASA are typically required to identify their top risk scenarios, report on the 
likelihood of their occurrence and severity of their impact, and explain how they are being 
responded to.   
Risk and opportunity scenario drivers are a higher-order representation of risk and opportunity 
drivers.  The elements that constitute risk and opportunity drivers (i.e., key departure events, 
underlying causes, assumptions, existing controls, etc.) are embedded within risk and opportunity 
scenarios, either as part of the conditions, departure events, and consequences that comprise a risk 
or opportunity scenario statement or as part of the narrative that accompanies one.  Therefore, just 
as a risk or opportunity driver is defined in Section 4.6.1 as an element or set of elements that cause 
the cumulative risk or opportunity for a top objective to change color,  
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Figure 4-9.  Hypothetical results showing how the elimination of a risk driver affects cumulative 
risk and the elimination of an opportunity driver affects cumulative opportunity. 
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a risk or opportunity scenario driver can be defined as a scenario or set of scenarios that leads to 
the same result. 
Also, just as risk or opportunity drivers can be identified by applying the risk or opportunity roll-
up process while selectively eliminating one or more sources of risk or opportunity until the color 
of a top objective changes, risk or opportunity scenario drivers can be identified in the same way 
by selectively eliminating one or more risk or opportunity scenarios.  Figure 4-10 shows how the 
removal of Risk Scenario Driver 1 and Opportunity Scenario Driver 1 might propagate up through 
the objectives hierarchy to change the ranking of the cumulative risk and opportunity. 
4.6.3 Identifying Options for Risk Response, Opportunity Action, and Internal 
Control 
When there is a need to reduce the cumulative risk or a desire to take advantage of the cumulative 
opportunity for one or more top objectives, there are several types of options to be considered: 
 Responses to mitigate the cumulative risk 
 Actions to seize the cumulative opportunity 
 Institution of controls to provide effective management oversight and protect operative 
assumptions 
The formulation of risk responses and opportunity actions can take many forms, including changes 
in the design of a system that is in development, retrofits to existing systems, changes in 
manufacturing processes, changes in operating procedures, changes in management, formation of 
partnerships, proactive actions to inform and influence governing agencies, improved public 
relations, and cost sharing arrangements, to name a few.  What these various formulations have in 
common is that they are based on certain assumptions, and their effectiveness depends upon the 
accuracy of those assumptions.  For example, design changes to a system are based on assumptions 
about the environments that the system will be exposed to, and whether or not those environments 
will stay within the parameters that are called out in the design specifications.  One of the main 
functions of internal controls, therefore, pertains to the protection of the accuracy of the 
assumptions. 
The use of controls to protect operative assumptions is emphasized by Leveson within the domain 
of safety performance in [14].  The types of assumptions of interest to Leveson include the 
following: 
 Assumptions about the system hazards and the paths to (causes of) hazards 
 Assumptions about the effectiveness of the controls, that is, the shaping and hedging 
actions, used to reduce or manage hazards 
 Assumptions about how the system will be operated and the environment (context) in 
which it will operate, for example, assumptions that the controls will be operating as 
assumed by the designers 
 Assumptions about the development environment and processes 
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Figure 4-10.  Hypothetical results showing how the elimination of a risk scenario driver and an 
opportunity scenario driver affect cumulative risk and opportunity.  
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 Assumptions about the organizational and societal control structure during operations, i.e., 
that it is working as designed, the design was adequate to ensure the system requirements 
are enforced, and the system controllers are fulfilling their responsibilities and operating 
as designed 
 Assumptions about vulnerability or severity in risk assessment that may change over time 
and thus require a redesign of the risk management and leading indicators system itself 
These types of assumptions, with minor modification, apply not only to the safety domain 
considered by Leveson but as well to virtually all other risk domains (technical, cost, schedule, 
institutional, acquisition, financial viability, liability, etc.) at all levels of the organization 
(executive, program directorate, technical directorate, etc.).  Controls should ensure: 
 Either that such assumptions remain valid over time in all risk and opportunity domains 
for all organizational levels 
 Or, if the conditions should change, that the operative assumptions are changed 
accordingly and the new assumptions are monitored and controlled 
The identification of risk mitigation responses, opportunity exploitation actions, and control 
options is directed at finding viable ways to act upon the risk and opportunity drivers and/or 
scenario drivers discussed in the preceding subsection.  The purpose is to reduce risks or act upon 
opportunities when the cumulative risks and opportunities demand that such influence be 
exercised.  There is, however, an obvious limitation on the ability of an agency or business to 
influence risk and opportunity drivers, in that not all drivers are actionable.  When a driver is not 
actionable, the fallback is to identify other risk and opportunity drivers that are actionable and that 
can exert an influence on the cumulative risk or opportunity.  For example, it is not within the 
province of a government agency to influence whom the voters choose to elect to Federal office, 
but it is within their province to track public sentiment and develop contingency plans. 
The identification of meaningful responses, actions, and control options will be discussed further 
in Section 5.7.2. 
4.6.4 Evaluating Options for Risk Response, Opportunity Action, and Internal 
Control 
Options for risk response, opportunity action, and internal control can be evaluated by assessing 
how the cumulative risks and opportunities for the top organizational objectives would change as 
a result of incorporating the responses, actions, and controls into the organizational structure and 
its operation.  The process for performing this assessment includes the need to consider not only 
the positive effects that such options might have on some parts of a system or operation but also 
the possible unintended negative effects on other parts of the system or operation. 
The process for performing this evaluation follows the framework that was developed in Sections 
4.4 and 4.5.  Risk and opportunity scenarios are redeveloped taking into account the proposed 
response, action, and control option.  In the case of opportunity actions, new risk scenarios 
introduced by the proposed actions and associated controls are included in the accounting.  The 
existing leading indicators are modified and new ones added to reflect the content of the 
redeveloped risk and opportunity scenarios.  Leading indicator trigger values are specified 
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consistent with the modified leading indicators.  Finally, the cumulative risks and opportunities 
are reevaluated based on a roll-up of the new risk and opportunity information. 
Figure 4-11 presents a flow chart depicting the development of a risk response, opportunity action, 
and control plan as an iterative process.   The plan is initially proposed if the evaluation of the 
cumulative risks and opportunities of the various objectives indicates that one or more risks is 
intolerable or marginal and/or one or more opportunities is significant or marginal.  The iteration 
of the plan continues until there is an optimal or near-optimal balance between the cumulative 
risks, the cumulative opportunities, and the cost of implementing the plan.  Optimality is 
considered to be reached when the following conditions all apply: 
 The cumulative risks and opportunities for the top objectives are in balance (a condition 
which evolves from using the risk and opportunity drivers to guide the development of the 
plan at each iteration). 
 The cumulative risks cannot be reduced further without violating cost constraints imposed 
on the organization. 
 The cumulative opportunities cannot be availed further without violating the cost 
constraints. 
 The cost of implementing the plan cannot be reduced further without negatively changing 
the status of one or more of the cumulative risks. 
The evaluation of proposed responses, actions, and control options will be discussed further in 
Section 5.7.2. 
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Figure 4-11.  Iterative process for identifying and evaluating a risk response, opportunity action, and control plan that balances 
cumulative risk, cumulative opportunity, and cost 
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5. Development and Utilization of OROM Templates for 
Performance Evaluation and Strategic Planning 
5.1 Overview 
As discussed earlier (e.g., Section 2.1.3), the literature contains a significant amount of guidance 
on the organizational aspects of risk and opportunity management and the fundamental framework 
to be used.  However, it provides very few details on how to conduct the analyses that are needed 
in order to reap the benefits.  Section 5 attempts to fill that gap by describing and demonstrating 
how comprehensive OROM analyses can be conducted using templates.  In Sections 5.1 through 
5.8, the templates will be introduced by pursuing an example that examines OROM’s role in 
evaluating organizational performance for its ongoing programs, projects, activities, and 
initiatives, and in identifying and evaluating actions and controls to reduce risk and/or seize 
opportunity.  In Section 5.9, the example will be modified to show how the same templates with 
different inputs can be applied to examine OROM’s role in organizational planning, where the 
organization is interested in examining its likelihood of success in meeting its top objectives for 
various candidate sets of programs, projects, etc., that are in the conceptual stage.   
The use of templates is a practical, efficient, and broad-based approach for implementing the 
framework for OROM that is discussed in Sections 3 and 4.  To illustrate how templates can be 
applied effectively, a real-world example relevant to NASA will be pursued.  The example will 
treat OROM from various vantage points: first by considering OROM implementation from the 
perspective of each of the major management levels in the organization (i.e., the executive level, 
the programmatic or mission directorate level, and the institutional/technical or center level), and 
then from the perspective of the organization as a whole (i.e., integrated across the major 
management units). 
The templates developed for this example pertain principally to organizations like NASA that 
conduct risky technical or scientific ventures and whose interest is mainly in achieving technical 
gain and knowledge advancement rather than financial gain for its stakeholders.  Following are the 
types of results that will be generated by the templates used in this example: 
High-Level Results (Suitable as a Synopsis for Management) 
 A hierarchical list of objectives to be satisfied across the organization and the way that they 
interface with various levels of the organization (executive; programmatic; 
institutional/technical) 
 A substantiated ranking (or rating) of the level of risk of not being able to achieve each 
objective 
 A substantiated ranking of the level of opportunity available for improving the ability to 
achieve each objective 
 A list of risk and opportunity drivers for each objective, leading to suggestions for 
responses such as risk mitigations, opportunity actions, and control options 
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Low-Level Results (Suitable for Explaining the Details behind the High-Level Results) 
 Identification of the complex interfaces between objectives, and the rationale for how the 
likelihood of success for each objective affects the likelihood of success for other 
objectives 
 A list of the significant individual risk and opportunity scenarios for each objective, and 
the rationale for why these scenarios are considered significant 
 A list of the key risk and opportunity indicators and the rationale for how these indicators 
relate to the likelihood of success of each objective  
 Specification of trigger values for each indicator, and the rationale for why these particular 
values signal the need for increased watchfulness or for a direct response 
 A roll-up of the significant individual risks and opportunities from the bottom level of the 
objectives hierarchy (near-term objectives) to the top level (long-term or strategic 
objectives), along with the rationale for choices made during the roll-up 
 Sensitivity results showing how the cumulative risk and opportunity for each objective are 
affected by various combinations of risk and opportunity scenarios and their constituent 
parts 
 Matrix-like risk and opportunity driver charts showing the time criticality for initiating 
response  
5.2 Example: The NASA Next Generation Space Telescope as of 2014 
The example application involves the development, deployment, and operation of a large-scale 
space telescope, based on the the James Webb Space Telescope (JWST), formerly known as the 
Next Generation Space Telescope.  Note that throughout this example we will keep the more 
generic term “Next Generation Space Telescope” in place of the more specific designation JWST, 
to indicate the pedagogical nature of the example, focusing the reader’s attention on the structure 
and form of the templates and how they may be used to facilitate strategic planning and 
performance evaluation in a general sense. To lend authenticity and promote recognition of the 
kinds of risks and opportunities that have to be dealt with, however, actual data pertinent to both 
the JWST and the Hubble Space Telescope (HST) are used throughout the example.  The data for 
the JWST project reflects its status as of the end of 2014. 
Timely development and launching of the telescope is an Agency Priority Goal (APG):  “By 
October 2018, NASA will launch the James Webb Space Telescope, the premier space-based 
observatory. To enable this launch date, NASA will complete the James Webb Space Telescope 
primary mirror backplane and backplane support structures and deliver them to the Goddard Space 
Flight Center for integration with the mirror segments by September 30, 2015.” 
The principal source of information is Report GAO-15-100 on the JWST project issued by the US 
Government Accountability Office in December 2014 to Congressional committees [15].  Among 
other things, the report addresses the degree to which technical challenges are impacting the JWST 
project’s ability to stay on schedule and budget, and the extent to which budget and cost estimates 
reflect current information about project risks.  The following bits of information obtained from 
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this and other sources are mentioned here not to criticize the project or its management but rather 
to provide a basis for analyzing risks and opportunities in this example using published 
information12:  
Information Pertinent to JWST Schedule and Cost 
 JWST is one of the most complex projects in NASA’s history (GAO [15]). 
 In addition to the design, the scale of JWST’s integration and test effort is more complex 
than most NASA projects (GAO [15]). 
 The cryocooler subsystem is particularly complex and challenging because of the relatively 
great distance between the cooling components and the need to overcome multiple sources 
of unwanted heat (GAO [15]). 
 The cryocooler subcontractor has experienced prior schedule delays and continued 
performance challenges (SpaceNews website “Manufacturing Issues Plague JWST,” 
November 2014 [16]). 
 The cryocooler element deferred seven earlier milestones until fiscal year 2015 as a result 
of manufacturing and development delays (GAO [15]). 
 The schedule reserve for development of the cryocooler subsystem diminished in 2014 
from 5 months to 0 months (GAO [15]). 
 The schedule reserve for the development of other subsystems has also diminished in the 
past year, but not as much as that for the cryocooler subsystem (GAO [15]). 
 The project entered fiscal year 2015 with approximately 40 percent of its cost reserves 
already committed, leaving fewer dollars available to mitigate other threats to the project 
schedule (GAO [15]). 
 The White House and Congress have sparred about cancelling existing operating programs 
(e.g., SOFIA, Spitzer) to help fund JWST, although no cancellations have yet occurred 
(NationalGeographic.com, “NASA Facing New Space Science Cuts,” May 2014 [17]). 
Information Pertinent to JWST Technical Requirements, Performance, and Design 
 Successful attainment of high resolution data requires a highly controlled environment, 
including minimum vibration, minimum stray light, particularly in the mid-infrared range, 
and minimum departures from a cold and stable temperature environment (GAO [15]; also 
NASA webpage “Explore JWST” [18]) 
 Although the subcontractor has built test cryogenic compressor units that perform to 
NASA’s specifications when connected to the spacecraft platform by bolts, they have not 
yet been able to get a brazed unit to perform to specification, and brazing is a design 
                                                          
12 In addition to the sources cited in the bulleted list below, the Jet Propulsion Laboratory published “James Webb 
Space Telescope Independent Comprehensive Review Panel Final Report,” JPL D-67250, in October 2010.  The 
report provides additional information on root causes of schedule and cost slippages, particularly those associated 
with the roles of NASA Headquarters and Goddard Space Flight Center in the 2010 timeframe.  The problems 
associated with establishing realistic budgets were particularly emphasized.  NASA management responded to the 
recommendations in the report in “NASA's Detailed Response to the James Webb Space Telescope Independent 
Comprehensive Review Panel Report,” presently available on the web under that title.  
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requirement for NASA systems (SpaceNews website “Manufacturing Issues Plague 
JWST,” November 2014). 
 The cold head assembly for the cryocooler has not been vacuum-tested in its flight-ready 
configuration to verify leak-tight operation with replacement valves that were recently 
installed in the assembly (SpaceNews [16]). 
 The JWST is considered unserviceable, since it will be located far from Earth at the second 
LaGrange point approximately 1 million miles from Earth (NASA [18]). 
 Although nominally unserviceable, the JWST is designed to have a grapple fixture for 
docking, implying that the option to conduct service missions has not been completely 
relinquished (NASA [18]). 
In addition to information pertaining to the JWST project, historical experience obtained from the 
operation of the HST in low Earth orbit is relevant to this example because of the similarity of the 
missions.  Of particular interest are the following bits of information obtained from various 
sources: 
Relevant Information Pertaining to HST 
 The HST has undergone several successful servicing missions enabled by its proximity to 
Earth, but initially there was uncertainty as to whether a successful servicing mission could 
be accomplished (HubbleSite.org webpage “Team Hubble: Servicing Missions” [19]). 
 Several serious operational difficulties for the Hubble required servicing missions to 
perform retrofits and/or corrective actions, including the famous mirror fabrication error 
which greatly degraded the quality of the image (SpaceflightNow.com, “The history of 
Hubble: a grand space telescope,” 2009 [20]). 
 Other operational difficulties that required a servicing mission included replacement of 
solar panels to correct a jitter problem caused by excessive flexing due to orbital cycling 
of solar input, and replacement of several gyros that were adversely affected by the launch 
environment (SpaceflightNow.com, [20]). 
 New opportunities were also availed through servicing missions, including incorporation 
of new, more sensitive instruments and addition of the Advanced Camera for Surveys, 
which was used to explore dark energy and other cosmological findings revealed by the 
HST (NASA webpage “Hubble Space Telescope Servicing Mission 4” [21]). 
5.3 Example Objectives Hierarchies  
We first specify objectives separately for each organizational management unit and then integrate 
them together into a single objectives hierarchy that spans the organization.  The management 
units for this example are grouped into the following three NASA organizational levels:  executive 
(E), mission directorate or programmatic (P), and center (C). 
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5.3.1 Objectives Hierarchies for Different Management Levels 
Executive-level objectives are the strategic objectives of the organization, derived in this case from 
the NASA Strategic Plan, and are considered to have a timeframe of more than 10 years.  Two 
strategic objectives are considered in this example, as shown in Figure 5-1: 
Executive-Level Objectives:  Strategic Focus 
 
Figure 5-1.  Executive-level objectives for the example. 
Programmatic-level objectives are concerned with design, development, fabrication, fielding, and 
operation of systems that support the various strategic objectives that relate to NASA’s mission.  
Four programmatic-level objectives are included in this example, as shown in Figure 5-2, 
differentiated according to the timeframes over which they apply. 
Programmatic-Level Objectives:  Program/Project Management Focus 
 
Figure 5-2.  Programmatic-level objectives for the example. 
Center-level objectives fall into two different categories: program/project support and 
development of the institutional capability.  Two of each category are considered in this example, 
as shown in Figure 5-3.  Like programmatic-level objectives, they are differentiated according to 
the timeframes over which they apply. 
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5.3.2 Integrated Objectives Hierarchy for the Organization as a Whole 
Figure 5-4 illustrates for the example how the objectives hierarchies at executive, programmatic, 
and center levels are integrated into a single objectives hierarchy that maintains the relationships 
between objectives within each level and introduces the principle interfaces that exist across levels.  
In general, the programmatic-level objectives support one or more executive-level objectives, 
whereas the center-level objectives may support both the programmatic-level objectives and one 
or more executive-level objectives.  For example, the objective numbered           C (5-10) #6 and 
entitled “Maintain a sufficient cadre of highly capable analysts,” directly supports both objective 
P (5-10) #4 entitled “Design, build, deploy, and operate the Next Generation Space Telescope,” 
and objective E (>10) #2 entitled “Attract and advance a highly skilled workforce, cultivate an 
innovative work environment, and provide the facilities, tools, and services needed to conduct 
NASA’s missions.” 
 
Figure 5-3.  Center-level objectives for the example. 
In Section 5.6.1, some additional cross-organizational interfaces between the objectives in Figure 
5-4 will be identified and included in the development of the example. 
5.4 Risks, Opportunities, and Leading Indicators 
In the example, as in the methodology development presented earlier (e.g., Section 2.2.4), we 
speak of two levels of risk and opportunity:  (1) individual and (2) cumulative or aggregate.  
Individual risks and opportunities are introduced by means of scenario statements.  Each objective 
in the hierarchy may have several risk and opportunity scenarios associated with it.  Each objective 
also has cumulative risk and opportunity, which represents the roll-up of: 
1. The individual risk and opportunity scenarios that feed into it; 
2. The cumulative risks and opportunities of the interfacing objectives that feed into it (i.e., 
its daughter objectives).  
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In preparation for demonstrating each step that is needed to complete the space telescope example, 
it is important to keep an eye on the principal outcomes that are sought.  These include: 
 Identification, evaluation, and ranking of individual known risks 
 Identification, evaluation, and ranking of individual known opportunities 
 Evaluation and ranking of cumulative known risks  
 Evaluation and ranking of cumulative known opportunities 
 Evaluation and ranking of cumulative UU risks  
 Identification of risk and opportunity drivers and suggestions for responses, including 
actions and control options 
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Figure 5-4.  Integrated objectives hierarchy showing primary interfaces between objectives. 
65 
 
For conceptual purposes, a high-level schematic of the form of the anticipated results for 
cumulative risks and opportunities is shown in Table 5-1.  The pursuit of the example in the 
following sections leads to results such as these. 
Table 5-1.  A view of the form of the outcome for cumulative risks and opportunities 
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5.4.1 Known Individual Risks and Opportunities 
Based on the information pertinent to JWST and HST presented in Section 5.2, a total of eight 
individual risks and one individual opportunity are postulated for this example.  Three of the 
individual risks are assigned to strategic objective E(>10) #1, as shown below in Figure 5-5, and 
two of those are also assigned to objective E(>10) #2 because they directly affect both objectives.  
Also shown are suggested leading indicators that apply to each risk. 
 
Figure 5-5.  Individual risks and associated leading indicators for executive-level objectives. 
In Figure 5-6, another three risks, with associated leading indicators, are assigned respectively to 
programmatic objectives at the top level, the mid-term level, and the short-term level, and in Figure 
5-7, two risks, with associated leading indicators, are assigned to mid-term mission support 
objectives C (1-5) #9 and C (1-5) #10 in the institutional category.  Finally, in Figure 5-8, a single 
opportunity, with associated leading indicators, is identified for strategic objective E (>10) #1, 
along with three introduced risks, with their own associated leading indicators, that would be of 
concern if the opportunity were acted upon. 
5.4.2 Cross-Cutting Risks and Opportunities 
Risk and opportunity scenarios identified during the practice of OROM may be cross-cutting in 
several ways: 
 Organizationally cross-cutting scenarios affect multiple organizational units within an 
organization. All the risks and opportunities in Figures 5-5 through 5-8 are cross-cutting in 
this sense. 
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Figure 5-6.  Individual risks and associated leading indicators for program-level objectives. 
 
Figure 5-7.  Individual risks and associated leading indicators for center-level objectives. 
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Figure 5-8.  Individual opportunities, introduced risks, and associated leading indicators for 
executive-level objectives. 
 Programmatically cross-cutting scenarios affect multiple programs and/or projects within 
the organization.  One of the two risks in Figure 5-5 (the one placed higher in the chart) 
and both risks in Figure 5-7 are programmatically cross-cutting. 
 Strategically cross-cutting scenarios directly affect multiple high-level objectives in the 
objectives hierarchy.  The risk in Figure 5-5 identified in the previous bullet as being 
programmatically cross-cutting is also strategically cross-cutting. 
 Pan-agency cross-cutting scenarios affect more than one agency.  Such risks occur when 
agencies are involved in a cooperative effort.  
Furthermore, it may be observed in Figures 5-5 through 5-8 that certain leading indicators may 
affect multiple risk scenarios and/or multiple objectives.  For example, the indicator “complexity 
of design” affects a risk scenario and two objectives in Figure 5-5, as well as two risks and two 
objectives in Figure 5-6.  This may be thought of as a “cross-cutting” leading indicator.  
The OROM methodology is designed to promote consideration of cross-cutting risks, 
opportunities, and leading indicators by allowing for them to be entered into the accounting 
wherever is appropriate.  Multiple listings of the same scenario or indicator under different entities, 
programs, or objectives are not a problem so long as they are treated consistently each time they 
are encountered.  The use of taxonomies, as described in Section 4.4.1, can facilitate the 
identification of cross-cutting risk and opportunity scenarios and cross-cutting leading indicators. 
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5.4.3 Unknown and Underappreciated Risks 
The process of identifying risk and opportunity scenarios is, of course, aimed at known risks and 
opportunities. In addition to known scenarios, however, the potential for unknown and/or 
underappreciated (UU) risk scenarios must be considered when determining the overall likelihood 
of success or failure (i.e., the cumulative risk of not being able to satisfy the top objectives of the 
organization). 
It may be noted that several of the leading indicators listed in Figure 5-5 through 5-7 pertain either 
directly or indirectly to sources of UU risk.  For example, “complexity of design” and “complexity 
of integration and testing” are direct exemplars of the first UU factor cited in Section 4.4.4: 
“amount of complexity, particularly involving the interfaces between different elements of the 
system.”  In addition, the following leading indicator cited in Figure 5-6: “severity of unresolved 
technical issues for cryocooler development,” is an indirect exemplar of the third UU factor in 
Section 4.4.4: “use of fundamentally new technology or fundamentally new application of an 
existing technology.”  If the assessment in this example had been performed prior to 2010, the 
sixth UU factor in Section 4.4.4 might also have been cited as a leading indicator of future risks 
based on commentary provided in [15] and [16] about former management deficiencies pertaining 
to cryocooler development: “degree of oversight when responsibilities are distributed among 
various entities.”   
Beside these indicators, there are also other leading indicators (see Section 4.4.4) that tend to be 
correlated with the occurrence of UU challenges.  Two of the most important are: 
 Pressures to meet extremely tight schedules and/or budgets, particularly in combination 
with a complex set of tasks 
 Deficiencies of management such as failure to maintain adequate oversight of distributed 
suppliers and failure to respect and promote open communication 
In addition to the ranking of cumulative known risks and opportunities for each objective, 
therefore, the principal outcome of the example will also include a ranking of the cumulative level 
of concern for UU risks based on the leading indicators that pertain to UU risks, along with a list 
of the key attributes of the UU indicators that drive that cumulative ranking.  A demonstration of 
the roll-up process leading to this type of result will be presented in Section 5.6.5. 
5.5 Example Templates for Risk and Opportunity Identification and Evaluation 
Sections 5.5, 5.6, and 5.7 present a series of templates intended to demonstrate how the information 
presented in the preceding sections can be used first to evaluate the aggregate risk and aggregate 
opportunity associated with each objective in the integrated hierarchy of objectives, and then to 
identify and evaluate options for risk mitigation, opportunity action, and internal control.  The 
principal purpose of the templates is to ensure that all relevant information is brought to bear in a 
fashion that is rational, comprehensive, and transparent. 
5.5.1 Risk and Opportunity Identification Template 
Table 5-2 presents the Risk and Opportunity Identification Template, which collects the 
information about known risks and opportunities presented in Section 5.4.  It does this by 
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Table 5-2.  Risk and Opportunity Identification Template 
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tabulating the identified individual risk, opportunity, and introduced risk scenarios, the leading 
indicators for each scenario, and the objective to which each scenario is assigned. 
5.5.2 Leading Indicator Evaluation Template 
Table 5-3 presents the Leading Indicator Evaluation Template, which is used to assign watch and 
response trigger values to each leading indicator, record the current value of the indicator, and 
provide an indication of the trend.  As explained earlier, leading indicator trigger values are used 
to signal when a risk is reaching a risk tolerance boundary or when an opportunity is reaching an 
opportunity appetite boundary.  Reaching the trigger values for risk leading indicators implies that 
the likelihood of not being able to satisfy an element of the strategic objectives hierarchy is 
becoming a concern.  Reaching the trigger values for opportunity leading indicators implies either 
that there is a potential for significantly increasing the likelihood of being able to satisfy an element 
of the strategic objectives hierarchy, or that there is an emerging opportunity to achieve new goals 
and objectives that were formerly considered unreachable or inconceivable.   Exceedance of a 
watch trigger suggests that an action should be considered but is not imminently needed.  
Exceedance of a response trigger suggests that an action may be imminently needed; e.g., 
mitigation of the risk or exploitation of the opportunity. 
The level of concern for a given leading indicator is determined by where the current value of the 
leading indicator and/or a projected future value lie with respect to the watch and response trigger 
values.  In Table 5-3, the projected future value one year from the present (referred to earlier as 
the “trend”) is shown as a range to account for uncertainty.  For conceptual purposes, it may be 
helpful for some people to think of the uncertainty range as being more-or-less a 90% confidence 
interval for the future value of the leading indicator.  However, if confidence levels are used in this 
context, they should be thought of as qualitative degrees of belief and not statistical quantities. 
Table 5-4 illustrates how the Leading Indicator Evaluation Template might be completed for short-
term programmatic objective P (1) #11, entitled “Deliver the cryocooler subsystem.”  The entries 
are based principally on information about the JWST that was previously itemized in Section 5.2, 
i.e., publicly available material.   The use of this information is summarized in the columns labeled 
“Rationale.”  In short, the template records the following information: 
 The 100% reduction during the past year in the schedule margin for development of the 
cryocooler (leading indicator 1) has caused concern about the cryocooler delivery date 
and the schedule of the program as a whole. 
 The 40% reduction during the past year in the cost margin for the program as a whole 
(leading indicator 2) has caused concern about the amount of resources that can be 
reallocated to the cryocooler. 
 The fact that several significant technical issues have not yet been completely resolved 
(leading indicator 3) has caused further concern. 
 A somewhat negative progress report written by the GAO (leading indicator 4) about 
management problems concerning the cryocooler development has again caused concern. 
72 
 
Table 5-3.  Leading Indicator Evaluation Template 
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Table 5-4.  Example entries for Leading Indicator Evaluation Template for Objective P(1) #11: Deliver the cryocooler subsystem 
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 A trend analysis by JPL implying that the schedule margin will not be further degraded 
(1-year projected value for leading indicator 1) has alleviated some concern, particularly 
since the analysis indicates that the schedule for integrating the cryocooler with the 
spacecraft and beginning the integrated testing should remain intact. 
 The warning signs discussed by the GAO, however, suggest there is a large amount of 
uncertainty in JPL’s estimate, leading to additional concern. 
5.6 Example Templates for Risk and Opportunity Roll-Up 
5.6.1 Objectives Interface and Influence Template 
While the principal interfaces between the objectives were displayed in Figure 5-4, a number of 
secondary interfaces could also be postulated.  For this example, three secondary interfaces 
between the top level of the programmatic and mission support objectives and the executive level 
strategic objectives are also considered, as shown in Figure 5-9: 
  
Figure 5-9.  Secondary objective interfaces for the example  
Two of the secondary objectives account for the fact that the success of the exploratory programs 
and projects (objectives P (5-10) #3 and P (5-10) #4) influence the success of attracting a highly 
skilled workforce and providing the needed facilities (objective E (>10) #2) by defining the 
technical qualifications that are needed within the workforce, by providing an incentive for 
qualified technical people to work at NASA, and by providing the driving function for the facilities 
to be developed.  The third recognizes the fact that maintaining a sufficient cadre of highly capable 
analysts (objective C (5-10) #6) is necessary in order to successfully interpret the data obtained 
from the telescopes during their operation and to set the direction for additional observations. 
The objectives interface and influence template encodes this sort of information in tabular form, 
as shown in Table 5-5. 
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Table 5-5.  Objectives Interface and Influence Template. 
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Figure 5-10.  Schematic of roll-up method alternative 1 for Objective E (>10) #1 
5.6.2 Known Risk Roll-Up Template 
The aggregate risk of not successfully meeting an objective can be evaluated by rolling up the 
individual risk scenarios in either of two alternative ways.  The first alternative is illustrated in 
Figure 5-10, with reference to one of the top objectives in Figure 5-4, and consists of the following 
steps: 
 Identify the objective of interest from the objectives hierarchy (Figure 5-4) 
 Identify the risk scenarios associated with the objective from the Risk and Opportunity 
Identification Template (Table 5-2) 
 Identify the risk leading indicators associated with each risk scenario from the Risk and 
Opportunity Identification Template (Table 5-2), and evaluate the leading indicator levels 
of concern using the Leading Indicator Evaluation Template (Table 5-3) 
 Roll up the leading indicator levels of concern for each risk scenario to obtain a 
corresponding level of concern for each risk scenario using a transparent and documented 
roll-up rationale 
 Roll up the levels of concern for the risk scenarios, obtained from the previous bullet, with 
the levels of concern obtained for the interfacing objectives, using the Objectives Interface 
and Influence Template (Table 5-5) to identify the interfacing objectives.  (The order of 
the roll-up is such that the levels of concern for the interfacing objectives will have been 
determined prior to the present roll-up.) 
The rolled-up level of concern at the end of the process is defined as the aggregate, or cumulative, 
risk of not meeting the objective, and the transparent and documented rationale for the roll-up 
process defines the justification for the aggregate risk.  
The second alternative for rolling up levels of concern to obtain the aggregate risk of an objective 
is illustrated in Figure 5-11.  The difference between it and the first alternative is that it cuts out 
77 
 
one of the steps.  Specifically, the aggregate risk of the objective is determined by rolling up the 
levels of concern for the leading indicators directly (together with the levels of concern for the 
interfacing objectives), without first performing a roll-up from the leading indicators to the risk 
scenarios.  The rationale is that the leading indicators are de facto surrogates for the risk scenarios, 
and so it is as reasonable to infer the aggregate risk of not meeting an objective from the levels of 
concern associated with the leading indicators as it is to infer the aggregate risk from the levels of 
concern of the risk scenarios.  Thereafter, it is possible to determine levels of concern for each risk 
scenario by performing an after-the-fact roll-up from leading indicators to individual risk scenarios 
in order to assess the importance of each risk scenario. 
 
Figure 5-11.  Schematic of roll-up method alternative 2 for Objective E (>10) #1 
Using the second alternative, the aggregate risk of not being successful in delivering the cryocooler 
subsystem in a timely manner (Objective P (1) #11) is reflective of a roll-up of the levels of concern 
for Leading Indicators 1 through 4 and the aggregate risk of not being able to provide the needed 
technical support for this task (Objective C (1) #12), as shown in Figure 5-12. 
The associated roll-up is performed on the Known Risk Roll-Up Template, Table 5-6.  A similar 
template for opportunity roll-up will be discussed in the next subsection. 
For each objective, starting from the bottom and working up to the top, the Known Risk Roll-Up 
Template lists all the risk indicators and interfacing objectives that feed into it.  As mentioned, 
these inputs are obtained from prior templates.  The following paragraphs discuss the additional 
information that is contained in the template, starting from the 6th column. 
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Figure 5-12.  Schematic of risk roll-up for Objective P (1) #11 in the example. 
Composite Indicator 
The column labeled “Composite Indicator” provides a means for accounting for the fact that the 
trigger values for some of the indicators may be dependent on the values of other indicators.  Such 
co-dependencies may be important.  (For example, trigger values for cost and schedule margins 
will normally depend on the amount of work remaining to be accomplished, as indicated by the 
number and complexity of unresolved issues.)   For simplicity, we initially assume that we do not 
need to specify co-dependencies between indicators to execute the example, but we will return to 
the subject in Section 5.6.4. 
Leading Indicator Level of Concern / Influencing Objective Level of Risk 
As mentioned, the roll-up process accounts for two types of risk input: (1) the level of concern for 
the leading indicators that are associated with the objective, and (2) the aggregate risk for the 
interfacing objectives that feed into it.  The level of concern for leading indicators has already been 
recorded in the Leading Indicator Evaluation Template (Table 5-3) and is transcribed from that 
template into the Known Risk Roll-Up Template.  The aggregate risk for influencing objectives, 
on the other hand, is obtained from the portion of the roll-up process that has already been 
performed and entered earlier into the Known Risk Roll-Up Template.  For example, the aggregate 
risk for Objective C(1) #12, which feeds into Objective P(1) #11, has been entered higher up in 
Table 5-6. 
Table 5-6.  Known Risk Roll-Up Template 
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Table 5-7.  Example entries for Known Risk Roll-Up Template for Objective P(1) #11: Deliver the 
cryocooler subsystem 
 
Aggregate Risk of Objective and Roll-Up Rationale 
The roll-up of levels of concern for leading indicators and aggregate risks for influencing 
objectives is conducted according to the rationale provided in the last column of the Risk Roll-Up 
Template.  The process is objective but not quantitative.  It is most easily demonstrated by 
considering the roll-up rationale that might be employed for Objective P(1) #11: Deliver the 
cryocooler subsystem.  Table 5-7 provides this demonstration.  As before with the example for the 
Leading Indicator Evaluation Template (Table 5-4), the rationale is based on publicly available 
information about the JWST that was previously itemized in Section 5.2.   In short, the template 
records the following information: 
 The cryocooler development schedule can be accelerated by diverting additional budget 
and manpower to this task from other tasks whose reserves are not at risk. 
 JPL's analysis of subcontractor performance trends projects that development will not be 
delayed by more than seven months to November 2015, making it likely that integrated 
testing will begin on time during February 2016. 
 Therefore, the overall risk of not meeting the objective of delivering the crycooler 
subsystem is marginal, even though the year’s schedule reserve for crycooler development 
has been depleted. 
For comparison, Table 5-8 illustrates how Table 5-7 would be reconstructed to reflect the 
alternative 1 roll-up method, which includes an intermediate roll-up of leading indicators to risk 
scenario level in accordance with the schematic representation in Figure 5-10. 
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5.6.3 Opportunity Roll-Up Template 
The Opportunity Roll-Up Template, Table 5-9, is comparable to the Known Risk Roll-Up 
Template, Table 5-6, with the exception that the opportunity scenarios generally have 
accompanying introduced risks.  For the example being considered, the opportunity scenario (as 
entered into the Risk and Opportunity Identification Template, Table 5-2) is that it may be possible 
for significant new technology advancements (such as a camera with improved resolution) to be 
delivered and installed on the telescope through retrofitting either by astronauts or robotically, 
since the JWST spacecraft is designed with a grapple fixture.  This could be the case even though 
the JWST is described by NASA as unserviceable, given that the incentive for trying such a 
rendezvous mission is strong enough to justify the risks.  In this case, the introduced risks are that 
the likelihood of loss of crew (LOC) or loss of mission (LOM), depending on whether the mission 
is crewed or robotic, may be unacceptably high, and/or that the cost of the retrofit mission may 
likewise be too high.  The leading indicators for the opportunity are the technology readiness level 
for improved resolution infrared cameras and the readiness level for the Space Launch System 
(SLS), including Orion if the mission is crewed.  The leading indicator for the introduced risk 
pertaining to the probability of LOC or LOM is the most current predictive estimate of P(LOC) or 
P(LOM) obtained from a probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) for an analogous SLS/Orion mission 
involving lunar orbit.  The leading indicator for the introduced risk pertaining to cost is likewise 
the most current cost estimate for the analogous mission. 
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Table 5-8.  Example entries for Known Risk Roll-Up Template for Objective P(1) #11 including an 
intermediate roll-up to risk scenario level  
 
Since the only opportunity scenario for this example is introduced at the top level of the objectives 
hierarchy (i.e., at Objective E(>10) #1), there are no roll-ups for opportunity from lower-level 
objectives to higher-level objectives.  Rather, the roll-up in this example concerns only the relevant 
leading indicators for opportunity and introduced risk at the level of Objective E(>10) #1 (which 
is entered at the bottom of Table 5-9).  Before performing this roll-up, the significance of the 
opportunity leading indicators and the tolerability of the introduced risk leading indicators are 
transferred from the Leading Indicator Evaluation Template (Table 5-3) to the column labeled 
“Leading Indicator Significance” in Table 5-9.  The roll-up for the aggregate opportunity in the 
next-to-last column of Table 5-9 is based on the perceived balance between the opportunity and 
the introduced risks as informed by the values of the respective leading indicators.  The rationale 
for the perception of balance is recorded in the last column of Table 5-9. 
An example opportunity roll-up is shown in Table 5-10.  In this example, the likelihood of being 
able to conduct a service mission to install a significantly improved IR camera is considered high 
based on anticipated technology developments, and so the opportunity leading indicators are 
colored blue (significant opportunity).  Less happily, the present-day cost of a rendezvous mission 
is considered intolerable by today’s standards, and hence the leading indicator for the introduced 
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risk associated with cost is red (intolerable).  However, the cost may be perceived to be more 
tolerable once the system is operational because of the following rationale: 
 Public enthusiasm for the program will likely increase substantially, as it did for Hubble, 
once the telescope is operational and its scientific value is fully appreciated. 
 Issues about the feasibility of performing a rendezvous will likely abate once the 
SLS/Orion system becomes operational and is shown to be reliable and safe. 
 The economic recovery will likely increase the willingness of the country to spend more 
on space.  
Since it is considered likely that the perceived cost of the rendezvous will become more tolerable 
over time, the aggregate opportunity considering leading indicators for both opportunity and 
introduced risks is ranked as marginal rather than insignificant. 
 
Table 5-9.  Opportunity Roll-Up Template 
 
Table 5-10.  Example entries for Opportunity Roll-Up for Objective E(>10) #1: Discover how the 
universe works, explore how it began/evolved, search for life on planets around other stars 
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5.6.4 Composite Indicator Identification and Evaluation Template 
In the examples shown so far, all of the leading indicators have been considered to be stand-alone 
indicators, even though the templates have included the possibility for introducing composite 
indicators.  Considering them to be independent in setting trigger values is acceptable as long as 
the rationale for aggregating them accounts for the more complex relationships that may exist 
between them.  Thus, ameliorating factors were introduced in the rationale column in Table 5-7 to 
justify an aggregated risk that was yellow (marginal) rather than red (intolerable), and in Table 5-
10 to justify an aggregated opportunity that was purple (marginal) rather than gray (insignificant), 
even though one of the indicators in each case was red. 
Using a composite indicator recognizes the fact that the trigger values of some of the indicators 
may depend upon the values of other indicators.  For example, in the Leading Indicator Evaluation 
Template in Table 5-4, leading indicators 1, 2, and 3 have just such a codependency that would 
justify the use of a composite indicator.  That is, the amount of schedule margin needed for 
cryocooler development (Indicator 1) depends on both the amount of cost margin from other tasks 
that can be diverted to the cryocooler development task (Indicator 2) and the severity of the 
technical issues that remain to be resolved (Indicator 3).  Note that a composite indicator does not 
necessarily collapse all the individual indicators for a risk or opportunity scenario.  For example, 
Leading Indicator 4, which concerns GAO’s evaluation of the cryocooler development progress, 
remains as a separate indicator for the risk of not delivering the cryocooler subsystem when 
required. 
The yellow box below provides an example of how one might define a composite indicator to 
recognize the dependencies between leading indicators 1, 2, and 3. 
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Example Representation of a Composite Indicator 
 
To define a composite indicator, the individual indicators comprising it must first be defined in precise 
quantitative terms.  Suppose, for example, that leading indicators 1 through 3 are defined exactly as 
follows: 
Ind(1) = the fraction of the original planned schedule margin for the cryocooler 
development task that remains unused;  has a possible value of 0 to 1 
Ind(2) = the fraction that remains unused of the original planned cost margin allocable to 
the crycooler development task from the program as a whole;  has a possible 
value of 0 to 1 
Ind(3) = the severity ranking of all unresolved technical issues for cryocooler 
development;  has possible values of 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5. 
Suppose Composite Indicator A is introduced at this point and is defined as follows: 
CInd(A) =  4 x Ind(1)   4 x Ind(2)  + Ind(3)  +7;  has a possible value of 0 (best case) to 
12 (worst case) 
This example composite indicator has the feature that a change in any one of the three indicators from 
its worst value to its best value has the same numerical effect on CInd(A) as a change in any other of 
the three indicators from its worst value to its best value.  For example, changing Ind(1) from 1 to 0 
causes CInd(A) to change by a total of 4 in the positive direction, as does changing Ind(2) from 1 to 0 
or changing Ind(3) from 1 to 5.  As a further illustration, the compound indicator has a value of 6 for 
any of the following conditions: 
 Schedule margin = 0% of plan,    cost margin = 50% of plan;   technical issue ranking = 1  
 Schedule margin = 25% of plan,  cost margin = 25% of plan;   technical issue ranking = 1  
 Schedule margin = 0% of plan,    cost margin = 100% of plan; technical issue ranking = 3  
 Schedule margin = 50% of plan,  cost margin = 50% of plan;   technical issue ranking = 3 
 Schedule margin = 50% of plan,  cost margin = 100% of plan; technical issue ranking = 5  
 Schedule margin = 75% of plan,  cost margin = 75% of plan;   technical issue ranking = 5 
In other words, all of these combinations produce the same level of concern. 
The Composite Indicator Identification and Evaluation Template for this example is shown in Table 
5-11.  The third column in that table indicates that the following combination is a “watch peg point”: 
 Schedule margin = 50% of plan,    cost margin = 50% of plan;   technical issue ranking = 2  
and the fourth column indicates that the following combination is a “response peg point”: 
 Schedule margin = 10% of plan,    cost margin = 10% of plan;   technical issue ranking = 3  
These peg points set the watch and response triggers for the composite index as follows: 
 Composite indicator watch trigger =       – 4 x (0.5) – 4 x (0.5) + 2 + 7 =  5.0 
 Composite indicator response trigger =   – 4 x (0.1) – 4 x (0.1) + 3 + 7 =  9.2 
These values appear in the 10th and 11th columns of Table 5-11. 
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Table 5-12 illustrates how the Known Risk Roll-Up Template example in Table 5-7 would change 
as a result of using this composite indicator.  Note that the roll-up result remains the same but there 
is no longer a red (intolerable) risk indicator feeding into it. 
Table 5-11.  Composite Indicator Identification and Evaluation Template 
 
Table 5-12.  Example entries for Risk Roll-Up Template for Objective P(1) #11 using a composite 
indicator 
 
5.6.5 UU Risk Roll-Up Template 
In addition to the leading indicators for known risks provided in the Risk and Opportunity 
Identification Template, Table 5-2, and the Leading Indicator Evaluation Template, Table 5-3, 
there is an additional set of leading indicators that correlate with the relative importance of UU 
risks.  Some of the more important ones were identified in Sections 4.4.4 and 5.4.3. 
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Just as the known risks were rolled up via the Known Risk Roll-Up Template, Table 5-6, to obtain 
insight into how known risks are affecting the likelihood of being able to satisfy the top objectives 
of the organization, it is possible to roll up the leading indicators for UU risks via a UU Risk Roll-
Up Template to obtain insight into how UU risk indicators are affecting the likelihood of successful 
objectives achievement.  For this example, we postulate the following two UU leading indicators 
to be the most significant sources of UU risk: 
 Schedule/budget pressure 
 Quality of oversight and communication  
Both indicators are measured on a scale of 1 to 5 for each objective, with the lower end indicating 
lowest concern and the upper end indicating highest concern.  The steps in the roll-up are identical 
to Section 5.6.2.  The example template is shown in Table 5-13. 
5.7 Example Templates for the Identification of Risk and Opportunity Drivers, 
Responses, and Control Options 
5.7.1 Risk and Opportunity Driver Identification Template 
As discussed in Sections 4.6.1, a risk driver causes the cumulative risk for one or more top 
organizational objectives to change color from green to yellow or red or from yellow to red.  Risk 
factors might include any combination of departure events, underlying causes of departure events, 
leading indicators, unprotected key assumptions, deficiencies in controls, or other factors that 
affect the risk of meeting the objectives.  Similarly, an opportunity driver can be any combination 
of opportunity factors/elements that collectively cause the cumulative opportunity for one or more 
top organizational objectives to change color.  Risk or opportunity drivers, as defined above, 
constitute a detailed resolution of the principal factors that contribute to the cumulative risk or 
opportunity.  They, therefore, are suitable for identifying the constituents of risk mitigations, 
opportunity actions, and control options. 
As discussed in Section 4.6.2, a risk or opportunity scenario driver is any combination of risk or 
opportunity scenarios that causes the cumulative risk or opportunity of one or more top objectives 
to change color.  Risk and opportunity scenario drivers provide a higher-level view of the concerns 
that need to be addressed, and are, therefore, suitable for summary presentations. 
The Risk and Opportunity Driver Identification Templates facilitate the process of identifying both 
drivers (henceforth called “constituent drivers” for clarity) and scenario drivers.  Table 5-14 
illustrates the process schematically for the Next Generation Space Telescope example.  A table 
similar to Table 5-14 is prepared for each strategic/top objective of the organization. 
In Table 5-14, two risk scenarios are identified as candidate risk scenario drivers for the objective 
“Discover how the universe works … .”  The first is “Failure to deliver the cryocooler subsystem 
on time,” a scenario that most directly affects the lower-level objective of delivering the cryocooler 
subsystem but also propagates up through the Known Risk Roll-Up Template to the top objective.  
The second is “Unavailability of expert technical staff for review.”  This second risk scenario was 
not included in the earlier development of risks for this example, but is added here to make a point. 
As shown in Table 5-14, neither of the risk scenarios causes the color of the cumulative risk for 
the top objective to change from yellow to green, but the combination of the two scenarios does.   
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Table 5-13.  UU Risk Roll-Up Template 
 
.
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Table 5-14.  Example Risk and Opportunity Driver Identification Template 
 
90 
 
Therefore, the risk scenario driver consists of the combination of the scenarios.  The associated 
risk driver constituents, or principal factors that contribute to the cumulative risk, are shown in the 
next-to-last column of Table 5-14.  They are the factors that are noted in the Known or UU Risk 
Roll-Up Template as being of particular concern, such that all of them have to be addressed in 
order for the cumulative risk to be reduced to a tolerable state. 
It may be noted that although there are no UU risks included in this example for identifying risk 
drivers, there is no reason why they should not be included if the UU Roll-Up Template shows 
that they are a large source of concern. 
The lower part of Table 5-14 concerns the identification of opportunity drivers.  In this example 
there is only one opportunity scenario, and it is a driver because the deletion of the scenario causes 
the color of the cumulative opportunity for the top objective to change from blue (significant) to 
gray (insignificant).  The associated opportunity driver constituents, shown in the next-to-last 
column, are the factors that are noted in the Opportunity Roll-Up Template as being of particular 
concern. 
Also indicated in the Risk and Opportunity Driver Identification Template is the spare time 
available to initiate a response to mitigate the risk drivers or an action to avail the opportunity 
drivers without exceeding the available timeframe to complete the response.  The combination of 
the identified driver scenarios, the driver identified constituents, and the timeframe available to 
begin a response for each constituent can be illustrated in a matrix format, as shown in Figures 5-
13 and 5-14.  This form of display is particularly useful for high-level presentations. 
5.7.2 Risk Mitigation, Opportunity Action, and Control Option Identification 
Templates 
As discussed in Section 4.6.3, the identification of risk mitigations, opportunity actions, and 
control options is directed at finding viable ways to act upon the risk and opportunity drivers that 
are identified after the risk and opportunity roll-up processes.  This identification is performed on 
the Risk Mitigation and Control Option Identification Template, demonstrated in Table 5-15 for 
the Next Generation Space Telescope example, and on the Opportunity Action and Control Option 
Identification Template, demonstrated in Table 5-16 for the same example.  The former starts from 
the risk drivers and the latter from the opportunity drivers that were identified in the Risk and 
Opportunity Driver Identification Template, Table 5-14. 
For each risk or opportunity driver, there is one or more proposed mitigations or actions intended 
to respond to the driver, and for each mitigation or action, there is one or more control options 
intended to provide assurance of success.  The control option is labeled “Assumption” if the intent 
is to protect an assumption made in defining the mitigation or action, and “Deficiency” if the intent 
is to address a shortcoming in the present controls.  These proposed mitigations, actions, and 
controls are purely hypothetical and intended for illustration purposes only.  
5.7.3 High-Level Display Template 
The High-Level Display Template, shown in Table 5-17, displays results obtained from the 
preceding templates in a condensed form.  It also includes suggested responses and controls that  
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Figure 5-13.  Matrix-like illustration of risk and opportunity scenario drivers and their timeframe 
criticalities 
 
Figure 5-14.  Matrix-like illustration of risk and opportunity constituent drivers and their 
timeframe criticalities 
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Table 5-15.  Example entries for Risk Mitigation and Control Option Template for Objective E (>10) #1: Discover how the universe works 
… 
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Table 5-16.  Example entries for Opportunity Action and Control Option Template for Objective E (>10) #1: Discover how the universe 
works … 
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Table 5-17.  High-Level Display Template 
 
address the risk and opportunity drivers.  The entries that are completed in Table 5-17 correspond 
to those presented in Tables 5-7 and 5-10 and in Tables 5-15 and 5-16. 
5.8 Upward Propagation of Templates for Full-Scope OROM Applications  
5.8.1 Scope of the Problem 
The example in the preceding sections was of limited scope, involving only twelve objectives of 
which two were strategic objectives with timeframes greater than 10 years, four were top 
programmatic and mission support objectives with timeframes of 5-10 years, four were mid-term 
performance objectives with timeframes of 1-5 years, and two were short-term performance 
objectives with timeframes of less than or equal to 1 year.  Comparatively, this represents a very 
small sampling of all the objectives that NASA has listed in its 2014 Strategic Plan and its 2015 
Performance and Management Plan, including fifteen strategic objectives and hundreds of 
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medium-term and short-term performance objectives.  For an undertaking of this size, the volume 
of information to be collected, encoded, and integrated is challenging, to say the least. 
5.8.2 Propagation of Templates 
The development and population of templates for a full-scope OROM effort involves collaborative 
participation of all the organizational units in the larger organization from the bottom to the top.  
Each unit should have its own objectives hierarchy, individual risks, individual opportunities, and 
leading indicators.  Each should complete the templates described in this report in a consistent 
manner, as shown in Figure 5-15, and pass the completed templates on to the next level of authority 
in the organization.  Each higher level in the organization should utilize the templates provided by 
the organizations subordinate to it to create its own set of templates.  Cross-organizational 
communication (vertically and horizontally) should freely occur during this process so that the 
templates produced by any one organizational unit are complete and consistent with those 
produced by other interfacing organizational units. 
Obviously, this process requires that all organizational units use the same format in preparing their 
templates.  Using the same format ensures that the information gleaned from the analysis can be 
passed readily up the chain of authority.  It does not mean, however, that the information provided 
in the templates should be constrained to only risks and opportunities that are already recognized 
by others.  Rather, each organizational unit should be creative in determining the risks and 
opportunities that influence the likelihood of success in meeting its objectives.  
After receiving templates from its subordinate organizational units, the organizational unit at the 
next level up should determine whether the completed templates it receives are consistent in terms 
of assumptions made, the interpretation of input information, recognition of important interfaces, 
and overall conclusions.  If there are inconsistencies or misunderstandings in these areas, then the 
higher-level unit has the obligation of determining why that is the case and how to resolve them. 
The highest level of analysis in the OROM analysis scheme is the agency-wide level, as illustrated 
in Figure 5-15.  The templates at agency-wide level represent a compilation of the templates from 
all the organizational units in the agency.  Any differences between organizational units in terms 
of assumptions, interfaces, interpretations, and conclusions should be resolved at the agency-wide 
level.  Once completed, the agency-wide level templates are passed back down the organizational 
chain of authority so that the individual organizational units can review them and provide their 
assent or dissent. 
5.8.3 Development of an Integrated OROM Database 
The templates prepared by the various units become part of an integrated database. Databases of 
risks, opportunities, and leading indicators that exist at each unit in the organization are integrated 
upward first to program directorate, center, and executive levels, and then into an agency-wide 
integrated database.  At the executive level, the integrated database should typically include the 
information in the risk and opportunity templates, the owner for each risk and opportunity, the 
organizational entities that are involved, corresponding working groups and management boards, 
change plans, change history, and status.  The development of an agency-wide database helps to 
ensure that cross-cutting risks and opportunities are correctly identified, consistently analyzed, and 
treated in an integrated manner.  It also helps to facilitate the process of rolling up individual risk 
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and opportunity scenarios from lower levels to an aggregate view of the agency’s overall 
likelihood of success in meeting its strategic objectives. 
 
 
Figure 5-15.  Schematic showing the upward propagation of templates for full-scope OROM 
applications 
Section 6.2.4 will discuss the challenges of creating and managing a database that integrates risk 
and opportunity information vertically and horizontally across an extended organization consisting 
of both internal organizational entities and external partners.  It will also discuss some best 
practices for doing so. 
5.9 Application of the Templates to Organizational Planning and the Selection 
from among Alternative Candidate Portfolios  
The templates developed in the preceding subsections can be applied, with some modification to 
the inputs, to examine OROM’s role in organizational strategic and performance planning.  In this 
application, the organization is interested in examining its likelihood of success in meeting its top 
objectives for various candidate sets of programs, projects, activities, and initiatives that are in the 
conceptual stage.  There may be no detailed designs and likewise no direct experience in the 
development, fabrication, testing, deployment, and operation of the systems that would eventually 
unfold. 
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The form of the templates for organizational planning can be the same as the form of the templates 
for the evaluation of organizational performance, but the entries into the templates would need to 
be different in the following ways: 
 Any risks, opportunities, leading indicators, and associated trigger values would have to 
be inferred from historical experience with related systems and from the judgment of those 
who are expert in the missions to be pursued and the challenges they bring, rather than 
from real-time experience with the actual systems to be used. 
 Short-term objectives (e.g., those with timeframes of a year or less) in most cases would 
not be applicable since they tend to relate to milestones that emanate from a well-defined 
design. 
Consider, for example, what would be included in the entries to the templates if the JWST project 
was in a conceptual stage and had not yet been initiated.  The JWST challenges highlighted in the 
GAO report and other sources mentioned in Section 5.2 would not yet have been identified.  The 
principal information for identifying risks and opportunities for a Next Generation Space 
Telescope would be from the experience gained for the HST system, which would already have 
been launched and operating.  The risks in Table 5-2 associated with development and delivery of 
the cryocooler subsystem would probably not appear in the Risk and Opportunity Identification 
Template, because the design of the next-generation telescope would probably not yet be known 
in enough detail to identify that the cryocooler subsystem had to be completely unlike previous 
cryocooler subsystems.  The potential status of leading indicators associated with shortages in cost 
and schedule reserves would have to be inferred without any direct information from the JWST 
project, but rather from HST experience and from the anticipated overall complexity of the next-
generation mission. 
In accordance with these observations, Table 5-18 shows how the entries in the Risk and 
Opportunity Roll-Up Template might appear if the next-generation telescope was being considered 
for inclusion in the agency’s portfolio but was not yet past the concept stage.  Those entries 
associated with the short-term (1-year) objectives relating to the cryocooler subsystem are no 
longer present, and the ones associated with cost and schedule reserves for the system as a whole 
are based on inference from the HST project (see yellow highlights in Table 5-18).  
The other templates presented in Tables 5-2 through 5-17 would similarly be modified. 
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Table 5-18.  Example Risk Roll-Up Template for the Next Generation Space Telescope as applied to 
alternative selection during organizational planning 
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6. Management and Implementation of OROM at the 
Institutional/Technical Level (NASA Centers) 
6.1 OROM from a Center’s Perspective  
As discussed previously in Section 2.1.6, OROM can be applied separately to management units 
within an organization so long as the objectives of each management unit are consistent with the 
objectives of the organization as a whole, and the cross-cutting risks and opportunities are handled 
consistently.  Since a center’s top objectives are derived from the agency’s strategic objectives, 
the top objectives of the center are consonant with those of the agency in all areas where the 
center’s roles align with the agency’s responsibilities.  
To support the agency’s strategic objectives, NASA’s centers have multiple roles. They support 
programs and projects that are assigned to them by the mission directorates, as contributors to 
programs and projects as requested when another center has management responsibilities, as 
preservers of core competencies required to support programs and projects, and as preservers of 
other core competencies mandated by the executive level.  In supporting programs and projects, 
they also act as integrators and arbitrators of an extended organization that includes other centers, 
prime contractors, other commercial suppliers, university partners, and international partners.  
Furthermore, as was illustrated in Figure 3-5, implementing a center’s plan includes developing 
and managing the workforce, maintaining needed facilities and retiring unneeded ones, acquiring 
services and material, and off-loading responsibilities when appropriate to the partnering agencies 
and companies.  Section 6 focuses on these areas in developing guidance for the conduct of OROM 
at the institutional/ technical level, viz. NASA centers. 
The particular objectives of OROM at the center level vary as the roles of the center vary.  For 
example, when the center is exercising its support role for programs and projects, the principal 
objective of OROM is to integrate the risks and opportunities discovered by the multiple 
organizations contributing to the program or project, ensuring that they are handled consistently 
across the program/project and across the center, that cross cutting risks and opportunities are 
accounted for, that the contribution of individual risk and opportunity scenarios are aggregated 
appropriately from lower levels to higher levels, and that responses such as mitigation of risks, 
exploitation of opportunities, and enactment of internal controls are coordinated.  On the other 
hand, when it is exercising its role as preserver of core competencies, the principal OROM 
objective is its principal institutional objective: to optimize the acquisition, allocation, and 
retirement of the various assets available to the center, including human assets (the workforce), 
physical assets (facilities, equipment, systems, and software), and instructional assets (policies, 
requirements, standards, and guidance). 
6.2 Extended Organizations  
6.2.1 Overview 
All the examples used in this report are instances of collaborative projects involving multiple 
partners, or entities, with overlapping responsibilities (see, for example, Table 6-1).  The collection 
of these entities for purposes of executing a project13 is referred to herein as a “project’s extended 
                                                          
13 We use the term “project” in this connotation to refer to both programs and projects, as defined in NPR 7120.5, 
NASA Space Flight Program and Project Management Handbook. 
100 
 
organization,” because in addition to contributing to the same project, each is an independent 
organization with its own set of strategic objectives and performance requirements.  The center 
that hosts the project (e.g., GSFC in the case of the JWST project) must communicate with the 
project’s extended organization in a manner that satisfies the strategic objectives of NASA while 
also respecting the strategic objectives of each of the contributing entities.  Other centers within 
the project’s extended organization (e.g., JPL, ARC, JSC, MSFC, and GRC in the case of JWST) 
also must communicate with the other entities they interface with. 
Table 6-1.  Distribution of responsibilities among the principal entities within the JWST Project 
(from NASA and Google web sites) 
Entity Responsibility 
NASA Centers 
Goddard (GSFC) 
Manages the JWST project and provides Integrated Science 
Instrument Module  (ISIM) components 
Jet Propulsion Lab (JPL) Manages the Mid-Infrared Instrument 
Ames (ARC) Detector technology development   
Johnson (JSC) Provides observatory test facilities 
Marshall (MSFC) Mirror technology development and environmental research 
Glenn (GRC) Cryogenic component development 
Industry Partners 
Northrop Grumman (NGC) Prime Contractor 
Ball Aerospace In charge of building the mirrors 
COM DEV International In charge of the Fine Guidance Sensor (FGS) 
Academic Partners 
Space Telescope Science Inst. Science and Operations Center at Johns Hopkins University 
University of Arizona In charge of building the New Infrared Camera (NIRCam) 
International Partners 
European Space Agency (ESA) 
Provides the Near Infrared Spectrograph, Mid-Infrared Instrument 
Optics Assembly, and the Ariane Launch Vehicle 
Canadian Space Agency (CSA) 
Provides the Fine Guidance Sensor/Near Infrared Imager and 
Slitless Spectrograph 
As a rule, each NASA center participates in many projects and therefore has responsibilities to 
interface with the extended organization for a variety of projects, as shown in Figure 6-1.  For 
convenience, we refer to the collection of all the entities that interact with Center 1 as the “extended 
organization.”  The center’s extended organization includes not only entities with which the center 
interacts on project planning and execution, but also entities within the agency administration that 
provide direction and administrative support to the center. 
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Figure 6-1.  The extended organization of a NASA center 
The success of such extended-organization endeavors depends upon the establishment of 
communication protocols that promote consistency of approach across the entities, sharing of 
information while protecting that which is proprietary, and seamless integration of the products. 
6.2.2 Relationship of Each Center to the Other Entities in the Center’s 
Extended Organization  
In its support roles, each center acts as its own self-contained organization with its own set of 
objectives to be achieved, as an integrator of risk and opportunity information emanating from the 
other entities in the center’s extended organization, and as an element of the projects’ extended 
organizations charged with helping to ensure that NASA’s strategic objectives are achieved. 
These roles are illustrated schematically in Figure 6-2, where NASA’s strategic objectives are 
taken as an example of the executive-level objectives that each center supports.  In this figure, the 
executive-level strategic objectives are divided into three types: 
 Those that are principally programmatic in nature and are allocated to centers by the 
mission directorates 
 Those that are more institutional in nature and are managed by designation of the 
Administrator within centers and within the Mission Support Directorate. 
 Those that are required of all agencies in the Federal Government and are typically 
managed at the executive level. 
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Figure 6-2.  NASA example of how each center takes risk and opportunity inputs from a variety of entities and supports multiple strategic objectives 
of the agency
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Correspondingly, the objectives of each center within the agency can be divided into three types 
that mirror the categories that apply to the higher-level strategic objectives: 
 Support of specific programs and projects that are assigned to the center in service of the 
agency’s mission 
 Provisions for additional institutional capabilities needed to maintain the center’s core 
competencies 
 Support of mandates that are required of all agencies. 
The risks, opportunities, and leading indicators associated with these types of objectives tend to 
cut across each center’s extended organization.  This cross-cutting aspect is illustrated in the lower 
part of Figure 6-2, which depicts the inputs from the center’s extended organization that are needed 
to perform the roll-up, or aggregation, of risks and opportunities within the center.  These risk and 
opportunity inputs are divided into the following categories: 
 Individual risk scenarios, opportunity scenarios, and associated leading indicators that are 
unique to the center 
 Individual risk scenarios, opportunity scenarios, and associated leading indicators that 
affect not only the center in question, but also other entities in the center’s extended 
organization 
 Aggregate risks and opportunities for objectives that are unique to the center 
 Aggregate risks and opportunities for objectives that emanate from, or are shared with other 
entities in the center’s extended organization 
6.2.3 OROM Organizational Structure for a Center’s Collaborative Projects  
Experience has shown [11] that for OROM to be practiced successfully in projects that have 
multiple partners, there needs to be a multi-organizational, integrating OROM team for each 
project that prepares the overall risk management plan and oversees the management of risk and 
opportunity.  The integrating team is responsible for identifying risks that cross over the interfaces 
between entities (i.e., between centers, contractors, and other partners) and/or that emanate from 
those interfaces, for conducting preliminary analyses to assess the likelihoods and potential 
impacts, and for assigning primary ownership.  When the origin of an interfacing or cross-cutting 
risk initiates from an action or inaction of a particular entity within the project’s extended 
organization, ownership is typically assigned first to that entity.  If the entity lacks authority to act 
upon the risk, it is elevated to a higher level within the chain of authority.  Frequently, risk 
ownership is assigned at project level if the process of resolving the risk requires action at that 
level. Thereafter, the OROM team monitors the resolution process, which may involve the 
improvement of existing controls, establishment of new controls, or formulation and 
implementation of a mitigation plan. 
To flesh out and monitor interfacing and cross-cutting risks and opportunities, the OROM team 
may establish various sub-groups.  The number of subgroups or their particular names is not that 
important.  What is important is that their responsibilities with respect to one another are clearly 
defined and the schedules under which they operate are coordinated.  
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For example, there may be separate working groups and management boards established for each 
organizational unit, for each program/project, and for each center, as shown in Figure 6-3.  Risk 
and opportunity (RO) working groups for each entity would have responsibility for identifying, 
analyzing, and recommending controls and mitigations to reduce risks pertaining to the entity’s 
objectives in the collaborative project.  They would meet on a regular, scheduled basis with their 
corresponding RO management board to share risks and opportunities that affect the entity and 
review decisions made by the management board about how to respond to them.  They would also 
meet with the working groups of the other entities in the project’s extended organization at 
regularly schedule meetings organized by the project, to discuss and evaluate risks and 
opportunities that are of mutual interest.  Although not specifically shown in the figure, informal 
communications between the working groups of different entities could also occur between 
scheduled meetings when there is a need to discuss technical issues in an ad-hoc manner. 
 
Figure 6-3.  A representative OROM organizational chart for a center that contributes to multiple 
collaborative projects 
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RO management boards for each entity would have responsibility for prioritizing the risks and 
opportunities identified and reported by the entity’s RO working group, determining the kind of 
response needed, assigning ownership, monitoring progress, and approving changes of status.  
Typical responses for risks would include, for example, (1) accept, (2) mitigate, (3) watch, (4) 
research, (5) elevate, or (6) close.  Changes of status would typically involve movement from one 
kind of response to another, and could involve elevating the response (e.g., from accept and watch 
to mitigate) or lowering the response (e.g., from accept and watch to close).  They would also meet 
on a regularly scheduled basis with the management boards of the other entities at meetings 
organized by the project to organize and adjudicate risks and opportunities that are of mutual 
interest. 
The center, in addition to supporting the collaborative projects that are assigned to it, has additional 
responsibilities that include contributing to other projects, executing designated institutional 
initiatives to maintain its core competencies, and communicating with other centers that have 
similar responsibilities for other collaborative projects, with the mission directorates that assign 
program/project responsibilities to the center, with the Mission Support Directorate that has 
institutional oversight at the executive level, and with the advisory councils and review boards that 
provide an evaluation function at executive level.  These interfaces are also shown in Figure 6-3. 
The principal goal of the OROM structure, which cannot be overemphasized, is for all entities to 
be involved in the OROM process by having technical representation in a working group and/or 
managerial representation in a management board.  This far-reaching intent is necessary to achieve 
the buy-in that is needed in all parts of the project’s extended organization. 
6.2.4 Challenges of Creating and Managing an Integrated OROM Database  
As discussed in Section 5.8.3, wherever there is a need for OROM oversight and communication 
between entities, there is also a need for an integrated database that incorporates OROM 
information across these entities.  At the top level of a collaborative project, the integrated database 
should typically include the information in the risk and opportunity templates, the owner for each 
risk and opportunity, the organizational entities that are involved, corresponding working groups 
and management boards, change plans, change history, and status. 
While ideally the integrated database for a collaborative project should capture all risks and 
opportunities for all the participating entities, some entities may already have an established risk 
management process and database that they do not want to give up.  To facilitate acceptance of the 
process, exceptions to the principal of a totally integrated database may have to be made.  For 
example, some entities may need their own version of the database because they do not have 
network connectivity.  Periodically (perhaps weekly), they might provide a copy of their database 
updates for uploading into the main database.  Other entities may have concerns about proprietary 
information and not want to have all their data available to all participants.  It may be decided that 
such entities may maintain their own separate database as long as they enter risks and opportunities 
into the main database that have the potential to degrade the capability performance at the 
program/project level.  These entities would be aware of how their risk and opportunity data affect 
the project as a whole by virtue of having access to the main database. 
Because of the cross-cutting nature of collaborative project risks and opportunities, there is also a 
need for reduced, summary databases that integrate OROM information at higher levels of the 
organization.  For example, there should be a repository of data at the center level covering those 
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aspects of OROM that cut across the collaborative projects within the center’s extended 
organization.  Similarly, there should be a data repository at executive level covering the aspects 
of OROM that cut across the centers, mission directorates, the Mission Support Directorate, and 
management councils. 
6.3 OROM-Informed Acquisition, Allocation, and Retirement of Resources 
across a Center’s Extended Organization  
6.3.1 Objectives-Based Distribution of Human, Physical, and Instructional 
Assets 
An important function of OROM, in its institutional mode of operation, is to assist each center in 
the budgeting of key resources across the extended organization.  The key resources to be 
budgeted, as shown in Figure 6-4, include human assets (personnel trained and experienced in 
different skill areas), physical assets (supporting facilities, IT systems, other systems, equipment, 
and software), and instructional assets (supporting policies, requirements, standards, and guidance 
documents).  The budgeting involves more than costs.  In addition to satisfying cost constraints, 
the final distribution of assets must reflect the intent of the agency’s strategic objectives that are 
inherited by the center, including: successful support of programs and projects that support the 
strategic objectives, maintenance of core competencies in specified strategic areas, promotion of 
strategic partnerships, and sharing with the public through strategic education initiatives.  The tools 
for achieving this strategic distribution of assets are both quantitative and qualitative. 
 
Figure 6-4.  The success of the center’s inherited strategic objectives is dependent on the “right-
sizing” of the resources available to the center (both internal and external) 
6.3.2 Representative Templates for Distributions of Allocated Assets 
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Representative templates that may be used for displaying the distribution of allocated assets are 
provided in Table 6-2.  These templates include both current and projected distributions.  The 
projected distributions refer to the predicted allocation of assets in the near-term (~1 year), mid-
term (~5 years), and long-term (~10 years), assuming the current plan is implemented.  The 
specific entries in Table 6-2 are discussed in the following three subsections. 
Human Asset (Workforce) Distribution 
The success of any organization (whether an entity in a center’s extended organization or the 
extended organization itself) depends upon the ability to hire and maintain a skilled workforce.  
Since several of the strategic objectives inherited by centers pertain to diversification of the 
workforce through formation of partnerships with other domestic agencies, commercial 
enterprises, universities, and international agencies, it is necessary for the proper skills to be 
maintained in all the contributing entities of the center’s extended organization.  The particular 
skills to be preserved have to be matched to the needs of the programs and projects that the center 
is supporting, as well as to the additional core competencies that the center is required to maintain. 
Table 6-2 (a) illustrates conceptually the type of information needed to evaluate the status of the 
workforce across the center’s extended organization.  It includes the number of equivalent persons 
(EP) at different skill levels for each skill area that is needed and for each entity that contributes.  
Skill level designations on the scale of 1 to 5 can be interpreted, for example, as follows (typical 
of industry standards): 
5 – Expert in area.  Typically the area lead. Understands all aspects of system and has extensive 
practical experience. 
4 – Senior member of area.  Knowledgeable in most aspects.  Leads projects.  Substitutes for 
area lead when needed.  Self-starter.  Understands most or all of system.  High degree of 
practical experience. 
3 – Junior member of area.  Owns specific areas of responsibility.  Needs continuous coaching.  
Self-supporting once tasks assigned.  Responsible engineer on some components.  General 
knowledge of system. 
2 – Group apprentice.  Minimal experience but shows competency in areas that have been tried.  
Does not work alone.  Understands key aspects of system.  Some practical experience. 
1 – Brand new to area.  Entry-level tasks.  Minimal contribution.  Some knowledge of the 
general workings of the system.  Limited practical experience. 
Each combination of skill area, skill level, and contributing organizational entity is referred to 
herein as a workforce category. 
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Table 6-2.  Templates for distribution of human (workforce), physical, and instructional assets. 
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Physical Asset Distribution 
Because the strategic objectives of the agency include both organizational objectives (programs 
and projects) and national policy objectives (e.g., the well-being of the agency’s commercial, 
educational, and international partners), it is necessary not only for workforce allocations to be 
considered in a holistic manner across the extended organization, but also for the distribution and 
utilization of physical assets to be so considered.  As mentioned earlier, physical assets in the 
present context include supporting facilities (including test facilities), IT and other systems, 
equipment, and software. 
Table 6-2 (b) illustrates conceptually the type of information needed to evaluate the status of 
physical assets across the center’s extended organization.  It includes the capability and availability 
of each asset to be used to satisfy the center’s objectives, broken out according to the support area 
that it addresses and the entity that owns it. 
The specifications of “capability” and “availability” in this template are expressed verbally rather 
than numerically (although numerical information may be included in the verbal descriptions).  
This is different from the specification of EP’s in the allocation of human assets, which is strictly 
numerical.  Both terms, capability and availability, are specifically referenced to needs for 
satisfying the center’s objectives.  For example, the capability of a propulsion test facility to test 
small components is not a relevant capability if its use for the center is only for testing of full-up 
systems.  Likewise, the availability of a propulsion test facility for purposes other than those 
needed by the center and its extended organization are not relevant and do not need to be tracked.  
In a larger sense, the description of the capability and availability of a physical asset is equivalent 
to a statement of its ability to meet the center’s performance and availability requirements. 
Instructional Asset Distribution 
Since NASA’s mission is dynamic and the means it uses to achieve its objectives change from 
time to time (e.g., as a result of the increasing complexity of its missions or the occurrence of 
break-through technology advancements), its instructional documents frequently need to be 
updated or superseded.  Similarly, the instructional documents for entities that partner with NASA 
may need to be revised or superseded to be consistent with NASA’s policies and requirements, 
and one of NASA’s responsibilities will be to audit the contents of the partners’ instructional 
documents.  As noted earlier, instructional documents include policy directives, procedural 
requirements, standards, and guidance documents. 
Table 6-2 (c) illustrates conceptually the information needed to characterize the status of 
instructional assets relevant to the center’s operation and the operation of its partners.  It includes 
the content required of instructional documents in various instructional areas over the near-term, 
mid-term, and long-term.  Again, the content is expressed verbally rather than numerically, and 
only content relevant to the center’s objectives need be entered in the template. 
6.3.3 Asset Risks, Opportunities, and Risk/Opportunity Scenario Statements  
In addition to the risks and opportunities associated with the successful performance of the center’s 
designated programs and projects, there is a separate category of risks and opportunities associated 
with the center’s human, physical, and instructional assets and its obligation to maintain its 
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mandated core competencies.  Both types of risk have to be considered in the overall assessment 
of whether a center is achieving all its objectives. 
Risks of future asset shortages and imbalances can arise from various sources.  Following, for 
example, is a list of risks that could affect the viability of the workforce by causing people to leave 
prematurely: 
• If funding is cut or a program is retired earlier than expected, people might seek more stable 
work alternatives. 
• If a program is extended beyond its planned timeframe, the impact of retirements may 
become more important. 
• If in-house competition for qualified persons increases, people might transfer to other 
organizations to increase their opportunities. 
• If market competition for qualified persons increases, people might accept positions with 
other companies with higher pay. 
• If local economic conditions degrade, people might move to another part of the country. 
• If a contractor or partner develops financial problems, that entity might not be able to 
maintain its workforce. 
• If people are required to work longer hours on a continuing basis, people might seek 
positions that are less stressful. 
Other risks can affect the viability of the workforce by increasing the number of qualified persons 
that are needed to achieve the center’s objectives beyond those that are available.  For example: 
• If domestic or international political priorities mandate an acceleration of the schedule or 
an increase in the scope of the objectives, there might be a need for more qualified people. 
• If an important task in a project falls behind schedule because of unexpected difficulties, 
there might be a need for an increased allocation of people to that task to get it on schedule 
again. 
There are also events that could lead to opportunities pertaining to the workforce.  For example: 
• If funding is increased due, for example, to favorable economic conditions, it may be 
possible to attract persons with unusually high qualifications by offering higher salaries or 
other monetary incentives. 
• If market competition for qualified persons decreases, it may be possible to attract qualified 
persons without offering higher salaries or other monetary incentives. 
Risks that could affect the viability of physical and instructional assets include, for example, the 
following: 
• If a facility has to be shut down unexpectedly due to an accident, malfunction, or the 
mandate of a watchdog organization, its availability to the center may disappear. 
• If another program that requires use of the facility suddenly gains high national priority, 
the availability of the facility for the center’s use may decrease. 
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• If a catastrophic accident on the scale of the Challenger or Columbia accident occurs within 
the space program, the agency’s policies and procedural requirements may have to be 
changed to respond to findings of the ensuing review board. 
• If a revolutionary new technology becomes available offering new opportunities previously 
not thought possible, the agency’s standards and guidebooks may have to be rewritten to 
accommodate the new technology. 
Obviously, the last of these encompasses both a risk and an opportunity, for while there is a risk 
that the instructional documents may have to be rewritten, leading to increased cost and/or 
schedule implications, there is simultaneously an opportunity for implementing improved 
technology. 
For asset risks and opportunities, it is useful to expand upon the risk and opportunity scenario 
statement structure presented in Section 4.4.2 to include information about the effect of the risk or 
opportunity on assets in the extended organization.  Following is a specialized form of 
risk/opportunity scenario statement that satisfies the general format but is specifically applicable 
to risks and opportunities affecting assets in the center’s extended organization: 
“ Given [a specified set of current conditions and current/projected trends],  
… there is a possibility that [a specified departure event or set of departure events] may 
occur,  
… affecting the [[envisaged or required] availability, capability, and/or content of specified 
human, physical, and/or instructional assets], 
… resulting in a noteworthy [decrease or increase] 
… in the center’s likelihood of being able to meet [a specified center objective or set of 
objectives].” 
The risk/opportunity scenario statement above recognizes that there are several ways in which a 
departure event can affect the viability of the human, physical, and/or instructional assets for the 
center’s extended organization.  The event can result, for example, in a positive or negative change 
in: 
• The number of experienced personnel available to the extended organization in various 
workforce categories 
• The number of experienced personnel needed by the extended organization in various 
workforce categories to meet the center’s objectives 
• The availability and capability of physical assets under the purview of the extended 
organization 
• The availability and capability of physical assets needed by the extended organization to 
meet the center’s objectives 
• The content of instructional assets needed by the extended organization to meet the center’s 
objectives 
These variants are encompassed in the risk/opportunity scenario statement within the phrase 
“[envisaged or required] availability, capability, and/or content of specified human, physical, 
112 
 
and/or instructional assets.”  Note that while each of the variants is different from the others, they 
all lead to a common result: an imbalance or gap (either positive or negative) between the assets 
in the extended organization and the assets needed to satisfy the center’s objectives. 
6.3.4 Leading Indicators of a Center’s Health 
In addition to the leading indicators cited in Section 4.4.3 and 4.4.4 and those listed in Table 4-1, 
there is a separate category of leading indicators associated with the center’s ability to maintain its 
mandated core competencies.  For example, the following is a subset of workforce-related leading 
indicators recommended for NASA use by the National Academy of Public Administration 
(NAPA) in 2007 [22]. 
• Median age of workforce 
• Number of uncovered full-time equivalents (FTE) 
• Ratio of fresh-out hires to total hires 
• Ratios of civil service persons to contractors and supervisors to staff 
• Center-by-center use of workforce incentives such as flexible work schedule, bonuses, and 
subsidized student loan payments. 
• Percentage of people participating in training over the past year 
• Number of turnovers and absenteeism 
• Overall productivity rating 
• Employee perceptions/assessments of management, e.g. from 360 degree feedback and 
Best Places to Work survey 
• Number and severity of disciplinary actions 
• Number of unfair labor practices and Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) complaints 
• Ranking in Best Places to Work in the Federal Government, diversity element 
These were devised by NAPA to be indicators of the health of a center, and in particular indicators 
of the risk of not being able to maintain a robust workforce. 
Similar lists can be postulated for physical assets and instructional assets.  For example, the 
following list of attributes can be thought of as leading indicators of the health of a center with 
respect to the availability and capability of an organization’s physical assets: 
• Median age of facilities 
• Maintenance history of facilities 
• Scale factors for testing 
• Unaddressed cybersecurity threats 
• History of changes to policies and procedures that affect the availability of a facility 
6.3.5 Correlations between Internal Leading Indicators and Gaps in the 
Distributions of Human, Physical, and Instructional Assets 
Important correlations exist between leading indicators that were cited earlier, such as schedule 
and cost margins, and gaps in the distributions of human, physical, and instructional assets.  These 
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correlations make it possible to develop a risk- and opportunity-based plan for acquiring, 
allocating, and retiring a center’s human, physical, and instructional assets. 
To illustrate by way of example, suppose that there happens to be a shortage of skilled personnel 
available to the prime contractor for the Next Generation Space Telescope project in the area of 
cryogenics for cooling systems, and suppose that, based on current trends and expected future 
events, the shortage is projected to worsen during the next 5 years.  When this information is 
factored into the scheduling for development and testing, it may be found that the margin for the 
completion of the buildup of the integrated system is less than the trigger value for significant 
concern (i.e., the response trigger value as defined in Section 4.5.1).   When this information is 
transferred to the risk roll-up template (Table 5-6), it may be found that there is intolerable risk of 
not being able to satisfactorily achieve the following strategic objectives that the center is 
committed to: 
 Objective 1.6:  Discover how the Universe works, explore how it began and evolved … 
 Objective 3.1:  Attract and advance a highly skilled, competent, and diverse workforce … 
needed to conduct NASA’s missions 
Observe that in this example, the following entry on the workforce template for the center’s 
extended organization: 
 Number of people in skill category 4 or 5 in the skill area of cryogenics working for the 
prime contractor 
is directly related to the following leading indicator: 
 Schedule margin for integration 
and thereby has been identified as causing two of the center’s top objectives (listed above) as 
having an intolerable risk of not being satisfactorily achieved. 
In addition, it should be apparent that the same sort of correlation can exist between entries on the 
physical and instructional asset template, the leading indicators pertaining to margins, and the 
center’s top objectives.  For example, if a certain testing facility is not available when needed or 
lacks certain needed capabilities, the schedule margin for completion of testing may be intolerably 
low, thereby having the same effect on the center’s top objectives. 
Likewise, the distributions of human, physical, and instructional assets can affect the ability to 
take advantage of opportunities that may arise in the future.  For example, having a few skilled 
researchers available to conduct innovative research in a pioneering propulsion technology may 
lead to an opportunity to utilize that technology to expand the agency’s objectives related to 
exploration of our solar system or to accomplish its current objectives more quickly or at less cost. 
6.3.6 Optimization of the Acquisition, Allocation, and Retirement of Human, 
Physical, and Instructional Assets 
Optimization of the plan for acquiring, allocating, and retiring human, physical, and instructional 
assets is an iterative process that utilizes the correlations between assets, leading indicators, and 
the center’s objectives.  The optimization process is summarized in Figure 6-5 and proceeds as 
follows: 
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 The center’s objectives and associated risks, opportunities, and corresponding leading 
indicators are identified as in Section 5.  
 
 
Figure 6-5.  Outline of the steps in the iterative process for optimizing asset distributions based on 
costs and current and projected values of leading indicators 
 An asset allocation plan that is postulated to meet cost constraints is proposed using the 
templates in Section 6.3.2. 
 The effect of the allocation plan on the current and projected leading indicator values is 
evaluated based on the discussion in Section 6.3.5, using the Leading Indicator Evaluation 
Template (Table 5-3). 
 The risks and opportunities are rolled up to the center’s top-level performance objectives 
using the Risk and Opportunity Roll-Up Templates (Tables 5-6 and 5-9). 
 The cost of implementation of the asset allocation is evaluated using traditional cost 
accounting methods. 
 Modifications to the asset allocation plan are considered to determine whether the balance 
between overall risk and opportunity exposure and overall cost can be improved. 
The iterative process may continue until any of the following conditions occurs: 
 The overall risks to success cannot be further reduced within cost constraints. 
 Additional significant opportunities cannot be availed within cost constraints. 
 Costs cannot be reduced without significantly increasing the overall risk or sacrificing 
significant opportunities. 
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The iterative process is illustrated in more detail in Figure 6-6.  As part of its graphical display, 
Figure 6-6 includes the Leading Indicator Evaluation Template originally presented in Table 5-3, 
modified to include not only performance risk indicators but also asset and UU risk indicators. 
6.3.7 Relevance to Provider Acquisition Decisions Made by Centers 
The processes described earlier in Section 6.3 can be applied to assist the center in selecting 
providers such as prime contractors and other suppliers.  The process of deciding between 
alternative providers is determined in large part by the amount of risk versus the amount of 
opportunity that each brings to the table in helping the center achieve its objectives.  The steps that 
a center needs to implement in order to make a rational selection are similar to those described in 
the earlier subsections, but with a focus on the risks and opportunities that are brought by each 
provider.  Very briefly, these steps are as follows: 
 Identify the risk and opportunity scenarios that are introduced by allocating the selected 
tasks to the provider. 
 Identify and evaluate the associated leading indicators.  
 Integrate the risk, opportunity, and leading indicator information for the provider with the 
corresponding risk, opportunity, and leading indicator information that is already in the 
OROM templates. 
 Perform the roll-up of risks and opportunities using the roll-up templates including the 
risks and opportunities introduced by the candidate provider. 
 Determine which candidate provider maximizes the likelihood of the center being able to 
achieve its objectives. 
The steps are similar to those in Figure 6-5, except that new risk and opportunities introduced by 
a new candidate provider are taken into account and the iterative process is not exercised. 
It is anticipated that more information and guidelines on the use of OROM processes to select 
between alternative providers will be developed as part of future work. 
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Figure 6-6.  Illustration of iterative process for optimizing asset distributions based on costs and current and projected values of leading indicators
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7. A Brief Overview of the Potential Integration of OROM with Agency-
Wide Capability Assessments and Program Reviews  
This section discusses how OROM in general and the OROM templates in particular can interact 
with important strategic initiatives and other agency-wide activities currently practiced within 
NASA, including the Technical Capability Assessment Team (TCAT) process, the Capability 
Leadership Model (CLM) process, and the Baseline Performance Review (BPR) process. 
7.1 Technical Capability Assessment Team (TCAT) and the Capability 
Leadership Model (CLM) 
The NASA Technical Capability Assessment Team (TCAT) was sponsored by Headquarters up 
until its conclusion in 2015 to assess technical capabilities and priorities across the agency.  Those 
capabilities were defined as a combination of workforce talent, specialized facilities and 
infrastructure, as well as unique tools and techniques.  As discussed in [23], the TCAT used an 
analytical method to determine alignment of NASA’s technical capabilities with the agency’s 
long-term strategic needs, the mission directorates’ near-term needs, and the centers’ identity and 
values.  The purpose of the TCAT was to establish a more efficient operating model that maintains 
a minimum set of technical capabilities to meet current and future mission needs while 
accommodating portfolio changes that occur periodically. 
As shown on the upper-left of Figure 7-1, the TCAT approach was based on using a three- 
dimensional model that included technical capabilities as one dimension, centers as a second 
dimension, and solutions as a third dimension.  In this context, technical capabilities included all 
of the assets (equipment and facilities) and human resources (NASA workforce and contractors) 
utilized to meet NASA technical objectives.  Solutions refer to the present and future portfolio 
content (programs, projects, systems, subsystems, activities, initiatives) that results from 
decomposition and implementation of the agency’s objectives.  One of the ultimate objectives of 
the TCAT approach was to use its analytical model to assist in the right-sizing of NASA’s 
workforce and assets. 
As discussed in [24], the recent TCAT assessments at NASA on particular capabilities highlighted 
the need to address capabilities from an agency-wide perspective. As a result, NASA senior 
management has adopted a Capability Leadership Model (CLM).  The intent of that model is to 
strategically address how to build a strong foundation to support NASA missions; advance 
capabilities intrinsic to NASA to meet long-term needs; optimize deployment of capabilities across 
centers; transition capabilities from government to the private sector; and eliminate capabilities 
when appropriate.  In particular, the model approach targets those capabilities that need (a) greater 
coordination and alignment across mission directorates and centers, and (b) an integrated strategy 
toward advancement for future agency objectives. 
The current CLM approach at NASA is based on a designated capability leader being assigned for 
each of 19 technical disciplines and 6 research areas.  They are collectively referred to here as the 
CLM team.  Their responsibilities are to advise various management councils of the agency in 
various areas such as helping to ensure proper alignment of capabilities across missions and 
centers, establish tasking plans based on executive-level roadmaps and strategic needs, determine 
118 
 
 
 
Figure 7-1.  Relationship between the TCAT process and the Objectives Interface and Influence 
Template (Part 1 of 2) 
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Figure 7-1.  (Part 2 of 2) 
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gap areas for advancement and strategic investment, advise on capability sizing and strategic hiring 
across all centers, assess opportunities for capability investments and divestments, solicit 
innovative ideas from other capability areas related to themes that are common among them, and 
establish standards and specifications. 
There appear to be two ways in which the OROM approach described in this report can interact 
synergistically with the CLM/TCAT approach.  One involves a transfer of information from the 
CLM team to the OROM team, and the other involves a transfer of information in the opposite 
direction.  Specifically, what CLM can provide to OROM is an understanding of all the interfaces 
that exist between the centers’ institutional initiatives, the centers’ mission support activities, the 
mission directorates’ programs and projects, and the agency’s strategic objectives.  Conversely, 
what the OROM team can provide to the CLM team is an assessment of how risks and 
opportunities contribute to the right-sizing of the workforce and other assets.  
The first interaction, from CLM/TCAT to OROM, is illustrated in Figure 7-1, and in particular by 
the arrow connecting the left side of the figure to the right side.  In its role of mapping NASA’s 
present and future technical capabilities with each center and with each solution, the CLM team 
members are in a unique position to ascertain a complete definition of the interfaces that exist 
between the centers’ institutional initiatives, the centers’ mission support activities, the mission 
directorates’ programs and projects, and the agency’s strategic objectives.  The lower right part of 
Figure 7-1 illustrates how this information could assist the OROM team in constructing its 
Objectives Interface and Influence Template. 
The second interaction, from OROM to CLM/TCAT, is illustrated in Figure 7-2, which shows how 
the two processes may interact with respect to the right-sizing of human and physical assets.  While 
it may appear at first glance that the OROM role in optimizing the development, allocation, and 
retiring of these resources, as described in Section 6.3.6, is duplicative of the CLM intent to right-
size NASA’s workforce and assets, the two are more complementary than duplicative.  The OROM 
focus is on incorporating a means for balancing risks and opportunities into the right-sizing 
process, a focus that is unique to OROM.  The service that OROM can provide to CLM, in this 
regard, is an accounting of the uncertainty associated with possible future events.  It is hardly 
arguable that the planning for future workforce and other assets should include a reasonable 
assessment of the uncertainties reflected in risks and opportunities, and therefore, OROM should 
be an essential part of this CLM function. 
7.2 Baseline Performance Review (BPR)  
The Baseline Performance Review (BPR) is NASA’s monthly senior performance management 
review of programs, projects, and activities.  Its intentions are to integrate agency-wide 
communication of performance metrics and analysis results, to highlight cross-cutting issues that 
impact performance and affect risk, and to enable senior management to quickly address issues.  
The BPR also meets requirements for quarterly progress reviews contained in the Government 
Performance and Results Act: Modernization Act (GPRAMA). 
In its present form, the BPR tends to concentrate on current issues much more than risks (potential 
future problems) and accordingly it tends to have a shorter-term focus than the TCAT initiatives.  
As stated in [25], “the BPR is the culmination of all of the agency’s regular business rhythm 
performance monitoring activities, providing ongoing performance assessment between key 
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decision points.  Within the NASA governance model, the BPR is distinct from the decision-
making Strategic Management, Program Management, and Mission Support Councils, [and] is 
‘action-oriented’ to improve performance and inform agency decision authorities of issues needing 
attention.” 
OROM tends to have a longer-term focus than the BPR, but there is also a component of it that 
deals with short-term performance objectives, as measured by success or failure in achieving 
“annual performance goals” (see Section 4.1.1).  Therefore, the relevance of OROM to BPR in its 
present form is mainly limited to short-term performance.  Of course, the BPR could, in the future, 
undergo a change to a longer-term, more strategic performance evaluation perspective.  If that 
were the case, the interfaces between OROM and BPR would have a larger scope.  
Within this more tactical approach to performance evaluation, there are areas where OROM and 
BPR can interface.  As shown on the left side of Figure 7-3 and discussed in [26], the activities of 
the BPR process include information gathering, both through questionnaires sent to all areas within 
NASA and through person-to-person interactions at the actual review meetings.  This information 
can help populate the OROM Risk and Opportunity Template, the Leading Indicator Evaluation 
Template, and the Risk and Opportunity Roll-Up Templates, as shown on the right side of the 
figure.  The usefulness to OROM could be increased substantially, however, if the questions 
addressed were extended so as to solicit information not only about the nature and status of issues 
perceived by each organizational unit, as is presently done, but also about the identification, 
characterization, and status of leading indicators.  Most importantly, information about existing 
margins within each mission execution domain (cost, schedule, technical, and safety) and their 
trends over time would be valuable to the OROM process. 
It is also likely that OROM could provide useful information to the BPR process in the area of 
aggregating the assessment from program/project level to directorate and center levels.  As 
discussed throughout this report, the OROM process can be exercised both for the agency as a 
whole and also for individual entities within the agency.  As shown in Figure 7-4, the OROM Risk 
and Opportunity Roll-Up Templates and High-Level Display Template, when exercised at the 
directorate and center levels, lead to rankings of the likelihood of success in achieving each top 
objective of each directorate and center.  These rankings could provide useful information to the 
BPR in its attempt to provide an “assessment aggregate roll-up” for each directorate.  The same 
could be done for centers, if the BPR process were to seek an assessment aggregation for centers, 
and for the agency as a whole.   
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Figure 7-2.  Relationship between OROM risk-and-opportunity-based asset optimization process 
and TCAT asset right-sizing objective (Part 1 of 2) 
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Figure 7-2.  (Part 2 of 2) 
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Figure 7-3.  Relationship between the BPR information gathering processes and the populating of 
various OROM templates (Part 1 of 2)  
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Figure 7-3.  (Part 2 of 2)  
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Figure 7-4.  Relationship between the Risk and Opportunity Roll-Up and High-Level Display 
Templates and the BPR assessment aggregation process (Part 1 of 2)  
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Figure 7-4.  (Part 2 of 2) 
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8. Examples of the Use of OROM Results for Informing Risk 
Acceptance Decisions 
8.1 Overview 
The purpose of Section 8 is to demonstrate how OROM can help inform risk acceptance decisions 
at key decision points for programs and projects that serve multiple strategic objectives.  Such 
objectives (and the associated performance requirements) may span multiple mission execution 
domains (e.g., safety, technical, cost, and schedule) as well as multiple government or other 
stakeholder priorities (e.g., tech transfer, equal opportunity, legal indemnity, and good public 
relations).  Since the risks of not meeting the top-level program/project objectives may imply risks 
of not meeting the organization’s strategic objectives, risk acceptance decisions at the 
program/project level have to include consideration of organization-wide risk and opportunity 
management.   
The example pursued in this section is based on the Department of Defense’s Ground-Based 
Midcourse Defense (GMD) program as it existed in an earlier timeframe (about 13 years ago).  In 
the time that has passed since then, a significant body of information about the GMD program has 
become available to the public through openly published reviews performed by the Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) and the DoD Inspector General (IG).  One of the advantages of using 
the GMD program as an example is that the information needed to pursue it is comprehensively 
reported and available in the open literature. 
Although this example is not from NASA, it provides lessons that are directly relevant to many of 
NASA’s programs that involve risk and opportunity tradeoffs across multiple objectives.  This is 
particularly true, for example, for the NASA Commercial Crew Transportation (CCT) program.  
Apart from the obvious differences in the mission objectives (one being space exploration, the 
other being defense against missiles), they share the following competing goals: 
1. Develop an operational capability quickly. 
2. Make the system safe and reliable. 
3. Keep costs within budget. 
4. Develop partnerships with commercial companies. 
5. Maintain public support. 
However, in one case (CCT), the plan for achievement of the mission objective emphasizes the 
second goal (safety and reliability) whereas in the other case (GMD), the plan emphasizes the first 
goal (rapid deployment).  Taken together, they represent an interesting study of the importance of 
OROM in helping the decision maker to reach a risk acceptance decision that reflects his or her 
preference for one goal without neglecting the other goals. 
8.2 Example: DoD Ground-based Midcourse Missile Defense in the 2002 
Timeframe 
The GMD program was initiated in the early 1980s by the Reagan Administration under a different 
name, and is now managed by the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) under DoD.    It is a system-
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of-systems designed to intercept and destroy enemy ballistic missiles during ballistic flight in the 
exoatmosphere after powered ascent and prior to reentry.  The individual systems within the 
system-of-systems include ground and sea-based radars; battle management command, control, 
and communication (BMC3) systems; ground-based interceptor (GBI) boost vehicles; and 
exoatmospheric kill vehicles (EKVs).  The main providers of these systems are Raytheon, 
Northrop Grumman, and Orbital Sciences, and the prime contractor is Boeing Defense, Space & 
Security.  The program is now projected to cost $40 billion by 2017 [27], a sharp escalation from 
its initial cost estimate of $16-19 billion [28]. 
In 2002, in an effort to achieve the rapid deployment goals of the George W. Bush Administration, 
the Secretary of Defense exempted MDA from following the Pentagon’s normal rules for acquiring 
a weapons system [29].  The upshot, according to the DoD Inspector General (IG) [30], was that 
the EKV did not go through the milestone decision review process and product development phase.  
These activities are normally mandated “to carefully assess a program’s readiness to proceed to 
the next acquisition phase and to make a sound investment decision committing the DoD’s 
financial resources.”  For the product development phase, the program is assessed “to ensure that 
the product design is stable, manufacturing processes are controlled, and the product can perform 
in the intended operational environment.”  As a result of waiving these processes for the GMD 
system, according to the IG, “the EKV prototype was forced into operational capability” before it 
was ready.  Furthermore, according to the IG, “a combination of cost constraints and failure-driven 
program restructures has kept the program in a state of change.  Schedule and cost priorities drove 
a culture of ‘use-as-is’ leaving the EKV as a manufacturing challenge.” 
Complicating the decision to suspend standard review and verification practices, the program was 
already subject to a variety of quality management deficiencies.  Before and after that decision 
was announced, concerns had been expressed by the GAO [31] about quality management within 
a number of DoD programs, including the GMD program.  These concerns included 
nonconformances, insufficient systems engineering discipline, insufficient oversight of the prime 
contractor activities, and relying on subtier suppliers to self-report without effective oversight.  
These deficiencies, among others cited by GAO, led to the installation of defective parts, ultimately 
resulting in substantial increases in both schedule and cost. 
The decision to proceed to deployment with an unproven EKV was made because of the primacy 
of Objective 1 at the time the decision was made.  The operating assumption was that the system 
could be deployed in a prototype form and later retrofitted as needed to achieve reliability goals. 
For this example, the principal objective of the program is to rapidly achieve a robust, reliable, and 
cost-effective operating GMD system.  The following three contributing objectives apply: 
 Objective 1.1:  Rapidly deploy a robust operational GMD system.  In this context, the term 
“robust” implies a system that is able to withstand any credible environment to which it 
may be exposed prior to launch, during launch, and during intercept. 
 Objective 1.2:  Rapidly achieve a reliable operating GMD system.  The term “reliable” 
refers to the ability of the system to identify, intercept, and destroy its targets with a high 
probability of success. 
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 Objective 1.3: Achieve a cost-effective operating GMD system.  The term “cost effective” 
refers to the ability to deploy and maintain a robust operational system and achieve 
consistently high reliability within the established funding limits for the program. 
8.3 Relevance of the Example to the NASA Commercial Crew Transportation 
Program 
The objective of the CCT program is to develop the capability to use a commercially provided 
system to transport crew to low-earth orbit, including to the International Space Station (ISS).  This 
objective has faced several challenges over the past two or three years.  As stated by Administrator 
Bolden in 2013 [32], “Because the funding for the President's plan has been significantly reduced, 
we now won’t be able to support American launches until 2017. Even this delayed availability will 
be in question if Congress does not fully support the President's fiscal year 2014 request for our 
Commercial Crew Program, forcing us once again to extend our contract with the Russians.”  
Clearly, while safety and reliability has always been a priority at NASA, the Administrator was 
concerned about the problem of having to be dependent on the Russians for transport capability 
for longer than necessary, while facing budget cuts that could prolong the problem. 
Before a system can be developed and American launches can occur, it is necessary for there to be 
a stable set of certification requirements, including engineering standards, required tests, analyses, 
and protocols for verification and validation.  The development and implementation of these 
requirements entails a number of steps: 
 Consultation between NASA and the providers leading to an agreement on the 
requirements to be implemented 
 Review of the set of requirements by the NASA technical authorities and by independent 
review groups, such as the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP) 
 Approval of the set of requirements by the NASA approval authority 
 Implementation by the providers 
 Formulation of a case by the providers that the requirements have been implemented 
correctly and successfully 
 Review of the case by the technical authorities and independent review groups 
 Approval of the implementation by the NASA approval authority 
It is noteworthy that at its quarterly meeting with NASA on July 23, 2015, ASAP was highly 
supportive of the efforts of the CCT Program (also referred to as the Commercial Crew Program, 
or CCP) in executing its responsibilities, while being cognizant of the challenges.  Quoting from 
[33]:  “This Program has all the challenges inherent in any space program; it is technically hard. 
In addition, it has the challenge of working under a new and untried business model—engaging 
with two commercial partners with widely varying corporate and development cultures, each 
bringing unique advantages and opportunities and each presenting differing aspects to be wrestled 
with. This challenge is compounded by budget and schedule pressures, appropriation uncertainties, 
the desire to remove crew transportation to the ISS from dependency on Russian transportation as 
soon as possible, and the fixed-price contract environment.  Given all of these challenges, the Panel 
sees considerable risk ahead for the CCP.  Fortunately, competent and clear-headed professionals 
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(in whom the Panel has great confidence) are dealing with these risks.  However, the risks will 
only increase over time and test the skills at all management levels.” 
The principal objective of the CCT program may be considered to be the rapid achievement of a 
certified, operational CCT capability within reasonable cost.  For this example, that top objective 
(denoted as Objective 1) may be subdivided into the following three contributing objectives: 
 Objective 1.1: Develop, review, and approve a set of CCT certification requirements within 
a designated near-term timeframe (e.g., by 2015 or 2016). 
 Objective 1.2: Develop and build an operational certified CCT system within a designated 
near-term timeframe (e.g., by 2017 or 2018). 
 Objective 1.3: Achieve a CCT system and perform a designated number of flights within a 
designated cost (e.g., the amount of funding expected from Congress). 
The similarity between these programmatic objectives and those in Section 8.2 for the GMD 
example is evident.  Therefore, the role that OROM can play in assisting risk acceptance decision 
making for the CCT program should be similar to the role outlined for the GMD program in the 
following subsections. 
8.4 Example Details 
8.4.1 Risk Tolerances and Risk Parity 
Restating one of the main themes of this report, the framework for OROM calls for factoring risk 
tolerance into the analysis processes that accompany the development of requirements.  To avoid 
imbalance between the competing goals that will later be regretted, it is necessary for there to be 
a process for eliciting the decision maker’s risk tolerances in an objective, rational manner, and 
incorporating these tolerances into the evaluation of the plan.  As discussed in Sections 4.3.1, 4.3.2, 
and 4.5.1, risk tolerance may be accounted for through the development of the following OROM-
generated items: 
 Risk parity statements 
 Risk watch and response boundaries 
 Leading indicator watch and response triggers 
Risk parity statements are elicited from the decision maker.  Each risk parity statement reflects a 
common level of pain from the decision maker’s perspective.  Thus, each reflects the decision 
maker’s view of an even tradeoff between objectives. 
The objectives for this example and a suggested format for a cumulative risk parity table are 
illustrated in Figure 8-1.  The following statements of cumulative risk, taken from the table in 
Figure 8-1, are parity statements because each of them corresponds to the same level of discomfort 
(i.e., rank 2): 
 Risk Parity Statement 1 (Discomfort Level 2):  We are 50% confident that it will take no 
more than X1 months to complete initial deployment of the system. 
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 Risk Parity Statement 2 (Discomfort Level 2):  We are 80% confident that it will take no 
more than X2 months to complete initial deployment of the system. 
 Risk Parity Statement 3 (Discomfort Level 2):  We are 50% confident that it will take no 
more than X3 months before the system is 80% reliable. 
 Risk Parity Statement 4 (Discomfort Level 2):  We are 80% confident that it will take no 
more than X4 months before the system is 80% reliable. 
 
Figure 8-1.  Objectives and hypothetical cumulative risk parity table for GMD example 
 Risk Parity Statement 5 (Discomfort Level 2):  We are 50% confident that the total cost to 
deploy the system and achieve 80% reliability will be no more than $Y1 billion. 
 Risk Parity Statement 6 (Discomfort Level 2):  We are 80% confident that the total cost to 
deploy the system and achieve 80% reliability will be no more than $Y2 billion. 
Similarly, the following parity statements also evolve from the table in Figure 8-1 and have a rank 
4 level of discomfort: 
 Risk Parity Statement 1 (Discomfort Level 4):  We are 50% confident that it will take no 
more than X5 months to complete initial deployment of the system. 
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 Etc. 
The first set of parity statements at rank 2 discomfort constitute watch boundaries for the 
cumulative risk, and the second set at rank 4 constitute response boundaries. 
8.4.2 Risks and Leading Indicators 
Based on the information provided in Section 8.2 for the GMD program, two risk scenarios suggest 
themselves.  The first emanates from quality management control concerns in the 2002 timeframe 
and affects all three objectives:  rapid deployment, reliability attainment, and cost effectiveness.  
The second results from the suspension of standard controls, combined with the challenging nature 
of kinetic intercept at hypersonic speeds, and affects the latter two objectives. 
Example risk scenario statements and corresponding example leading indicators are shown in 
Figure 8-2.  The leading indicators for each risk are representative of the sources of concern cited 
by GAO and by the DoD IG, as summarized in Section 8.2.  Those listed for the first risk scenario 
in Figure 8-2 are based on the following observation provided in [34]: 
“Quality management system deficiencies identified by GAO and DoD OIG reports include:  
• Inconsistent process review at key decision points across programs,  
• Quality metrics not consolidated in a manner that helps decision makers identify and 
evaluate systemic quality problems,  
• Insufficient workforce knowledge,  
• Inadequate resources to provide sufficient oversight, and  
• Ineffective supplier oversight.” 
Those listed for the second risk scenario are based on technology readiness level (TRL) and 
experience from other programs and projects, which can serve as an indicator of potential future 
problems for the present program.  These indicators pertain to the principal factors that have tended 
to produce reliability, schedule, or cost impacts and UU risks for complex programs. 
8.4.3 Leading Indicator Trigger Values 
Parity between cumulative risks can be stated in terms of parity between leading indicators.  As 
discussed in Section 4.5, trigger values for leading indicators of risk are developed by the OROM 
analysts and are used to signal when a risk is reaching a risk tolerance boundary that was 
established by a decision maker.  When there are many leading indicators, as is typically the case, 
various combinations of the leading indicators are formulated to act as surrogates for the 
cumulative risks.  These combinations were referred to as composite leading indicators in Section 
5.6.4. 
To simplify this example, we combine the leading indicators in Figure 8-3 into three composite 
indicators, as follows: 
 Composite indicator A, termed “Quality Management Ranking”: A composite of leading 
indicators 1 through 8 with a ranking scale of 1 to 5. 
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Figure 8-2.  Risks and leading indicators for GMD example (2002 timeframe) 
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 Composite indicator B, termed “Technology Readiness Ranking”: A composite of 
leading indicators 9 through 11 with a ranking scale of 1 to 5. 
 Composite indicator C, termed “Previous Success Ranking”: A composite of leading 
indicators 12 through 14 with a ranking scale of 1 to 5. 
It is assumed that as a part of the OROM analysis, formulas have been derived for combining the 
14 leading indicators in Figure 8-2 into these three composite indicators, but these formulas are 
left unstated for purposes of this example.  
Figure 8-3 illustrates how parity statements for composite leading indicators may substitute for 
parity statements for cumulative risks.  The lower table in the figure leads to the following leading 
indicator parity statements corresponding to watch triggers (level of discomfort rank 2): 
 Leading Indicator Parity Statement 1 (Discomfort Level 2):  The watch boundary for the 
time to complete initial deployment of the system is consistent with a value of 1.5 for the 
quality management composite indicator. 
 Leading Indicator Parity Statement 2 (Discomfort Level 2):  The watch boundary for the 
time to reach 80% system reliability is consistent with a value of 4.0 for the quality 
management composite indicator. 
 Leading Indicator Parity Statement 3 (Discomfort Level 2):  The watch boundary for the 
time to reach 80% system reliability is consistent with a value of 4.0 for the technology 
readiness composite indicator. 
 Leading Indicator Parity Statement 4 (Discomfort Level 2):  The watch boundary for the 
time to reach 80% system reliability is consistent with a value of 4.0 for the previous 
success composite indicator. 
 Leading Indicator Parity Statement 5 (Discomfort Level 2):  The watch boundary for the 
cost to complete the program is consistent with a value of 3.5 for the quality management 
composite indicator. 
 Leading Indicator Parity Statement 6 (Discomfort Level 2):  The watch boundary for the 
cost to complete the program is consistent with a value of 3.5 for the technology readiness 
composite indicator. 
 Leading Indicator Parity Statement 7 (Discomfort Level 2):  The watch boundary for the 
cost to complete the program is consistent with a value of 3.5 for the previous success 
composite indicator. 
Similar leading indicator parity statements evolve for level of discomfort rank 4: 
 Leading Indicator Parity Statement 1 (Discomfort Level 4):  The response boundary for the 
time to complete initial deployment of the system is consistent with a value of 1.0 for the 
quality management composite indicator. 
 Etc. 
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Figure 8-3. Hypothetical composite leading indicator parity table for GMD example 
The trigger values in the leading indicator parity table indicate that quality management is less of 
a concern for the objective of rapidly deploying a robust operating system than for the objectives 
of rapidly achieving a reliable operating system and of completing the project in a cost-effective 
manner.  Thus, a quality management watch trigger value of 1.5 is posited to be adequate for 
achieving rapid deployment, whereas corresponding technology readiness and previous success 
watch trigger values of 4.0 are needed to rapidly achieve reliability goals.  Furthermore, only 
slightly lower values are needed to keep operating costs down.  These entries reflect the fact that 
the deployment plan calls for bypassing most obstacles that would normally impede early 
deployment (including quality management provisions such as milestone decision reviews), 
whereas quality management issues not addressed prior to deployment could create substantial 
risks after deployment.  The above discussion, and any other pertinent observations, would 
normally be included as rationale in the last column of the table. 
8.4.4 Example Template Entries and Results 
Having developed risk scenario statements for each objective, the associated leading indicators, 
and the associated parity statements, it is now possible to develop templates similar to those in 
Sections 5.5 through 5.7 to complete the analysis.  For example, Tables 8-1 and 8-2 show, 
respectively, how the Leading Indicator Evaluation Template and the High-Level Display 
Template might appear for the GMD example, based on the information provided in the preceding 
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subsections.  The results indicate that there was (in 2002) significant risk after deployment owing 
to the combination of quality management deficiencies, flight test failures for predecessor systems, 
the complexity of the EKV system, and the probable need for a substantial number of retrofits. 
Table 8-1.  Leading Indicator Evaluation Template for GMD example (2002 timeframe) 
 
Table 8-2.  High-Level Display Template for GMD example (2002 timeframe) 
 
While hypothetical, the example results are consistent with the decision maker’s belief that in 
addition to early deployment, long-term reliability and cost effectiveness are important objectives.  
To put it another way, the decision maker’s parity statements are the main determinant of the 
outcome. 
8.5 Implications for Risk Acceptance Decision Making 
Results such as those in Table 8-2, based on the decision maker’s risk tolerances, would seem to 
indicate that the aggregate risks for two of the three objectives are intolerable and that the program 
should probably not proceed as currently formulated.  The results also indicate the principal 
sources (drivers) of the risks and the corrective actions (suggested responses) that would tend to 
make the intolerable risks more tolerable.  The principal risk driver in the case of the GMD 
example would be the decision to exempt the managing organization from following certain 
standards and rules, including the verification and validation processes normally followed prior to 
deployment of a system.  Inadequate qualification testing for the integrated system and lack of 
milestone reviews are two of the principal issues to be addressed by corrective action. 
The next step would be to assess the aggregate risks for all three objectives assuming the corrective 
actions were implemented.  If such evaluation indicated that none of the aggregate risks remained 
red (as, for example, in Table 8-3), a logical decision might be to request aniteration from the 
prime contractor and reschedule the key decision point to a later date. 
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Table 8-3.  High-Level Display Template for GMD example after adopting corrective actions that 
balance the risks to the top-level objectives 
 
Overall, achievement of a balance between the competing objectives of timeliness, safety/ 
reliability, and cost requires an honest appraisal of the decision maker’s tolerances in each area.  
As the 2002-timeframe GMD example shows, it is easy for risk acceptance decisions to be made 
based on what is perceived to be the most pressing objective at the time without considering the 
longer-term objectives that will become more pressing in the future.  The use of OROM guards 
against this tendency, thereby making today’s decisions more inclusive of short-term, mid-term, 
and long-term needs. 
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Appendix A. 
Administrator’s Letter to NASA Employees, April 19, 2013 
NASA and the Importance of Risk  
 
NASA has achieved great things for our nation by embracing bold challenges while managing the risks to 
the things we build, and the people who test and put them to use.     While we are never pleased when 
things go wrong, throughout our history NASA’s explorer spirit has led us deeper into the unknown where 
we continue to learn as much from our failures as our successes.  One of the things that impress me most 
about our workforce is the willingness of so many to dream big, think outside the box, and take risks.  In 
fact, a major reason behind NASA’s ranking as the best place to work in government is our first place 
ranking in the category of leadership and employee empowerment.  Your vision, expertise, and courage to 
take risks are what set this agency apart.  Whether you are part of the team that helped land Curiosity on 
Mars, or are assembling the parts to the next generation spacecraft…whether you are reaching out to the 
public through education and social media or working in a field office, your ideas, ingenuity, and initiative 
are keeping NASA in the forefront of exploration and innovation.     
 
Much of the time, we work in an environment where the consequences of not getting things exactly right 
are very high.  The good news is that our processes and culture are well adapted to doing these things very 
well.  We must not lose that.  Human spaceflight and flagship science missions can sometimes be a 
dangerous business.  But, as I have said before, when you do stuff that nobody else has ever done, you 
have to be willing to accept risk.  We have to be willing to do daring things.  Put another way, risk 
intolerance is a guarantee of failure to accomplish anything of significance. 
 
Discovery has and will continue to be our guiding star!  One of our significant lines of business is 
inventing and demonstrating new technologies, tools, and techniques that will allow our nation to lead 
humanity outward from our planet, and do so sustainably, more effectively, and often at lower cost.  We 
may not always know the ideal path to the objective when we take the first steps, but as long as we move 
forward intelligently, keep our people safe, and back each other up we will be able to adjust as we go along 
and make faster progress toward the objectives.   
 
Let me give you an example of what I mean.  Most of you have heard of the Morpheus Project.  This small 
project was formulated at JSC as a way to develop, understand, and demonstrate some new technologies 
and to build the capabilities of our work force in a rapid engineering cycle environment – in the 
vernacular, learn fast, fail forward.  I am sure some might think of Morpheus as a failure since a 
significant piece of hardware crashed and burned while under test.  Contrary to this view, I regard 
Morpheus as a success and here is why: 
 
 From the beginning, the team worked to an aggressive, but thoughtful plan to move forward and 
learn fast.    
 They accomplished a lot and learned a lot in a short time without much money.   
 After many successes (and a few failures) they lost the test vehicle during a flight.   
 The Morpheus test vehicle could have been built with more fault tolerance so that it wouldn’t have 
crashed, but doing so would have required a much more complex system design and a longer 
build and test process and would have slowed the pace of learning.  
 An increased risk of losing hardware was the price paid to learn fast.   
 
All that said, the team did a good job of planning for the safety of their people so that when the worst did 
happen, no one was hurt.  As a learning organization, I think we reacted properly to the crash.  The team 
had identified and accepted the loss of vehicle risk and no one was pilloried for the loss.  The center 
leadership moved quickly to establish an engineering investigation to understand what happened and to 
learn from it.   At the agency level, we let it be known that we endorsed that approach and would not 
convene a formal mishap investigation.  No one likes to lose equipment, but we recognized that failure is 
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part of the price of learning and acted accordingly.  As long as we ensure that our people are protected we 
can manage and tolerate failures as part of the price of progress.       
 
Morpheus is but one case in point.  As we prepare to undertake the many challenges offered in the 
President’s 2014 budget for our agency, I ask you to continue to think about how we can identify and seize 
opportunities to make progress quickly and affordably, identify and manage risks, learn fast and adapt 
our plans to take the next steps.  While we do this, we must constantly balance our risks and rewards and 
always, always put the lives and safety of our people first. 
 
Charlie B.  
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Appendix B.  Acronyms 
AoA  Analysis of Alternatives 
BPR  Baseline Performance Review 
CLM  Capability Leadership Model 
COSO  Committee of Sponsoring Organizations  
CRM  Continuous Risk Management 
EP  Equivalent Person  
EXT  External 
GAO  Government Accountability Office 
GPRAMA Government Performance and Results Act Modernization Act 
HST  Hubble Space Telescope 
IG  Inspector General 
INT  Internal 
IR  Infrared 
IRM  Institutional Risk Management 
ISS  International Space Station 
ITAR  International Traffic in Arms Regulations 
JPL  Jet Propulsion Laboratory 
JWST  James Webb Space Telescope 
OMB  Office of Management and Budget 
OROM Organizational Risk and Opportunity Management 
P(LOM) Probability of Loss of Mission 
PRA  Probabilistic Risk Assessment 
RIDM  Risk-Informed Decision Making 
RM  Risk Management 
RO  Risk and Opportunity 
SAE  Society of Automotive Engineers 
SOFIA  Stratospheric Observatory for Infrared Astronomy 
STEM  Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics 
TCAT  Technology Capability Assessment Team 
TRL  Technology Readiness Level 
UU  Unknown and/or Underappreciated 
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Appendix C.  Definitions 
Annual Performance Indicator  A desirable outcome within the agency’s objectives hierarchy 
having a timeframe of 1 year or less 
Baseline Performance Review  An internal, bottom-up assessment of how well the agency has 
performed against its strategic goals and other performance metrics, such as cost, schedule, 
contract, and technical commitments 
Continuous Risk Management  A specific process for the management of risks associated with 
implementation of designs, plans, and processes 
Cumulative Opportunity  The likelihood and benefit of being able to meet a specified element in 
the agency’s objective hierarchy more satisfactorily than originally planned, or to meet a new goal 
or objective that better promotes the agency’s mission   
Cumulative Risk  The likelihood of not being able to meet a specified element in the agency’s 
objective hierarchy, and the degree to which the element is not satisfied 
Extended Enterprise – A program, project, or coordinated activity that involves multiple partners, 
or entities, with overlapping responsibilities.  In addition to contributing to the same program/ 
project/ activity, each partner is an independent enterprise with its own set of strategic objectives 
and performance requirements. 
Extended Organization – The collection of organizational units that interact with a center.  The 
center’s extended organization includes the entities in all the extended enterprises with which the 
center interacts on program/project planning and execution, as well as other entities within or 
outside the agency that provide direction and administrative support to the center. 
Internal Controls  The set of policies and procedures that management uses to help programs, 
projects, and other activities within the organization to achieve results and safeguard the integrity 
of their operation 
Lagging Indicator  A traceable measure that is quantifiable and correlates with the past 
performance of the organization with respect to one or more of its objectives 
Leading Indicator  A traceable measure that is quantifiable, correlates as a predictor of the 
likelihood of future success of one or more of the agency’s objectives, and is actionable 
Multi-Year Performance Goal  A desirable outcome within the agency’s objectives hierarchy 
having a timeframe of 1 to 5 years (commonly referred to at NASA as simply “Performance Goal”) 
Objectives Hierarchy  A tree-like structure of desired outcomes starting at the top with long-term 
strategic goals and progressing down to short-term tactical accomplishments (commonly referred 
to at NASA as “Strategic Performance Framework”) 
Opportunity  The possibility of an existing goal, objective, or desired outcome being met more 
efficaciously, or a new goal, objective, or desired outcome becoming feasible.  
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Opportunity Scenario  A specific sequence of possible events that, if they should occur, would 
lead to an opportunity to either increase the likelihood of achieving an element in the agency’s 
objectives hierarchy or open the possibility of defining a new objective that coincides with the 
agency’s mission 
Opportunity Scenario Statement  A statement characterizing an opportunity scenario in terms of 
one or more conditions, enabling events or potential advances, affected entities, actions, benefits, 
and objectives affected 
Organizational Risk and Opportunity Management  The methods and processes used by 
organizations to manage risks and seize opportunities related to the achievement of their objectives 
Parity Statement  A statement that defines risk and opportunity boundaries in terms of equivalent 
levels of discomfort or comfort 
Performance Indicator  A type of lagging indicator that measures the efficiency and effectiveness 
of past actions with respect to accomplishing performance objectives 
Portfolio  A set of programs, projects, institutional assets, and other activities and resources that 
implement the high-level goals and objectives within the strategic plan 
Response Boundary  A measure of the likelihood and severity of a risk scenario or the likelihood 
and potential benefit of an opportunity scenario that would suggest that an action is imminently 
needed.  A risk response boundary marks the boundary between “marginal” and “intolerable” risk, 
and an opportunity response boundary marks the boundary between “marginal” and “significant” 
opportunity. 
Response Trigger Value  A measure of a leading indicator that would suggest that an action is 
immediately needed.  A leading indicator response trigger signals when a risk is progressing from 
“marginal” to “intolerable” or when an opportunity is progressing from “marginal” to 
“significant.”  
Risk  The possibility of a goal, objective, or desired outcome not being met. 
Risk-Informed Decision Making  The use of risk analysis results to inform the selection of 
decision alternatives and to assure effective approaches for achieving goals and objectives 
Risk Scenario  A specific concern, characterized as a sequence of possible events, that is 
perceived as presenting a risk to the ability to achieve an element of the objectives hierarchy 
Risk Scenario Statement  A statement characterizing a risk scenario in terms of one or more 
conditions, departure events, affected entities, and consequences 
Strategic Goal  A desirable strategic outcome within the agency’s objectives hierarchy having a 
timeframe of 10 years or beyond 
Strategic Objective  A desirable strategic outcome within the agency’s objectives hierarchy 
having a timeframe of 5 to 10 year or less 
Strategic Performance Evaluation  The evaluation of an organization’s performance with respect 
to the achievement of its strategic goals and objectives 
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Strategic Plan  A document used to communicate with the organization the organization’s goals 
and objectives, the actions needed to achieve them, the means for implementing those actions, and 
all of the other critical elements developed during the planning exercise 
Strategic Planning  An organization's process of defining its strategy, or direction, and making 
decisions on allocating its resources to pursue this strategy. It may also extend to control 
mechanisms for guiding the implementation of the strategy. 
Watch Boundary  A measure of the likelihood and severity of a risk scenario or the likelihood 
and potential benefit of an opportunity scenario that would suggest that an action should be 
considered but is not imminently needed.  A risk watch boundary marks the boundary between 
“tolerable” and “marginal” risk, and an opportunity watch boundary marks the boundary between 
“insignificant” and “marginal” opportunity. 
Watch Trigger Value  A measure of a leading indicator that would suggest that an action should 
be considered but is not imminently needed.  A leading indicator watch trigger signals when a risk 
is progressing from “tolerable” to “marginal” or when an opportunity is progressing from 
“insignificant” to “marginal.”  
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